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1CHAPTER I
Meteorology in 1870
Although meteorology did not exist as a separate science prior to the 
establishment of the national weather service in 1870, centuries of keen interest 
in weather and climate had already produced the necessary background for meteor­
ological theory and its practical application. While the awareness of the 
seasons, winds, and violent changes in weather were certainly known to man in all 
ages, the systematic measurement of various meteorological elements could not be 
undertaken until adequate instruments had been invented for such purposes.
An early example, the determination of wind direction ly numerous crude 
types of weather vane, can be traced to Greek accounts of the fifth century B. C., 
when parapegmata, fixed on public columns, indicated wind directions.'*' By 1870
the wind vane had been developed throughout the centuries to the model constructed
2
of pine boards and reading to eight points of the compass. Self-recording aero- 
vanes were not known to the early meteorologists of the national weather service.
Similar to the measurement of wind direction, suitable means had already 
evolved for the recording of wind movement through utilization of the Robinson 
anemometer. Force of the wind turns the four-cup, later a three-cup, instrument 
provided with an odometer on which the total movement is recorded in miles. At 
the end of any given period, the average wind velocity is determined by subtract­
ing the former total from the current reading, then dividing by the length of the 
period involved.
1 A. E. M. Geddes, Meteorology. An Introductory Treatise (London, 1921), pp. 1-2.
2 Robert DeCourcy Ward, Practical Exercises in Elementary Meteorology (Boston, 
1899), P. 15.
While the relatively simple procedures for determining wind direction am 
movement proved to be key factors in stimulating the study of past weather condi­
tions, and hence leading to the notion that future weather might be foretold, ob­
servations of temperature, precipitation, and barometric pressure were also 
necessary to correlate with wind data. Apparently the first of these major 
weather elements to become systematically recorded was precipitation, as shown by- 
rainfall records kept in India as early as 400 B. C.3 The type of rain gauge con­
sisted of a crude bowl eighteen inches in diameter. Despite the apparent lack of 
earlier records, it is quite possible that data on rainfall were collected in such 
rudimentary devices centuries earlier than the example in India. Recorded meas­
urements of rainfall in Palestine have been found covering parts of the first 
century A. D., while rain gauges of similar nature to the common non-recording 
types of later centuries were found in Korea in the fifteenth century. Additional 
examples of non-recording rain gauges were in evidence in western Europe during 
the seventeenth century, including one developed by Benedetto Castelli of Italy in 
1639. By the middle of the nineteenth century the non-recording rain gauge, of 
the type still used by the Weather Bureau, was in existence. Although experiments 
with different sized orifices were conducted, the eight-inch aperture became 
standard.
The eight-inch non-recording precipitation gauge consists of an overflow 
can, measuring tube, rainfall receiver, measuring stick, and support. The top 
portion of the receiver is of exactly eight inches inside diameter, and is pro­
vided with a funnel-shaped bottom which conducts any liquid precipitation caught 
in the receiver into the tall cylindrical measuring tube. In order to provide for
3 John C. Kurtyka, "Precipitation Measurements Study," Illinois State Water
Survey Division, Report of Investigation No. 20 (Urbana, Illinois, 1953), p. 3.
3measuring rainfall depth easily to hundredths of an inch, the measuring tube has a 
cross-section area that is one-tenth the cross-section area of the receiver. There­
fore, when one inch of rain falls into the receiver, it fills the measuring tube 
to a depth of ten inches. Accordingly, the scale of the measuring stick used with 
the tube is expanded ten times, and since the scale is graduated to hundredths of 
an inch, the correct rainfall depth of water in the tube is read directly to 
hundredths from the stick. With the rainfall receiver and the measuring tube re­
moved, the overflow can serves as a snow gauge, and is used as such in winter 
months for collecting all forms of precipitation. It is also used to cut snow 
samples for the determination of their water equivalent.^ Perhaps the crudest of 
« n  meteorological instruments, this rain gauge design has changed very little 
down to the present.
Although a multitude of different recording-type gauges have been in­
vented, the majority were never adopted for use on any widespread scale. An early 
example appeared in 1662, when the noted Sir Christopher Wren of England invented 
the self-recording, tipping-bucket rain gauge.5 Recording gauges were definitely 
in existence in the United States early in the nineteenth century. The tipping- 
bucket rain gauge was later used at first-order Weather Bureau stations starting 
in the 1890's.
The underlying principle of the tipping—bucket gauge is to determine the 
time and amounts of rainfall. Precipitation dropping through a small opening over­
turns a small, bucket-type container which simultaneously forces a metal arm to
4 Weather Bureau, "Instructions for Climatological Observers," Circular B (tenth 
edition, Washington, D. C., 1952), p. 19.
5 Kurtyka, "Precipitation," p. 3.
Arise for each hundredth of an inch of rainfall. The measurements are recorded on 
a clock-driven drum equipped with a chart denoting the time. The amount of rain­
fall is determined by totaling the number of identical vertical marks recorded on 
the chart.
In addition to the tipping-bucket automatic gauge, various forms of 
weighing-type recorders had also been invented. The Weather Bureau did not use 
this type of gauge generally until the 1930's. The weighing-type recording gauge 
is designed to determine the rate of fall as well as the depth of precipitation. 
It consists of a receiver of exactly eight inches inside diameter through which 
precipitation is funneled into a bucket mounted on a weighing mechanism. The 
weight of the catch is recorded by a pen-arm on a clock-driven chart as inches of 
precipitation. Clock cylinders usually are furnished with gears that rotate the 
cylinder one revolution in twenty-four hours. Most of the recording gauges will 
record up to twelve inches of precipitation, but the capacity of a few is limited 
to six or nine inches.^
Meteorologists soon realized a limitation of recording gauges because 
freezing conditions reduce their value in so fair as the determination of the time 
element is concerned. Frozen precipitation could not be recorded when coated on 
the top of the gauge.
In atddition, by 1870 there also prevailed a general knowledge about 
proper exposure of rain gauges for optimum results. If a gauge is erected near 
a building it is liable to be affected by eddies or currents of air causing more 
rain to fell on one side of the building than on the other. The most suitable 
place for a rain gauge is in an open field remote from all obstructions. Dif­
ferent heights also cause a different catch of precipitation in the same general
6 Kurtyka, "Precipitation," p. 22.
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5vicinity. Higher wind speeds with increasing altitude decrease the amount of 
precipitation collected. Later establishment of roof-top rain gauges by the 
United States Weather Bureau did not follow these suggestions in regard to ex­
posure.
While precipitation measurement evolved in this fashion, the adequate 
recording of other weather elements resulted from the seventeenth century scien­
tific mind, when both the thermometer and barometer were perfected. Several 
thermometers were produced by such famous men of science as Galileo Galilei of 
Italy at the start of the century and Daniel Gabriel Fahrenheit of Danzig one 
hundred years later.^ Galileo invented first a water thermometer and then an 
alcohol thermometer, while Fahrenheit used mercury for improved accuracy. Francis 
Bacon mentioned the term thermoscope in 1620. During the same century Evangelista 
Torricelli, an Italian student of Galileo, perfected a crude mercury barometer 
while experimenting with water pressure. The instrument was soon utilized to 
enable scientists to weigh the atmosphere. When mercury began to be employed, 
the barometer assumed the form that has since become standard. By the middle
and late portions of the seventeenth century, these instruments were in fairly
8
common use, as is shown by the diary of Samuel Pepys. Pepys referred to both 
the barometer and thermometer as "types of weather glass, but specifically 
mentioned the thermometer as the one to determine heat and cold.
Further refinement of the thermometer involved devices for recording 
maximum and minimum temperatures, invented in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century. The maximum thermometer of the liquid-in-glass type has a mercury-filled
7 Ward, Practical Exercises, p. 12.
8 Henry B. Wheatley, ed.. The Diary of Samuel Pepys, eight vols. (London, 1904.), 
vol. 3, P. 70; vol. 2, p 7 l2 jT ~ ^
6bulb or sensing element, and is exposed in a nearly horizontal position. The 
bore is constricted between the bulb and the graduated portion of the stem. As 
the temperature rises, a portion of the expanding mercury in the bulb is forced to 
pass through the constricted portion of the bore into the graduated portion. When­
ever the temperature falls, the column of mercury remains in the graduated portion, 
so that when the thermometer is lowered to a reading position, the top of the 
column of mercury indicates the highest temperature reached. The maximum ther­
mometer is reset to the current temperature by whirling it, which forces the 
mercury to retreat.
The minimum thermometer of the liquid-in-glass type has an alcohol-
filled bulb, and is also exposed in a nearly horizontal position. The alcohol is
often colored to facilitate reading. The bore of the thermometer contains a dark,
dumbbell-shaped piece of glass called an index. Cooling of the thermometer causes
the alcohol to retreat, and at the same time force the index back toward the bulb.
As the temperature rises, the alcohol expands and flows around the index without
displacing it. When this occurs, the alcohol column moves toward the top of the
bore without moving the index, thereby leaving the index to indicate the lowest
temperature reached since the last observation. By turning the thermometer bulb
up, the index is moved to the current level of the alcohol, or the present 
o
temperature.
Besides the invention of various thermometers, technological development 
provided for the measurement of relative humidity. Relative humidity refers to 
the percentage of water vapor in the air at a given temperature, as compared to the 
maximum amount of vapor the air might contain at that same temperature. For in­
stance, with relative humidity of twenty percent, the air is considered quite dry,
9 Weather Bureau, "Instructions,” tenth edition, p. 7.
7while relative humidity of ninety-five percent indicates moist air approaching the 
saturation point. Evaporation of water from open surfaces takes place at a maxi­
mum rate when, among other conditions, relative humidity readings are lowest.
The measure of absolute humidity refers to the actual amount of water vapor 
present in the air at a given time. Dew point refers to the temperature at which 
condensation will occur.
An improvement in the science of weather resulted from the adoption of 
a means to determine dew point temperatures and relative humidity by use of the 
sling psychrometer, an instrument most fully perfected in 1868 by Dr* B. 8. Craig 
of the Office of the United States Surgeon General* Here again many earlier at­
tempts at perfection of hygrometers had been undertaken. Simple hygroscopes and 
hygrometers were used at times since the middle portion of the fifteenth 
century. ^  None of these hygrometers proved to be as effective as the psychrom­
eter, which still remains as the most accurate means of determining current 
temperature and humidity data at the surface level* Before 1870 meteorologists 
realized the imperfection of the hair element already used in hygrometers*
The psychrometer generally used consists of dry-bulb and wet-bulb ther­
mometers mounted on a common back* Both thermometers are mercury-filled glass 
thermometers of identical construction. The bulb of one thermometer has a close- 
fitting cover of loosely-woven wicking, which, when wet, is adapted for use as the 
wet-bulb thermometer. When ventilated by a fan, the psychrometer is hung from a 
nail or hook on the mounting board inside the weather shelter* A fan, mounted on
10 G. von Hellmann, Neudrucke von Schriften und Karten Ueber Meteorologie und 
Erdmagnetismus (Berlin, 189757 vol. 2, No* 7, p. 13.
8the inner right side of the weather shelter, provides forced ventilation for the 
thermometers. When the psychrometer is used as a sling-type, a wooden handle and 
short length of chain provide for whirling the psychrometer by hand to ventilate 
it,11 Dry-bulb and wet-bulb temperatures are read from the dry-bulb and wet-bulb 
thermometers of a psychrometer, and the readings are used to calculate dew point 
and relative humidity. The current air temperature is the current reading of the 
dry-bulb thermometer. The wet—bulb temperature is the lowest temperature to be 
secured by evaporating water from the wick—covered temperature—sensing element. It 
differs from the dry-bulb temperature by an amount dependent on the temperature, 
relative humidity, and atmospheric pressure of the air.
While only the anemometer and recording rain gauge of the instruments 
already described provided continuous or automatic records of data, by the 1870!s 
there were a few examples of barographs and thermographs in Europe, They were 
not yet generally available in the United States, The thermograph contains a 
metallic temperature-sensing element. Response to temperature change moves a pen 
arm mechanism which traces the continuous record on a clock-driven chart. The 
barograph records in similar fashion, but differs in the sensing-elements used# 
Instead of the column of mercury, the barographs, and aneroid barometers, employ 
a metallic pressure-measuring element.
Although the various instruments of the pre-1870 variety were suited for 
observations taken at the earthfs surface, the use of kites and balloons to raise 
meteorological instruments into the upper air was certainly known and considered 
of the utmost importance to the future of weather science. For example, an ex­
perimenter in Glasgow, Scotland, succeeded in 1749 in raising a thermometer into
11 Weather Bureau, ‘’Instructions,” tenth edition, p. 39«
9to
the air by means of a kite, the first time on record of such occurrence.
Within three years the versatile Benjamin Franklin conducted his famous kite ex­
periments on electricity during a thunderstorm. In a more startling fashion the
use of manned balloons had been utilized to prove that man could become air borne
13and take simple meteorological instruments along with him. The foremost ac­
complishments came from James Glashier, who attained the height of 11,200 meters 
in 1862.
Through use of these various instruments, in addition to visual observa­
tions of other phenomena not yet accurately measured, records of climate, though 
quite general in nature, were becoming available for most of Europe and for the 
more densely populated areas of the United States. Of those individuals profes­
sing keenest knowledge of meteorology and thus collecting weather data, a great 
number came from the ranks of mathematicians, physicians, and astronomers. Aside 
from this professional interest, there were numerous inventors, statesmen, phil­
osophers, and men of less stature, who included weather observations among their 
hobbies.
In regard to specific observations, it was inevitable, that following 
the colonization undertakings to the New World after the age of discovery, men 
would realize that large storm centers travel farther than through the portions 
of merely one country. A British account states that Daniel Defoe, in speaking of 
the famous British storm of November 27, 1703, emphasized that this tempest had 
been felt several days before on the shores of America.^-
12 Geddes. Meteorology, p d. 5-6.
13 Geddes, Meteorology, pp. 10-12.
14 Nature. A Weekly Illustrated Journal of Science, vol. 31 (London, 1885), p.198#
10
This assumption that movement of storms follows generally in a west to 
east direction became more firmly established during the American colonial period, 
and most directly from the meteorological interests of Benjamin Franklin. By 
means of personal observations of wind direction and shy condition, later cor­
related with similar data from other colonial cities, which he received through 
correspondence with learned friends, Franklin soon became convinced that storms 
moved generally from the southwest on a northeasterly course. He further observed 
that such weather disturbances at Philadelphia were preceded by three to four days 
of prevailing northeast winds. This idea was a forerunner of a later visual ob­
servation technique used in order to determine the position of the nearest center 
of low pressure. In one instance Franklin was unable to observe an eclipse at
Philadelphia, while friends at Boston successfully watched the phenomenon because
1«
the storm had not yet arrived. y
Another lasting guide to meteorology, really an elaboration of Franklinfe 
earlier observation on wind direction preceding storms, originated in Holland 
around I860,with the Buys-Ballot guide to the detection of a cyclone. If you 
stand with your back to the wind in the northern hemisphere, then the low pressure 
will be on your left hand.^
Considerable refinement evolved from these early contributions on the 
movement of storms. In 1868 Elias Loomis, among others, maintained that it was
15 Ward, Practical Exercises, p. 114-, One example of Franklin’s storm movement is 
contained in a letter of July 7, 1747, to Jared Eliot, in which Franklin 
asserted that storms travel from Virginia to Connecticut, and then to Cape 
Sable in their northeasterly track.
16 Alfred J. Henry, Weather Forecasting in the United States (Washington, D. C.,
1916), p. 221.
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possible to obtain telegraphic reports on the weather from several places in the
Mississippi Valley and its tributaries, and often predict with confidence the
approach of storms twenty-four hours before they arrived at New York. Along the
Atlantic Coast of the United States the approach of a violent northeast storm was
generally indicated by the barometer rising above its mean height. At the same
time the wind prevailed from the northeast, and the atmosphere became hazy. After
the rain or snow commenced the barometer began to fall, and when the barometer
reached its lowest point, the wind changed to north or northwest after which the
barometer began to rise. While these concepts seem entirely too simple for the
modern day weather forecaster, they were the basis of forecasting in the early
days of our national weather service and hold true to some extent, to the present 
17day. Loomis also generalized that when the upper clouds moved in a direction 
different from that of the lower clouds and that of the surface wind then blowing, 
it foretold a charge of wind direction.
Knowledge of the forward movement of storms was quite incomplete unless 
supplemented by findings on the severity of storms. Meteorologists already 
looked to the barometric gradient of the cyclone to determine this factor, the 
steeper gradient indicating the more intense cyclone.1® It was generally con­
sidered that at the center of the storm the barometer sometimes fell one inch 
below its mean height, and after the storm often rose an entire inch above its 
mean height.
17 Elias Loomis, Treatise on Meteorology (New York, 1868)f pp. 14.3-144-.
18 Julius Hann, MQn the Relation Between the Difference of Pressure and the 
Velocity of the Wind According to the Theories of Ferrel and Colding," Annual 
Report of the Board of Regents of the Sfaithsonian Institution, for 1877.
vol. 32 (Washington, D. C.), p. 4-32, translated by Cleveland Abbe from 
Zeitschriften of the Austrian Meteorological Association. 1875, vol. x,
pp. 81-106.
_I:
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While changes in pressure accompanying centers of high and low pressure
had been calculated, another pressure phenomenon was also known. Through his
close personal observations of weather, James P. Epsy became familiar with the
diurnal effects on barometric pressure readings, which showed that a midday
depression of pressure was not necessarily the forewarning of an approaching
19
center of low pressure.
In addition to barometric pressure, other meteorological elements were 
also generally known by 1868. As to wind direction, although observations with 
accurate anemometers were not very numerous, yet observations with the common 
wind vane had been made to such an extent to determine, if not the velocity of 
the wind, at least its average direction for nearly every part of the world. 
Records for the Northern Hemisphere included directions from approximately 600 
land stations and periods ranging from a few months to more than half a century.
Proceeding from this and other examples of keen speculation, interest 
in meteorology continued to develop at an ever increasing rate during the 1800- 
1870 period as numerous refinements of observations followed in rapid succession. 
One of the initial examples appeared as a helpful technique for classification of 
wind speed, and is still used today with but little modification. The basis for a 
wind speed scale had been established in 1805, when Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort 
classified wind from calm to hurricane intensity. The scale in miles per hour is 
as follows:
19 James P. Epsy, The Philosophy of Storms (Boston, 1841), p. 543.
13
0-2 calm 28-34 strong breeze
3-8 light air 34-40 moderate gale
8-13 light breeze or 40—4® fresh gale
light wind 48-56 strong gale
13-18 gentle breeze 56-65 whole gale
18-23 moderate breeze 65-75 storm 2 0
23-28 fresh breeze over 75 hurricane
Curiosity in regard to the behavior of wind and its relation to temper­
ature and storms had been expressed for some time, especially by Thomas Jefferson, 
a prominent contributor to meteorology. In 1797 Jefferson informed a friend:
Before our revolution I had meant to engage some person in every county, 
give them a thermometer, to observe temperature and the winds twice each 
day for one year at sunrise and at 4*00 p.m. and to communicate these 
records to me at the end of the year. I would have made a map correlating 
winds blowing to a center within the state and how they had handled the 
analogy to temperature of the air. We might have found out some causes 
for wind directions but the war stopped us*21
While wind observations were of absolute necessity to an improved status 
of meteorology, all weather elements of the upper air provided a field hitherto 
primarily unexplored• Besides isolated instances of kite and balloon ascensions, 
there were several advancements in this category. For determining the heights 
of clouds, Epsy and Loomis each experimented with different means. Epsy employed 
a kite and sextant in one instance, but also attempted to use a crude formula 
involving dew point temperatures. He claimed correlation with the kite and sex- 
tant method to heights of 3,600 feet. On the other hand Loomis relied on ob­
servations taken at mountain observatories and the use of a barometer in manned 
balloon ascensions. Naturally both methods afforded infrequent and inadequate
20 Henry, Weather Forecasting, p. 221.
21 Edwin T. Martin, Thomas Jefferson: Scientist (New York, 1952), pp. 141-142.
22 Epsy, The Philosophy, p. 75«
Hchecks on cloud information. Observations at Mount Washington, New Hampshire, and 
Mont Blanc, Switzerland, had indicated that the high-level cirrus clouds never 
prevailed at levels as low as 16,000 feet. To measure the height of clouds while 
in a balloon, Loomis recommended use of a barometer by noting the height of the 
barometer at the instants of entering and emerging from the cloud.
Despite their limitations, mountain observations provided meteorology 
of the mid-nineteenth century with the beginnings of useful concepts. Their short­
comings included the important factor of mountain effects themselves on climate, 
which lessened the representative value of mountain-top observations.
Before the era of national weather services in Europe and this country, 
differences in temperatures between the surface and higher altitudes had been 
observed. In regard to the variation of temperature between hilltops and valleys, 
Loomis noted that plants are often killed by frost in the valleys and up to a 
certain point on the hills, above which they escape injury. It had been found 
by observation that a thermometer attached to a high tower in the valley at night 
showed the same average temperature as a thermometer on the side of a neighboring 
hill at the same level. This indicated that during a tranquil, clear night the 
air that was cooled by radiation at the surface of the earth settled in the val­
leys in consequence of its greater density, and that the warm and cold air are
23
arranged in different strata similar to liquids of different densities.
Differences in mountain and surface temperatures were determined, but 
only meager tools existed by which changes in temperature with succeeding altitudes 
or the lapse rate could be estimated. Nevertheless, manned balloon ascensions of 
the period were cited to estimate the average decrease in temperature at one
23 Loomis, Treatise, p. 94.
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degree Fahrenheit for each 300 feet of altitude, or approximately the same as 
determined later.^
While temperature differences for separate localities and at various 
altitudes proved of much later value in forecast techniques, significant advance­
ment had been accomplished in formulation of more general climatological con­
cepts, Realizing that meteorology in his day was the slowest-developing of all
sciences, Thomas Jefferson, nevertheless, expounded on popular observations of 
25climatic change. Jefferson declared that a change in climate was taking place 
very sensibly. He stated that periods of extremely high and low temperatures had 
become less frequent. Many older people advised Jefferson that there was less 
snow than in earlier years. Actually Jefferson's contemporaries, like people of 
any generation, recalled only the extremes in past weather, and attributed these 
differences to permanent changes of climate. In regard to possible causes of 
climatic change, the effect of land clearance was debated in Europe and through­
out the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
In sharp contrast to this contention of warmer winters is the data 
recorded about the summerless year of 1816, commonly called at that time 
"eighteen hundred and froze to death". Snow and ice were observed even in June, 
July and August, and blame had been laid either to sunspots or the probability 
that south winds moved the Iceland low pressure area out of position.
24 Epsy, The Philosophy, p. 450.
25 Martin, Thomas Jefferson, pp. 131-147.
26 Charles F. Talman, Our Weather. What Makes It and How to Watch It (New York, 
1922), pp. 359-360.
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Building on these early contributions, the forty years of more extensive
data compiled since Jeffersonfs death convinced Loomis that the climate of a
country remains permanently the same from age to age« The observations covering
a century for various places in the United States and Europe indicated no large
change in the mean temperatures from year to year or that of the separate months*
Loomis further surmised that climate in any of the countries had not changed ap-
07
prsciably in 2,000 years. He would have, therefore, minimized the permanency 
of the increase of three to six degrees in mean temperatures, which some meteor­
ologists claim for the United States in the last fifty years. Interestingly 
enough, the mean annual temperature for Chicago was 4-6.7 degrees compared to the 
present day 50.1 degrees. Loomis also compiled tables of average annual rainfall, 
which enabled meteorologists to compare current precipitation records with past 
normal figures, another means of considering changes in climate.
Interest in the study of past climate, in fact all weather data, in­
creased rapidly through the aid of a newly-found research technique. This major 
innovation, contributing to the vast improvement of meteorology, involved the 
introduction of the synoptic weather chart. When later modified, the synoptic 
weather chart enabled the scientist to place observation data on maps of large 
areas and yet retain the major elements of the observation clustered around each 
location from which information originated. In addition, high and low pressure 
storm centers could be drawn with the pressure, wind, and temperature data which 
define such areas. Acceptance of the synoptic chart opened a new era of interest 
in research of past storm data, at first particularly on Atlantic and Indian 
ocean storm data as collected by several early meteorologists.
27 Loomis, Treatise, p. 157-158.
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The evolution of a synoptic chart to the type similar to that utilized
since the 1870's encompassed over fifty years of intensive modification. If the
earliest of wind charts is considered, then Edmund Halley's 1686 description of
28
the trade winds must be cited. Despite the fact that these charts were later 
reproduced by the Dutch and again by the English, further significant development 
did not occur until early in the nineteenth century. The German scientist, H. W. 
Brandes, produced more elaborate examples of synoptic charts in manuscript form 
only during the 1816-1820 period, of which one example analyzed observations of a 
storm occurring in 1783.
In 1817 another noted German, Alexander von Humboldt, achieved the 
honor of publishing the first isotherm charts, showing areas of equal tempera­
tures. Apparently influenced by earlier investigations on climate by C. F.
Volney, Humboldt correlated differences in temperature with his own botanical 
29
studies. By 1821 the American scientist, William C. Hedfield, had adopted the
30synoptic chart to use in this country.
More complete in description than these pioneer contributions were the 
series of synoptic charts published over twenty years later in the United States. 
Epsy, also a pdoneer contributor to meteorological theory, arrived at his con­
clusions through synoptic analysis of storms covering the 1780-184.0 period.
For the most part his charts, issued in the 1840's, emphasized wind direction and 
velocity. However, in a detailed recapitulation of one storm Epsy also incorpor­
ated air temperature and barometric pressure data into the analysis.^1
28 Hellmann, Neudrucke. vol. 2, No. 8, p. 5.
29 Hellmann, Neudrucke. vol. 2, No. 8, p. 6.
30 Geddes, Meteorology, p. 7.
31 Epsy, The Philosophy, pp. 100, 172.
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Shortly after Epsy*s first synoptic maps appeared, further improvements 
were introduced ty Loomis, professor of mathematics at Western Reserve College 
and later at Yale University. Appearing first in I846, these charts featured not 
only temperature, barometric pressure, and wind data but also information on sky 
conditions and precipitation. To illustrate sky conditions Loomis shaded the area 
with blue for clear sky and grey for cloudy sky, while additional colors described 
the type of precipitation occurring at the time of observation.^
From the stage of development in synoptic charts attributed to Epsy 
and Loomis in this country, the next innovation of this nature occurred in 1849» 
when, both in the United States and England, scientists demonstrated the fact that 
current data as well as analysis of prior storms could be collected and described 
immediately by the synoptic weather map. The progress to this stage where the 
systematic collection of observations allowed synoptic summaries of current data 
will be described in detail in the succeeding chapter.
In the meantime, meteorologists further improved synoptic charts by 
their recent findings on the distribution of barometric pressure. Prior to 1831 
isobars for the Atlantic and Indian oceans had been drawn as parallel lines to 
the equator. Since this date there was the general realization that the former 
method had been erroneous. Likewise, before Humboldt's scientific journeys of 
the early years of the century proved otherwise, men believed that barometric 
pressure at the surface of the ocean was similar throughout the world, regardless 
of latitude.
Aiding in the use of pressure information were two examples of synoptic 
charts which sought to determine mean barometric data. In I864 Qnilien Jean 
Renou produced average pressure maps for Germany, while several years later
32 Hellmann, Neudrucke. vol. 2, No. 8, p. 7. Hellmann includes reproductions of 
the various types of early synoptic charts.
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Alexander Buchan of Scotland issued similar charts of a quite generalized nature 
covering the world.^
While the ability to observe and draw generalizations about the basic 
weather elements had progressed to its modern status by the middle of the nine­
teenth century, the theories of meteorology had likewise advanced to the extent 
that those interested were able to review past data and determine the movements 
and characteristics of prior storms. This certainly demonstrated a major evolu­
tion from the weather lore existing since primitive man and indeed not wholly 
eliminated from portions of the twentieth-century world. In theory as in design 
of instruments, the trend toward modern meteorology consumed many centuries, most 
generally from the fifth century B. C., although meteorology had later apparently 
fallen out of favor by the time of Socrates. However, the weather elements did 
not escape the keen mind of Aristotle, who formulated general theories on winds, 
which later came to be used in Europe until the end of the seventeenth century.
In 1686 the English astronomer Halley undertook a description of trade winds and 
monsoons, which was followed in 1735 by a quite general explanation showing the 
effects of the earth’s rotation on the direction of the trade winds.^ This
account by George Hadley described only north and south winds.
Now in possession of synoptic weather charts and records from many in­
dividual storms of prior years, meteorologists sought explanations for the entire 
complex patterns of weather affecting the earth. In this regard Heinrich W. Dove 
in Germany and Matthew F. Maury of the United States Navy had both explained the
33 Hellmann, Neudrucke. vol. 2, No. 8, p. 9.
34- Geddes, Meteorology, pp. 3-5.
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general circulation theory prior to mid-nineteenth century. By general circula­
tion meteorologists mean the elaborate systems of cyclones and anticyclones, 
differences of air masses, and the interactions of all these phenomena, which 
produce various types of weather. The terms cyclone and anticyclone denoting low 
and high pressure areas also first appeared earlier in the nineteenth century.^ 
The known existence of low pressure systems did not define the origin or exact 
nature of these phenomena. Because they were often accompanied by storms, the low 
pressure center was the object of primary concern from the outset, to the neglect 
of research on anticyclones. One of the early points of disagreement arose as to 
whether winds form around the storm, or low pressure center, in exact circles or
in a less circular, but still a radial arrangement. Redfield stressed the exact,
36circular arrangement, while Epsy advocated the more elliptical pattern.-' Support 
for the elliptical pattern was given By Loomis, who found storms of 1,000 miles 
in west-east diameter while the north-south axis sometimes measured over 3,000 
miles in length.
Of greater detail than the general descriptions of storm areas were the 
theories of wind and pressure formulated by William Ferrel, who was later em­
ployed for a time by the national weather service while under control of the 
Signal Corps. To Ferrel belongs the distinction of presenting conclusive evi­
dence concerning winds and their relation to centers of barometric pressure.
Ferrel elaborately described the spiral circulation of winds around both cyclones
35 Ward, Practical Exercises, p. 76.
36 Ward, Practical Exercises. p. 181.
37 Loomis, Treatise, p. 139.
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and anticylones, or the law of deflection of wind to the right of the gradient.
In 1861 Ferrel first related variations in pressure to the centrifugal force of
38
the center of pressure, gravitation, and the rotation of the earth.
In consequence of the force of rotation, Ferrel explained the varia­
tions of barometric pressure and their dependence on geographic latitude, with 
the least likelihood of a cyclone near the equator and the impossibility right at 
the equator. Ferrel also explained the role of the earth's rotation as the cause 
of frictional resistance, which reduces the rotary force of winds at the center of 
the cyclone by over eighty percent.^9
Up to this point Ferrel*s theories were readily acceptable to Dr. Julius 
Hann of Austria and other leading meteorologists. However, Ferrel*s ideas on the 
formation of storms created divided opinion on the subject. Ferrel attributed the 
cause of storms to the excessive condensation of moisture resulting in the in­
flowing and rapid ascension of air. The ensuing depression of barometric pressure 
itself was viewed as a consequence of the condensation of moisture over an ex­
tensive portion of the e a r t h . I n  this theory, called by Hann the physical 
theory, winds resulted from the previously-existing differences in pressure.
Later known as the convective theory of atmospheric circulation, Hann, among other 
Europeans, believed that this rationale contradicted the theory of general cir­
culation, primarily held prior to 1870 by the German and Scandinavian meteorol­
ogists, which asserted that pressure differences result from the meeting of
38 Hann, "On the Relation," pp. 426-444«
39 William Ferrel, "Reply to Hann," Annual Report...of 3nithsonian. 1877, 
pp. 445-446.
40 Hann, "On the Relation," p. 427.
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different currents of air. The centrifugal force arising in consequence of the
rotary movement of the air caused the low barometer in the center of the whirl*
Although later realizing the complementary features of both theories,
meteorologists were compelled, in the absence of upper air data, to regard the
general and convective circulation approaches as rival theories for at least the
rest of the century. Meteorologists undertook international cloud observations in
1896 in an attempt to reach further conclusions about the convectional and general
41
circulation theories.
Convection explained the formation of atoms, but it did not account for
the persistence of centers of low pressure, a problem cited during the first year
in federal operation of a weather service in this country. I. A. Lapham,
assistant to the Chief of the Signal Service, mentioned one storm during the years
Stations in Cheyenne, Ctoaha, 3t. Louis, Chicago, among others, traced 
the eastward movement of a bad December storm and telegraph reports of 
its progress were posted. The cause of such storms is unknown, and 
is not brought about by local temperature changes as has been assumed.
Let us look for an exterior cause, perhaps exterior to our earth.42
A portion of Lapham's generalization applies at the present time because meteorol­
ogists a m  still unable to foresee the causes of development of specific patterns 
in the weather except for a matter of several days in advance. Eventually meteor­
ologists realized that convection is a major portion of the general circulation 
theory, while general circulation depends on solar energy as its ultimate source 
of control.
Aside from theories involving changes of pressure, meteorologists found 
at least the preliminary bases of explanation for several additional specific
41 Willis L. Moore, Annual Report of the Chief of the Weather Bureau. 1895-1896 
(Washington, D. C., 1896), p. x.
42 Signal Service, Report of the Chief Signal Officer to the Secretary of War 
for the Year 1871 (Washington, D. C., 1871), pp. 167-171.
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weather phenomena. One such area included the subject of tornadoes. Because of 
the limited size of geographical locations affected by individual tornadoes, very 
few extensive observations worthy of detailed analysis had been recorded before 
1870. Fortunately, intensive case studies during the rest of the century greatly 
expanded scientific knowledge of these most violent of all storms.^ While none 
of the meteorologists of the period possessed anything but fragmentary knowledge 
contributing to an explanation of tornadoes, it is interesting to note that Epsy 
presented the correct opinion in 184.1 that clouds associated with tornado activity 
build up to very great heights.^
For an explanation as to the causes of tornadoes, American meteorolo­
gists generally believed by 1870 in the convective approach, which stated that 
warm, moist air ascending rapidly caused instability, and, under extreme condi­
tions, the eventual funnel cloud. Because of only theoretical knowledge of the 
upper air, scientists could not explain the heights to which this air was carried. 
In the 1860’s Ferrel likened the motion of a tornado to the flow of water down 
through a hole in the bottom of a basin. While the disturbance is large, the area 
involved remains small. Contrary to the cyclone, the rotation of the earth has 
less effect on tornadoes. As the mass of air at the center executes rapid rota­
tions, the resulting centrifugal force creates the vacuum inside the funnel cloud. 
However, in further reasoning Ferrel displays the lack of insight generally prev­
alent before the 1870's. He remained uncertain about the direction of rotary 
movement of the funnel cloud, believing that rotation could develop either from 
right to left or vice versa. Later findings pointed exclusively to the
43 William Ferrel, A Popular Treatise on the Winds (second edition, New York, 
1911), p. 4 (first published 1889).
44 Epsy, The Philosophy, pp. 434-435.
45 Hann, "On the Relation," p. 443.
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counter-clockwise gyrations.^
To help eliminate the extreme differences in barometric pressure during
a tornado, meteorologists in the 1950’s urge the opening of windows on the north
and east sides of buildings. This difference in pressure va3 noticed ninety
years earlier. In speaking of various aspects of tornadoes, Loomis observed that
when a violent tornado passes over a building with the doors and windows closed,
the walls are sometimes thrown outward with great force, the house presenting an
appearance of an explosion, This indicated that the pressure on the outside of the
building was suddenly diminished, and the house was burst open by the sudden ex-
LHpension of the air within.
Although it was already known that hail often accompanied or followed a 
tornado, here again vague concepts of weather phenomena in the regions of upper 
air prevented anything except an incomplete description of how hailstones are 
formed. For example, in 1868 Loomis described hail as the result of rapidly 
cooled air, but mentioned little about the strata of air in which it is formed, 
or the ways in which hailstones may rise and fall considerable distances several 
times before finally reaching the e a r t h . I n s t e a d  of stressing the rapid rising 
and falling of hailstones in the air, the old theory described hail as accumulat­
ing by falling straight downward through many different strata of snowy and moist
46 Ferrel, A Popular Treatise, p. 395, Ferrel cited in 1889 the evidence of 600 
studies of tornadoes by Lieutenant J. P. Finley in Signal Corps, Professional 
Paper of the Signal Service. No. 4.
47 Loomis, Treatise. p. 153.
48 Loomis, Treatise, p. 134*
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clouds. As one illustration, in 1870 an observer counted thirteen concentric 
layers of ice in hailstones from a storm in Massachusetts, without realizing that 
the hail had oscillated between freezing and warm air. Though meteorologists ap­
parently did not immediately realize the significance of it, a manned-balloon
IQ
ascension in 1843 by John Wise already correctly described the phenomenon. 7
With the evolution of theories on atmospheric circulation and the in­
creasingly abundant observational data and its resultant climatological computa­
tions, as described above, meteorology had advanced notably during the middle 
portion of the nineteenth century. The basic meteorological concepts were avail­
able by 1870. It is only natural that through the ensuing years of systematic 
observation and forecasting of weather, most theories were modified, while tech­
nological advancement permitted measurement of weather elements in greater detail.
49 Ferrel, A Popular Treatise, pp. 425-426} see also John Wise, Through the Air: 
A Narrative of Forty Years Experience as an Aeronaut (Philadelphia, 1873)# 
p. 560, in the John Crerar library, Chicago, Illinois.
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- CHAPTER II
Early Meteorological Services Lead 
to a National Organization
A history of the United States Weather Bureau would indeed be incom­
plete if it did not mention earlier attempts, which led to an organized weather 
service. Interest in weather services for long-term climatological study pre­
vailed long before the means were available for the collection of current, 
simultaneous observations* It is indeed a difficult task to trace the exact 
origins of systematic weather observations as differentiated from sporadic 
examples of individual records*
In connection with -idle description of meteorological instrumentation,
the systematic rainfall observations in India, Palestine, and Korea, in addition
to wind observations in ancient Greece, have already been mentioned. Other
similar examples undoubtedly existed at various times throughout succeeding
generations. The next known instance of particular merit occurred in 1653» when
Ferdinand II of Tuscany established several observation stations in Northern
Italy* Ferdinand tried unsuccessfully to promote an international meteorological
1
system at the time*
Over one century later another meteorological service began operation* 
In 1780 the Meteorological Society of the Palatinate gave rain gauges to fourteen 
Germans, two Austrians, and two Swiss* Detailed publications of the data re­
ceived were issued until 1792, when they were stopped by the French Revolution*
Meanwhile, regular observations of weather data had also been under­
taken in colonial America* Apparently the first continuous records were kept
I Geddes, Meteorology, p. 3“k*
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in 161*1*-161*5 by the Reverend John Campanius at Swedes Fort, near Wilmington, 
Delaware*^ The majority of other records date from the eighteenth century, in­
cluding those of Paul Bradley, Chief Justice of Massachusetts, who had records 
for Boston from 1738 to 1750, and Professor John Winthrop of Harvard, who re­
corded the period of 17l*2 to 1778* Governor James Glen also kept a diary of 
weather observations in the mid-eighteenth century*
For the sake of climatological records, Thomas Jefferson kept a daily 
log of observations taken as early as possible in the morning and again at 1**00 
p*m. A typical entry in his Garden Book was the one for July 1*, 1776* Jefferson 
noted the temperature of 68° Fahrenheit at 6t00 a*m* He paid for his new ther­
mometer on the way to the State House and later entered the highest temperature 
for that memorable day as ?6°*3 Jefferson knew before the Revolutionary War 
that simultaneous observations were necessary for better knowledge of weather*^ 
He actually became an unofficial weather bureau, and many friends wrote to him 
for data* He collected records from as far as Quebec and the Mississippi River 
regions*
Much of his own data is included in a weather memorandum book kept for 
most of the years from 1776-1820* He and his friend, the Reverend James Madison, 
later president of William and Mary College, compiled simultaneous observations
2 J* Cecil Alter, "Three Early Systems for Climatology," Bulletin of the 
Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, vol* 7* No* 3 (Cincinnati.
7uTy7 W ) 7T»'W » ------- ---- ----------
3 Dumas Malone, Jefferson, the Virginian (Boston, 191*8), vol* 1, p* 229.
k Edwin Betts, Thomas Jefferson*s Garden Book, 1766-1821* (Philadelphia, 191*1*) 
and Martin, Thomas Jeffers6n,~pp* Ijl-ll*7* Both works fully describe 
Jefferson’s contributions to meteorology.
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at Williamsburg and Monticello during the years 1772-1777* Wind directions two 
or three times a day, temperature averages, and barometric pressure readings 
were all included in the record* Jefferson later kept a detailed temperature 
record at Monticello during 1810-1816*
In the case of another colonial locality, Charleston, South Carolina, 
observers began recording weather data in 1670, and maintained the daily entries 
of statistics until 1873» when taken over by the national weather service* The 
story of the Charleston observations reveals the fact that writers of promotion 
pamphlets, in the effort to lure new settlers to South Carolina, utilized the 
record of the climate in that state as early as 1682.^ A much more Important 
correlation between climate and life in South Carolina was the study of meteor­
ology in relation to yellow fever* In a survey of daily temperatures at 3t00 p.m. 
in relation to the amount of yellow fever cases for the period 1793 to 1809, Dr* 
Cadwallader Evans of Philadelphia advised Dr. Benjamin Bush that a 79 degree 
reading at 3 *00 p*m* was not alarming, but higher temperatures seemed to cause 
a quick spread of the dread disease* In 1837 another doctor explained rapid 
spread as caused by both heat and moisture*
One of the Charleston weather observers was Dr* John Lining, Who, as 
early as 1737» took two barometric pressure observations a day, and maintained 
precipitation and temperature records* Lining mentioned his observations in 
letters written during 17ltl to Charles Pinckney, later Chief Justice of the 
United States* Lining guessed the wind direction and speed. He measured rain­
fall in inches, and used a whipcord hygroscope, a Fahrenheit thermometer, and a
5 Robert C. Aldredge, «Weather observers and Observations at Charleston, South 
Carolina, 1670-1871*M yearbook of Charleston (Charleston, 19it0). in Weather 
Bureau library* — — — — —
i I
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barometer* He also had a window-bar type weather shelter on the northeast side
of the house* The Charleston Medical Society picked the weather observer,
usually a doctor* Doctor Joseph Johnson kept observations during 1812-1862,
probably the longest time of any one man*
Individual observers with their own particular interests or needs in
mind continued to log weather data into their diaries throughout the remainder
of the period before the beginning of the national weather service. Weather
Bureau officials of the mid-twentieth century remain anxious to obtain such
isolated examples of data with the aim of strengthening climatological statistics
for the country. One of the famous Americans who mixed weather enthusiasm among
his many trades was Henry Thoreau, who traced the current trends of Indian
summer weather for late September to mid-December 1851-1860 at Concord,
6Massachusetts*
7
Recognition of these various weather observations has long been given* 
However, the true value of such pioneer efforts has been minimized. The major 
obstacle to the later use of a vast portion of these records kept by various 
individuals has been the absence of processing and duplication of the data at one 
accessible location* Potential users of these materials have been unaware of 
their existence* This is not to say that these records meet present-day standards 
as to continuity of observations. On the other hand, only three percent of the 
climatological stations reporting to the Weather Bureau in 1956 show a continuous
O
record over the previous fifty years. At least one writer believes that there 
5 Taiman, Our Weather, p. 3521
7 Alexander G. McAdie, »A Colonial Weather Service," Popular Science Monthly 
vol. Ui> (New York, July, 1891*), pp* 331-337*
8 H. B* Harshbarger, "Station Networks to Sample the Climate," Weekly Crop and 
Weather Bulletin vol* 1$, no. 28 (Washington, D.C., July 9, 1956), p, 8*
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might be developed a fairly homogeneous series of climatological data for the 
colonial p e r i o d t h i s  necessarily must be modified to include only settled 
areas along the eastern seaboard, where such statistics as annual precipitation 
records are available at some locations back to 1733* In a similar manner, cold 
eaves dating to 1717 are also available from several of these individual recordlr 
While the foregoing description deals with the East and the population 
centers of the young country, wherever explorers and settlers pushed westward 
there resulted the first step in the preparation for the eventual recording of 
weather statistics. Weather observations were quite prominent in the daily 
journals of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark on their expedition of 180Í¿-1806. 
The first page of the journal proper covers Monday, May Hi, lSOiis "Rained the 
fore part of the dayj May 16, a fair morning." Clark added on May y that violent 
wind had prevailed during the night from the west, southwest, and rain lasted 
about three hours, clearing away in the morning. On May 25 he noted that it 
rained the previous night, and the river fell several inches* Clark listed a 
heavy fog prior to 7*00 awn. on July 15* It was a fine morning with the wind 
from the southeast on August 19* The mercury dropped to nine degrees below zero 
on December 29, I80li* Clark appears to have kept a majority of the meteorological 
data* However, Lewis entered several comments, such as the one of August 17,
1805, when they crossed the divide with temperature of forty-two degrees above
James M. Havens, "An Annotated Bibliography of Meteorological Observations 
in the United States, 1731~1818," Florida State University, Department of 
Meteorology, Technical Report No* 5 (Washington, D.C., March 1, 1956).
10 Mark W. Harrington, "Rainfall and Snowfall of United States to the End of 
1891," Weather Bureau, Bulletin C (Washington, D.C., 189U), p. 31*
11 E. B* Garriott, "Cold Waves and Frosts in the United States," Weather Bureau, 
Bulletin P (Washington, D.C., 1906), p. 9*
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zero at sunrise. The Lewis and Clark data is particularly good on sky conditions, 
days of precipitation, and wind direction. Continuous temperature readings are 
lacking*
The preceding examples of climatological observations might well be 
differentiated from another series of efforts beginning around 1818, Detailed 
records in the former category resulted from the endeavor of numerous individuals, 
While observations were perhaps of a continuous nature, and were often taken at 
approximately the same time each day, they, nevertheless, lacked certain features, 
which later became standard. With the exception of the Jefferson-Reverend 
Madison records and a few other examples, the idea of simultaneous observations 
taken at numerous localities had not been generally carried out in practice.
By the time of the War of 1812, there developed the initial impetus 
for the organization of simultaneous observations. Doctor James Tilton, physician 
and Surgeon-General of the Amy, issued a directive before the end of the war to 
hospital surgeons ordering them to take weather observations and to keep clima­
tological records. However, this apparently was not carried out on an organized 
basis until reorganization of the army in 1818 and by Surgeon-General Doctor 
Joseph Lovell,^ Climatological records continued to be taken at army posts 
throughout the country until 1887, when the duties were released to the national 
weather service. The Surgeon-General system grew slowly to include ninety-seven 
army camps by 1853*^
12 Reuben Gold Thwaites, eel., Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark 
Expedition, 180U (New York, I90I4), voi. 1,
13 Betts, Thomas Jefferson, p, 132,
111 Joseph Henry, Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian 
Institution..., for 1853 (Washington, D.C., I85ii), vol. 87 p* 23B,
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As was the case with many early observations, complete equipment was 
not provided for individual stations» However, slow progress followed, and by 
I836 each Surgeon-General post had received a rain gauge. The majority of these 
army stations did not record either barometric pressure or psychrometric data 
until after 187U. In order to encourage the simultaneous readings of temperature, 
precipitation, and wind data, observation times were established at 7*00 a*m.,
2:00 p.m., and 9*00 p»m., presumably local time. In 182*1 an observation at sun- 
rise replaced the 7*00 a»m. recordings. ^ While not as important to meteorology as 
later developments, the Surgeon-General observations set a precedent by inaugu­
rating the first meteorological organization in the country which was financed 
by the federal government.
Although the Surgeon-General network of records was established first, 
several other governmental agencies soon followed, however, with results of less 
permanent nature. Josiah Meigs of the General Land Office, established in 1817, 
encouraged daily observations of weather at the various land offices. Of a more 
restricted manner in regard to geographical coverage were miscellaneous data 
concerning meteorology as collected by the United States Patent Office in lblpL.
In addition to the organized systems involving information taken from 
stations on land, there were a few attempts to collect records on weather from 
mariners. The staunchest supporter of this type of program was Lieutenant Mathew 
F. Maury of the United States Navy. Assigned to the Naval Observatory at 
Washington, D.C., Maury proceeded to obtain a number of useful reports, especially 
on stoims at sea. His records came from data in the official logs kept aboard
15 Helen Finneran, «Meteorological Correspondence,»* MS, in the Natural Resources 
Branch of the National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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ci 16ship on voyages, in some cases dating back to 1781+«
At the same time as manifestations of meteorological development 
emerged at the federal level of government, interest among state officials in 
several instances promoted the notion of meteorological organizations» The 
initial, and most successful of these attempts, resulted in the establishment of 
a statewide system in New York» Inaugurated in 1825, the observers performed 
their services for the Board of Regents of New York University»-*’? The network 
consisted of over thirty stations, many of which were located at academies, 
and flourished until the early 1850*8, when interest apparently slackened» By 
1851+ only seventeen observers reported»^-® Intending to obtain a complete survey 
of climatic conditions throughout the state, stations were spaced, whenever 
possible, so that no single locality would be over thirty-five miles from another 
station»1^
While successful in New York, a similar undertaking in Massachusetts 
proved to be unsatisfactory» The proposed system was made up of twelve stations, 
all established around 1850»^ During the early 181+0's a state weather bureau 
was also attempted in South Carolina, but it never materialized»^
16 fa. F. Maury, "Ship Logs,” ks, The original logs including meteorological 
data are in the Natural Resources Branch, National Archives»
17 Henry, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 181+9, p* lit*
18 Henry, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1851+, p» 5l*
19 Henry, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1853, p» 188»
20 Henry, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1853, PP, 3, 189*
21 Aldredge, "Weather Observations," p. 21+1+»
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Meanwhile, the Pennsylvania state legislature appropriated $i*,000 for 
use by the Franklin Institute to establish meteorological stations throughout 
the state* James Epsy supervised the program*22 The system in Pennsylvania did not 
develop to comparable status to the network in New York*
Operating in the 181*0* s as already described, the several examples of 
organized weather-reporting organizations came to be largely outmoded by tech­
nological progress which introduced telegraphic communications for adaptation 
to meteorology* Fortunately for those interested in weather, one of the hardiest 
supporters of the use of the telegraph, also an early experimenter in telegraphy,
was Professor Joseph Henry, since 181*6 secretary of the new Smithsonian Instl-
.
tut ion. Also an ardent believer in the future of meteorology, Henry soon 
formulated a plan combining the essential features of the pre-tele graphic era 
of observational systems with benefits of the new, revolutionary improvement in 
communications. Ey 181*9, or five years after the first successful exchange of 
telegraphic messages between Baltimore and Washington, D.C., Professor Henry 
received the first meteorological observations via telegraph in this country*
Also during 181*9 G* J. Symons collected telegraphic observations in England 
frcm thirty stations*2^
In the same year, Professor Henry completed arrangements with the 
telegraph companies for the allotment of time to send observational messages*
In return the Smithsonian Institution supplied the more important of these 
offices with meteorological instruments*2^ One of the Smithsonian observers, who
22 Epsy, Trie" Philosophy, p* see also E. B. Garriott, “West Indian Hurricanes,11 
Weather~5ureau, Bulletin H (Washington, D*C., 1900), p. 7*
23 Hellmann, Neudrucke, vol* 2, No. 8, pp. 8, 12*
21* Henry, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 181*9, p* 15*
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telegraphed observations, was Edward Rosewater, who called himself the first 
weather observer west of the Mississippi. Rosewater later recalled that he was 
asked by Professor Henry to report from time to time on conditions between 
Omaha and Salt Lake City. Rosewater added that no death messages were released 
until the weather reports were tickered off.^At the outset not all of the 
observers comprising the newly—formed Smithsonian corps of observers reported 
all data via the telegraph. Much of the more detailed information was filed 
on monthly reports.
Organized on a voluntary basis, Professor Henry* s reporting network 
included 1$0 stations within the first year of activity. By 185U Smithsonian 
observers represented thirty-one states in addition to one or two foreign reports 
each from Canada, Nova Scotia, and Paraguay.^ A H  of the stations were located 
east of the Mississippi River with the exception of three each in Texas and 
Missouri, one in Nebraska, eight in Iowa, and several in portions of Minnesota. 
Steady growth in the number of stations continued until over 500 stations re­
ported in i860. Drastic reduction of the network commenced with the Civil War 
the following year, and the pre-war status was never regained after hostilities 
ceased.
Early plans around 181*9-1850 called for three classes of observers*
One group reported only visual observations, including changes in the condition 
of the sky, direction of -the wind, and the beginning and ending times of pre­
cipitation. The second class necessitated the ruse of thermometers to indicate 
the daily changes and averages of temperature. A final category, the smallest 
of the three groups, needed complete sets of instruments in order to also report
¿5 United States Weather Bureau, "Proceedings of the Convention at Omaha, 1898,w 
Bulletin No. 21* (Washington, D.C., 1898), pp. 180-181.
26 Henry, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1851*, pp. 1*7-51.
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precipitation, barometric pressure, and psychrcanetric data*
While rain gauges were supplied to a number of observers, the pro­
hibitive costs of accurate barometers, wind vanes, and psyehrcmeters seriously 
altered the original plan to that of supplying only approximately twenty-five 
stations with full equipment* The Department of the Navy received $2,000 from 
Congress in 181# to be expended on the meteorological system, primarily for 
instruments. Professor Epsy was chosen by the Navy to supervise the program, 
but in turn was directed to expend the funds according to the instructions of 
Professor Henry*^?
After five years of experience, Professor Henry discontinued the
issuance of complete equipment to the selected, voluntary observers* Expressing
disappointment with this phase of the program, Henry reported that too many
instruments had been broken, while comparatively few reports were received of
28this detailed information*
With the administration of the reporting network handled in this 
fashion, a lasting contribution to American climatology resulted from another 
innovation introduced by Professor He ray. Beginning in 1852, the Smithsonian 
Institution tabulated its monthly and annual temperature data, including the 
records started in 181#*^ A series of charts was constructed to exhibit the 
distribution of temperature by isothennal lines, and another indicated the 
distribution of precipitation throughout the country for each month* Un­
fortunately a fire in 1868 destroyed many of these past records kept by the 
Smithsonian Institution*
27 Henry, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 181#» p* 1U*
28 Henry, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, l8glt, p. 20.
29 Henry, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1853, p* 239*
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Beyond the compilation and display of past data for climatological 
purposes, Professor Henry took a significant step toward the future forecasting 
of weather, when he also displayed a synoptic chart showing the current observ­
ational information received from the telegraph stations submitting regular 
reports* Instances of this chart have been cited first in 181*9«^ Beginning 
in l&5kt the map display became a regular, daily feature for the next seven 
years * ^
The United States was not alone in the efforts to gain simultaneous 
observations of current weather* At an 1851 exhibition in London, simultaneous 
observations of daily barometric pressure were kept along with wind direction 
from twenty-two stations. In 1857 simultaneous observations were collected 
from three weather districts in Ireland and Britain* France later assumed the 
lead, and starting in 1863, Urbain LeVerrier published a daily weather map*^2
With the display of current meteorological data, thanks to the telegraph 
there quickly followed the initial efforts toward the next logical advancement, 
the forecasting of weather* Prior to the introduction of telegraphic reports, 
all of the individual attempts at forecasting the weather resulted from reliance 
on the observation of local weather conditions* No doubt numerous examples of 
such forecasting yielded correct results, much to the delight of those listening 
to successful prophets of future weather* Local conditions never came to be 
completely ignored by conscientious forecasters* However, with the introduction 
of the telegraph, and its expansion to include a suitable network of stations, 
simultaneous observational data could reach the hands of one meteorologist in
3t> Alter, «Three Early Systems," pp* 1U6-Hj.7*
31 Ivan R. Tannehill, Hurricanes* Their Nature and History (Princeton University. 
1938), p. 6 -------------------- --------------
32 HeUmann, Neudrucke, vol* 2, no* 8, p* 8*
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a matter of minutes following its collection from an area limited only by the 
extent of the telegraph system*
■While Professor Henry did not aim to provide a forecasting service, 
keen-minded individuals with the knowledge of the west to east progression of 
stomas, undoubtedly realized that for example, storms posted on the Smithsonian 
map for the Cincinnati region often meant a forewarning for the Washington, D.C., 
area*
In the meantime, there originated several specific attempts at fore­
casting* For the protection of his steamers along the Atlantic Coast, Captain 
Joseph Brooks, manager of a Portland ship company, began in 1850 to base future 
operations on the telegraphic reports of meteorological conditions.33 During 
the mid-fifties an example of a private forecaster emerged in the person of E.E. 
Meriam* Operating under the title, "The Sage of Brooklyn Heights," Meriam fre­
quently attempted forecasts based on the telegraphic reports, which were pub- 
lished in several daily newspapers at the time.-3
The necessity of forecasts, especially for the type that warned of 
storms, was continually demonstrated throughout the middle of the nineteenth 
century* A violent storm on the Black Sea during the Crimean War hampered 
Allied operations and stimulated interest in the possible forewarning of such a 
phenomenon* In 1861 the famous British meteorologist Admiral Robert Fitz-Roy 
correctly forecast a February storm. While European meteorologists directed 
their attention toward the forecasting phase of the science, American efforts were
53 Alter, "Three Early Systems,"' p.' lit?,
3k Alter, "Three Early Systems," p. 151j see also "Index to Weather Diaries,"
MS, in the National Archives, includes records on Meriam.
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interrupted by the Civil War« However, the interest in forecasting did not 
disappear* At least one enterprising individual realized the potential usefulness 
of forecasting the weather for the entire military operations of the North • 
Francis L. Capen, who styled himself as a practical meteorologist capable of 
computing changes of the weather, offered his services to President Abraham 
Lincoln with the promise that application of this science to war would save many 
lives and millions of dollars* Capen requested a favorable reference to the 
Department of War*^
President Lincoln immediately became convinced that Capen»s forecasting
ability would not materially benefit the Union forces*
It seems to me Mr. Capen knows nothing about the weather, 
in advance. He told me three days ago that it would not 
rain again till the 30th. of April or 1st* of May* It is 
raining now and has been for ten hours* I can not spare 
any more time to Mr. Capen*3°
Additional letters from Capen indicate that Capen lacked sufficient 
scientific knowledge of the subject to be considered a competent forecaster*
While the Capen request represents the lack of sound meteorological 
forecasting in the country, there arose an immediate desire on the part of 
numerous scientists at the end of the war to renew government-sponsored observ­
ational network. In 1865 Professor Henry urged Congress, without success, to 
appropriate $50,000 for this enterprise.^  The recommendation was strongly en­
dorsed by the United States Commissioner of Agriculture Isaac Newton, who
35 Francis L. Capen to Abraham "Lincoln, April 25, 1863, The Collected Works of 
Abraham Lincoln, (Abraham Lincoln Association edition, 1555), vói* 6,” pp. 
190-191, Microfilm is available at the Illinois State Historical Library, 
Springfield, Illinois *
36 Abraham Lincoln, April 28, 1863, endorsement on Capen letter of April 25, 
I863, Collected Works, voi* 6, pp. 190-191*
37 Alter, »»Three Early Systems,»» p. 153*
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stressed the need of observations and warnings for agricultural interests.
Despite these attempts by scientists to secure the renewed support of 
the federal government, nothing resulted, and the succeeding accomplishments 
came from a newcomer to the field of meteorology. The distinguished scientist 
involved was Professor Cleveland Abbe, Sr., who was b o n  December 3, 1838 in 
New York City, where he later attended private schools, Abbe then enrolled in 
the New York Free Academy, now City College of New York, Here he received the 
bachelor of arts degree in 15$7 and the master of arts degree in i860. In the 
meantime, Abbe taught mathematics for a brief period at Trinity Latin school 
in New York and engineering at both Michigan Agriculture School, later called 
Michigan State University, and the University of Michigan,
Early in the Civil War Abbe volunteered for military duty, but soon 
was rejected because of excessive nyopia. Subsequently, Abbe seriously pursued 
an interest in the field of astronomy, a science which had captured his fancy 
while at the University of Michigan. Abbe went to Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
where he spent the 1861-186U period helping Dr. B. A. Gould at Harvard with 
determination of longitude for the United States Coast Survey. For the next 
two years Abbe studied at the Pulkoya Observatory In Russia. He returned to the 
United States in 1867 to become aide to the United States Naval Observatory at 
Washington, D.C, Within a year Abbe left this position to become director of the 
Cincinnati Observatory,^® Prior to 1868 Abbe had professed an interest in meteor­
ology, but certainly could not yet be considered a leader in this field.
Professor Abbe became impressed during his boyhood days in New York 
City by the popular ignorance of weather. He retained this enthusiasm into
53 Dictionary of American Biography "(New York, 1928), vol. 1, pp, 1-2, 
article by william J.Humphreys,
la
adulthood, and by the late fifties William Ferrel had become his favorite au­
thority on meteorology. Throughout his studies in astronomy Abbe became con­
vinced that the astronomer needed a nearby series of weather observations. At 
Cincinnati, Abbe impressed upon members of the Chamber of Commerce the desira­
bility of a meteorological program of simultaneous observations and warnings.
The suggestion was eventually endorsed, and Professor Abbe was instructed to
"39develop the system.
Considerable time elapsed before arrangements were completed for 
voluntary observers and telegraph facilities. The new enterprise received full 
cooperation from Western Union, which offered the Observatory the same daily 
service provided for twenty years to the Smithsonian Institution. Abbe dis­
counted the services of telegraph operators as observers, and sought the aid of 
the trained observers of the Smithsonian system. Enthusiasm for the new plan 
proved to be wanting at first. For the opening day of actual operation on 
September 1, 1869, Abbe received only two telegraphic reports. Nevertheless, 
Abbe issued the initial forecasts, which were then called the probabilities, and 
announced easterly and southerly winds to prevail during the following day. The 
observations and probabilities were published as the Cincinnati Weather Bulletili. 
In one of the earliest probabilities, all done in handwriting, Abbe in his haste 
misspelled the word Tuesday and promptly obtained the nickname Old Probs.
In order to facilitate the sending and receiving of the weather ob­
servations, Abbe, with the aid of an employee of Western Union, devised a code 
of cipher in October, 1869, This first code consisted of twenty to twenty-five 
words,^
39 Cleveland Abbe, Sr., “How the United States Weather Bureau was Started,” 
Scientific American. n,s., vol. 111* (New York, May 20, 1916), p. 529.
ItO Abbe, “How the Weather Bureau was Started,” p, 529. 
la Alter, “Three Early Systems,” p. 158,
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Efforts to increase the number of reports met with varying success.
Many of the Smithsonian observers in the Midwest consented to provide the data. 
Within one year thirty-three stations supplied daily reports. On the other hand* 
the Chicago Board of Trade refused Abbe’s request to extend the Cincinnati 
system to include a majority of the territory around the Great Lakes. However, 
the Milwaukee observer did consistently endeavor to supply data for the proba­
bilities.
Revealing his keen interest in the expansion of his own system and to
aid similar establishments outside of this country, Abbe offered to exchange
reports with LeVerrier of France. The latter meteorologist had already expanded
1,2
his earlier endeavors into a forecasting service.4
Although Abbe maintained that hourly observations were necessary, no 
such arrangement could be undertaken under a system of voluntary observers. He 
also advocated the use of self-registering instruments. Here again the Cincinnati 
network could not put into effect such recommendations because of prohibitive 
costs and the scarcity of such instruments in this country.
While Abbe was engaged in forecasting the weather for the Cincinnati 
Observatory, another noteworthy meteorologist had been attempting for years to 
build up a similar type of service in Wisconsin. Increase A. Lapham had kept 
weather observations since 182?, and later published isothermal maps of Wisconsin. 
Lapham took a major interest in the meteorological theories of Professor Epsy.
In 181*9 Lapham observed the lunar tide on Lake Michigan. He became an observer 
of the Smithsonian network and in l8f>0 had requested without success, a state-sup- 
ported system of weather observations for Wisconsin. Lapham suggested one station
^2 Cleveland Abbe, Sr. "International Simultaneous Observations,” Weather Bureau, 
Monthly Weather Review, vol. 1*2, no. 12 (Washington, D.C., December, 1911*),
P* ¿76.
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for each county* In 1869 Lapham enthusiastically supported Abbe's venture at 
Cincinnati by submitting daily reports.
Though Lapham maintained his belief that meteorological warning service 
was essential for the entire nation, his immediate interest concerned the region 
of the Great Lakes. For this area Lapham felt certain that warnings of ap­
proaching storms might be made available to the vast commercial interests, which 
annually suffered losses in cargo, ships, and men. Lapham's idea was not new 
because various individuals had entertained similar thoughts for twenty years.
As previously mentioned, individual warnings, collected via the telegraph, had 
already been issued in the United States and abroad. Professor Abbe had started 
this type of service at Cincinnati, and only the lack of interest from potential 
beneficiaries had prevented Abbe's extension of service to include the area 
around the Great Lakes.
Proceeding in December 1869 with his plan to inaugurate warnings for 
shippers on the Great Lakes, Lapham presented a petition for such action to the 
Chicago Academy of Science. Lapham suggested the establishment of a meteor­
ological station at Chicago to supervise the warning system. Upon hearing of the 
proposed warning system, a leading newspaper, the Chicago Tribune, expressed the 
skepticism of many people in regard to such a suggestion. Lapham was ridiculed 
for needing eleven years to track the movement of one storm, when he used a 
storm of 2859 to illustrate his scheme.^
53 United States Weather Bureau, "Fourth Annual Association of State Weather
Services at Indianapolis, October 16-17, 1895," Bulletin 18 (Washington. D.C.. 
1896), p. 37. -----------
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If this plan had been adopted as originally presented, the Chicago 
system might not have differed materially from the existing organization under 
the Cincinnati Observatory* Had this proved to be the case, there might have 
developed the establishment of additional state or regional-type weather services 
instead of a national meteorological service*
Events of the next two months decided the question by halting the 
further extension of individual, non-governmental services set up on a regional 
basis* The first step in this direction resulted from Lapham’s petition to the 
Chicago Academy of Science* Upon hearing of the proposal, another enthusiastic 
supporter of meteorology, Congressman H. E. Paine of Wisconsin, entered the 
discussion in favor of the plan* Paine had earlier become acquainted with the 
advanced meteorological theories of Elias Loomis while attending Western Reserve 
College* He at once took up Lapham’s proposal, but with the change to eventually 
include meteorological service for the entire country under the supervision of 
the federal government*
On December 16, 1869» Paine introduced in Congress, by unanimous con­
sent, a bill to authorize the Secretary of War to provide for the taking of 
meteorological observations at all military stations in the interior of the con­
tinent and for giving notice on the Northern Lakes and the Atlantic seaboard of 
the approach and force of storms*^ Paine also presented a lengthy petition from 
Lapham which included thirty-five pages of endorsements for an observational 
network* Also listed were storms and detailed accounts of the shipwrecks during 
1868-1869 on the Great Lakes*^
E5 Congressional Globe, hist Congress, 2d Session, vol. 1*2, part 1, p, 177 
(House, December l6, 1869)*
1*6 Ulst Congress, 2d Session, House Miscellaneous Document 10(1869)*
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Other reports promoting a meteorological service soon followed. One 
was subnitted by the New York Chamber of Commerce, which also strongly endorsed 
the plan of a national weather service at militaiy stations. It was signed by 
George W, Dow, Mathew Maury, and J. D. Jones Accompanying the same petition 
was a letter to Paine relative to storm telegraphy in feich the proposal for 
storm warnings was backed by Professor Henry, Elias Loomis, then of Yale, and 
Colonel A. J, Myer, chief of the Signal Service, Colonel Myer gave as an example 
a winter storm, which was traced to Washington, D.C, from the Midwest, as best 
description of the possibilities for such a weather service.
Meanwhile, John A. Gano and William Hopper, Cincinnati businessmen 
who had backed Abbe's meteorological enterprise, took action to extend the 
Cincinnati system to the whole country,^® Their activities, unlike the later Abbe 
interpretation, appear to have been separate from the Lapham-Paine operations, 
although both supported a federal service. The group from Cincinnati solicited 
■fee backing of fee National Board of Trade, which in turn gave its support to a 
national service.
Before any of the measures reached the voting stage, several of the 
interested meteorologists expressed varying opinions as to whom the weather 
service should be entrusted. Professor Henry advised Paine that military stations 
would not be sufficient, and that there was need for new stations, such as used 
by fee similar services in England, France, Holland, and Italy, Professor Abbe 
apparently had not considered fee army organization as best suited for such an 
undertaking, Abbe told Representative George H. Pendleton of Cincinnati that he 
thought Paine's bill implied use of fee observation corps of the Smithsonian
U? List Congress, 2d Session, House Miscellaneous Document 105 (1869),
It8 Abbe, "How the Weather Bureau," p, 529*
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Institution to administer the service. In a letter to Professor Lapham, Abbe
also discounted Army observations by saying that meteorological observations of
the Army had generally proved themselves to be very unreliable and were certainly
¿9no better than those that the telegraph operators could easily make. Abbe had
hoped that the appropriations for a meteorological service might pass through
50the hands of meteorologists rather than army officers.
In contrast to this argument, Congressman Paine indicated that army
discipline might prove to be the best means of providing the required service.
Another reason cited in favor of military control was the supposedly cheaper 
51operation. Apparently Lapham backed Paine in this matter. Bains had un­
doubtedly been convinced of the merits of military control through the concen­
trated entreaties of Colonel Myer, who visited Paine soon after the first bill 
was introduced in mid-December.^
While the debate continued in regard to the merits of civilian versus 
military organization, Congressman Paine introduced a joint resolution which 
embodied the same provisions as the earlier bill. The House of Representatives 
passed this resolution on February 2, 1870. Led by Senators Henry Wilson and 
Arthur P. Gorman, the Senate concurred three days later, and President Ulysses 
S. Grant signed the measure on February 9 . ^
49 Alter, “Three Early Systems,“ p. 177.
50 Miller, "New Light,« p. 68.
51 Miller, «New Light,« p. 68.
52 Miller, «New Light,« p. 68.
53 Congressional Globe. 41st Congress, 2d Session, vol. 42, part 2, p. 1160 
(House, February 9, 1870), 16 Statutes at Large. 369.
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Little immediate attention was given by the press to the joint reso­
lution creating the national weather service» The New York Tribune semi-weekly 
carried a resume of Congressional action but failed to mention the new meteor- 
ological assignment»
A national weather service was now provided for by law, but the 
Secretary of War had as yet not designated to whom would fall the responsibility 
for carrying out the act» Although a foregone conclusion, it was not until 
February 28 that Secretary William B. Belknap notified Chief Myer that the 
responsibility would belong to the Signal Service»
It may be well at this point to consider a brief review of the Army 
Signal Service in order to tell just how this organization could be selected to 
administer the newly-passed law for a national weather service»^ The Signal 
Corps was organized in June, i860, by Assistant Surgeon Albert Ifyer, who was then 
a major» An expansion of activities followed in March, 1863, at which time Myer 
was promoted to colonel* He became a brigadier general in 1879» Among other 
duties, the Signal Service had constructed telegraph lines during the Civil War 
and for protection against Indians in other areas» It also cooperated with the 
Lifesaving Service of the Treasury Department along the coasts by using inter­
national code on flag signals, and helped to find the identity of grounded ships 
off Cape Heniy and other points«» Myer had devised the wig-wag signal to replace 
couriers, apparently conceiving the idea from Indian signals. Having quarreled 
with Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton over control of military telegraph lines, 
ify-er was out of the corps during 186^-1866. Back in the service again, Myer was
$k New York Tribune, February 11, 1870, p. 5«
35 L.D» Ingersoll, A History of the War Department of the United States (Washing­
ton, D.C., 1880)7 PP.'l57-179* ---------
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called "a bureau chief without a bureau.« The Signal Service had been popularly- 
called the stepchild of the War Department. Then, a bill of 1866 allowed one 
chief, six officers, and one hundred non-commissioned officers. This status was 
almost unchanged until creation of the weather service in 1870.
Despite the assignment in late February, little further was heard of 
the new service during the next five months* The Signal Service issued an 
announcement in August that it would start a meteorological weather service, but 
no definite plans were given as yet. Further delays of three months followed 
this public release.
Although apparently not a matter of controversy in 1870-1871, the sub­
ject of responsibility for establishing the pemanent, national weather service 
has become a matter of considerable debate in more recent years. Essentially 
the contention revolves around whether the credit rightfully belongs to Abbe or 
Lapham, that is, whether the backers of the Cincinnati system,1869-1870, or 
Lapham and his followers for the Great Lakes region should receive full credit* 
Writing in 1916, his last year of life, Abbe credited his Cincinnati 
supporters with getting Paine to initiate the successful legislation.^ This
became the popular interpretation until 1921*, when the true role of Lapham was 
*■>7
reemphasized.'' Further study proved beyond doubt that Lapham was the immediate 
instigator of Paine's legislative efforts.^® It is, however, not reasonable to
55 Abbe, "How the Weather Bureau,"p* 529*
57 William J. Humphreys, «Origin and Growth of the Weather Service of the 
United States and Cincinnati's Part Therein, "Scientific Monthly, vol. 18, 
no* 1* (New York, April, 1921*), pp. 372-382.
58 Miller, "New Light," p. 67-68.
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credit any one man with the establishment of the weather service.^
■While the above interpretations deal only with the events of 1869- 
1870, certainly credit for the national weather service must also go to Professor 
Henry, who originally set the pattern by establishing idle first federal-supported 
system providing current information, and who continually after the Civil War 
urged Congress to reestablish a reporting system for the country.
59 R. Hanson Weightman, "Establishment of the National Weather Service t Who 
Was Responsible For It,» MS (1952), in Wbather Bureau Library.
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CHAPTER III
The Military Weather Service
When the Signal Service in 1870 assumed the responsibility of issuing
weather warnings, it possessed only one great asset for the task - the telegraphic
facilities. For meteorological knowledge it had to turn to civilians. The major
initial purpose of the weather service involved storm warnings for the Great Lakes
and Gulf, and Atlantic Coasts. To undertake this project Colonel A. J. Myer
quickly turned for aid to scientific leaders in meteorology. On November 8, 1870
he requested Professor Increase A. Lapham to assume responsibility for the Great
Lakes region, and Lapham obliged by issuing the first storm warning that very same
day. The dispatch of November 8, 1870, to observers on the Great Lakes, read:
High wind all day yesterday at Cheyenne and Omaha; a very high wind this 
morning at Omaha; barometer falling, with high winds at Chicago and 
Milwaukee today; barometer falling and thermometer rising at Chicago, 
Detroit, Toledo, Cleveland, Buffalo and Rochester; high winds probable 
along the Lakes.
This forecast was based on data from only twenty-five stations which 
reported via telegraph on that day. It became necessary for Lapham to establish 
his headquarters for this meteorological work at Chicago. Personal business
4 j
caused him to be absent so often from Chicago, however, that he was released from 
the service May 31, 1872.2
While Lapham was engaged in the Great Lakes area, Myer had also request­
ed the aid of Professor Cleveland Abbe, his chief critic.
1 United States Weather Bureau, "Omaha Convention", p. 153. Lapham was paid 
$167 per month.
2 Miller, "Lapham," pp. 69-70, The reason stated by the Signal Service was lad 
of funds.
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Abbe left Cincinnati in December, 1870, to become special assistant to the Chief 
Signal Officer, effective January 3, 1871. After a month's practice, it was de­
cided that Abbe's forecasts, covering the next twenty-four hours, more than filled 
popular expectations, and tri-daily forecasts began at once. Entitled weather 
synopsis and probabilities, the first public issue of February 19, 1871, was based 
on the 7*35 a.m. observations. One of the early examples included this data*
Synopsis for past twenty-four hours* the barometric pressure had 
diminished in the southern and Gulf states this morning; it has 
remained nearly stationary on the Lakes. A decided diminution has 
appeared unannounced in Missouri accompanied with a rapid rise in 
the thermometer which is felt as far east as Cincinnati; the barometer 
in Missouri is about four-tenths of an inch lower than on Erie and 
on the Gulf. Fresh north and west winds are prevailing in the north; 
southerly winds in the south.
Probabilities; it is probable that the low pressure in Missouri 
will make itself felt decidely tomorrow with northerly winds and 
clouds on the lakes, and brisk southerly winds on the Gulf.5
Additional leading figures in American meteorology were also consulted
by Myer with an eye to gaining a still better service. In one case F. E. Loomis
declined a six-month job because Myer did not define the position.To answer
the need for additional forecasters, Myer employed Thomas B. Maury and Lieutenant
A. W. Greely to assist Abbe.5
3 Cleveland Abbe, Abbe Papers, MS, in the National Archives, Washington, D. C., 
this forecast was based upon A*35 p.m. observations of February 20, 1871.
A F. E. Loomis to Abbe, June 17, 1871, Abbe Papers.
5 Maury later resigned from the service and joined the New York Herald, where he 
continued to write weather stories, Myer to Abbe, June 15, 1871; Abbe, Lt. 
Craig, and Maury made the predictions during the second year, and verifica­
tions for the year of November 1, 1871, through October 1, 1872, were listed 
as 76.8 percent. Abbe continued to do part of the forecasting until 1879, 
Signal Service, Annual Report. 1872. p. 81.
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General services of the Signal Service were extended throughout the
United States by Act of Congress June 10, 1872* It will he remembered that the
original Congressional resolution covered only the Great Lakes and sea coasts*^
A sample 1872 forecast reflects the change to include the country more extensively
but still reveals the lack of sufficient data west of the Mississippi River:
Partly cloudy, but pleasant weather will prevail on Wednesday for 
Pennsylvania and the upper lakes southward to the Gulf. Cloudy weather 
will extend over New England and Canada and clearing away by Wednesday
From the beginning all general forecasts originated at Washington, D.C. 
What are known today as local forecasts were not allowed until 1881, when a very 
few stations, including New York City, were given permission to issue such 
indications* The system of local forecasting did not expand until 1890, wMic a 
district system was not to evolve until trader the civilian Weather Bureau.
Starting May 1, 1889, forecasters were advised to extend the time periods of each 
forecast to two to three days if conditions warranted*^
During the first days of the Signal Service it was very difficult to 
secure reports west of the Mississippi River because of insufficient telegraph 
lines. Early reports did include essential data from Omaha and Cheyenne, while 
San Francisco and Corinne, Utah, had been added early in 1871. Additional stations 
were also completed on the Gulf, in the Mississippi and Ohio Valleys during the 
summer of 1871, and an exchange of meteorological observation with the Canadian 
Meteorological Service was commenced in November, 1871.
6 Signal Service, Annual Report. 1872, p. 83.
7 Cleveland Abbe, Abbe Papers, Forecast of 1:00 a.m* July 24, 1872, Myer, 
apparently quite pleased with Abbe*s work, raised his salary twice in two 
years from $3,000 to $4,500.
8 New York Tribune. April 30, 1889, p. 1.
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Canadian Northwest Territory data aided greatly, even at this early date, in 
predicting cold waves.^ Plans were also discussed in 1871 for stations in the 
Aleutians and Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands, while fifty new sites were surveyed 
for possible new stations in the United States. Applications for 113 new stations 
had already been received.
Regular stations increased from twenty-four in the autumn of 1870 to 
fifty-five within one year, all but four of which still existed in 1942.^ By 
June, 1890, there were twenty-six first order, 118 second order, and thirty-four 
third order, «11. regular Signal Service stations. Actually very little difference 
existed between first and second order stations because both were fully-equipped 
and employed full-time personnel. On the other hand third order stations under 
the Signal Service usually reported only maximum and minimum temperatures and 
precipitation. An interesting question quickly arose as to the spacing of station^ 
Although at the time Professor Loomis advocated a station every 100 miles, the 
location of telegraph lines regulated this procedure under the Signal Service. 
Curiously enough the civilian Weather Bureau later attempted to get one station foa 
every fifty miles. Seventy-five mile and thirty-five mile limits have also been 
suggested, while the possibility of a thirty mile limit is sometimes discussed in 
the present era.
The number of various observations rapidly increased to aid the weather
9 Weather Bureau, Bulletin 24» 1898, pp. 147-149, summarize the early 
innovations of the Weather Service.
10 National Archives, List of Climatological Records in the National Archives 
(Washington, D.C., 1942), p. li.
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service daily forecasts.^ Similar to the reports received by Abbe at the 
Cincinnati observatory, the Signal Corps observations included all basic data* 
Each station observer was required to report three times daily by telegraph the 
barometric pressure and its change since the last report, temperature and its 
change in twenty-four hours, relative humidity, wind direction, wind velocity, 
pressure of wind in pounds per square foot, amount of clouds, and state of the 
weather* The hours of those observations used for forecast purposes at regular 
Signal Service stations varied throughout the years. From November 1870, until 
August 1872, the regular forecast observations were taken at 7:35 a.m., A:35 p*m*, 
and 11:35 p.m* Numerous minor changes followed until another more permanent 
ehange was made in 1888 to involve only two daily observations at 8:00 a.m. and 
8:00 p.m.^
11 They included 474 daily domestic observations, 317 international, 379 from 
voluntary observers, 119 from the Medical Corps of the Army, and sixty-two 
from United States Naval observations* By 1877 the cipher manual had been 
revised through the addition of 1,600 words and the total number of words in 
use was now 5,136. This provided for the additional report of station 
barometric pressure readings, Signal Service, Annual Report. 1877. p. 137.
12 United States Weather Bureau, "Convention at Omaha," p. 147. From August 
1872 until October 1879, the times did not vary except the late evening 
observation, which was then made at 11:00 p.m. From November, 1879, until 
January, 1885, the hours were 7:00 a.m., 3*00 p.m., and 11:00 p.m. For the 
next two years times were changed to seventy-fifth meridian time, at
7:00 a.m., 3:00 p.m., and 11:00 p.m. From January, 1887, through June, 1888, 
the times were 7:00 a.m., 3:00 p.m., and 10:00 p.m.
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Equipment used at the individual stations in 1371 consisted of a 
barometer, thermometer, hygrometer, anemometer, wind vane, non-recording rain 
gauge, tool box, clock, and the various meteorological forms.^ Fully-equipped 
or first order stations used Smithsonian Institution forms to record their data, 
with minor changes until the familiar form number 1003 made its appearance in 
1391. Forms used for voluntary observers were also identical to the earlier 
Smithsonian form and became the form 1009 in 1891.^
The procedure employed from the time of receiving reports on observations 
through the distribution of forecasts was substantially the same from early Signal 
Service days well down into the period of civilian service. All the telegraphic 
reports arrived at the Washington, D. C. office where one man read the telegrams 
while other men recorded selected types of data. Other employees, with common 
words already set in type, waited nearby. One portion of the room had metal 
plates with slots pertaining to signal stations on the United States map.
13 Signal Service, Report of the Chief Signal Officer. 1871, pp. 6-171. 
Measurement of snow was by means of taking a snow section from the ground 
with the use of the top of the rain gauge. Observers were advised to take 
a section measurement whenever one inch of snow fell. The Smithsonian 
Institution, from a detailed study, had recommended use of small orifice 
rain gauges of two to twenty- four inch apertures. Snow measurement has 
improved very little since that time. Wind direction and speed were 
determined by the wind vane and the Robinson four-cup anemometer. Wind 
movement was obtained by subtracting the twelve noon reading from that of 
the preceding noon reading. Another innovation, which has carried on to 
the present, was the uniform recording of thunderstorms, started in 1884.
At that time the definition came to mean that if observers could hear thunder 
distinctly, even though there was no rain, it was still to be called and 
entered as a thunderstorm.
14 National Archives, List of Climatological Records. Included is research on 
use of forms for recording data for the period of the Signal Service; An 
unpublished abstract, "Administrative Records of the Weather Bureau," also 
contains useful materials on records kept by the Signal Service and is on 
file in the National Archives.
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The correct symbols were dropped into these as results from each station were 
announced, and as the last telegram was read the weather map was ready for the 
printer with the exception of the forecast. The forecaster had observed all this 
procedure and now made his brief forecast after which the map could be printed
and issued, all within two hours after the observations were taken. The whole
15process of forecasting took only forty-nine minutes. All reports were coded
similar to this example: "Paul diction sunk Johnson imbue hersal."
Decoded this read: "St. Paul, 29.26 inches barometric pressure, -4
degrees temperature, wind six miles per hour, maximum temperature 10 degrees,
dewpoint -18 degrees. This observation was at 8:00 p.m. and the local prediction
16
called for fair weather."
Forecasts were distributed by telegraph to weather stations and to the 
railroad stations, and predictions were also sent to the Associated Press, A 
system used by Western Union for weather reports consisted of combined telegraph 
circuits and saved the service considerable expense. Forecast copies were then 
printed at Signal Service stations, and sent to the post offices so as to reach 
2,000 post offices five hours after the midnight predictions. Naturally this 
appears extremely slow by mid-twentieth century standards of communications.
The difficulty in carrying through a correct forecast and making it 
appear successful to the public is shown by one example.
15 John W. Powell, "National Agencies for Scientific Research", The ChantangnapT 
vol. 14, no. 3 (New York, December, 1891), pp. 291-297, Powell was Chief of 
the United States Geological Survey and a staunch supporter of the weather 
service.
16 Powell, Chautauauan. p. 295j Before issuing the synopses and indications 
or forecasts, the telegraph observation data would also be placed on eight 
manuscript charts, which showed the forecaster at a glance the various 
weather conditions over the country, Signal Service, Annual Report. 1877. 
p. 120.
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In the early eighties a frost warning had been sent to Madison, Wisconsin, thirty- 
six hours ahead of time to save the tobacco crop. However, a telegraph operator 
kept the message at the office without relaying the information, and the tobacco 
crop was killed without warning. The crop, ready to be cut, could have been 
saved if the farmers had been notified. Even today this need for fast and 
efficient distribution of forecasts has been readily displayed during the flash 
floods in the east during hurricanes of -August, 1955 and throughout various 
other floods in the East and in Nebraska during recent years.
Enthusiastic acceptance of these pioneer government weather forecasts 
was not immediately gained on a large scale. The weather service was a novelty, 
without much fanfare, and menynewspaper editors undoubtedly decided to watch the 
experiment for a time before making regular use of the probabilities. The New 
York Herald, later one of the foremost weather service supporters, did not 
regularly include the government daily reports until May 5, 1871. The only 
Herald weather feature previous to this was the past day's temperature summary.^ 
It was stressed at the beginning that weather data for the press must be given 
without expense to the United States government because of the general use of 
weather information. Press reports were issued at 9:49 a.m. and midnight.
Special bulletins were also issued daily except Sundays for hot and cold waves, 
frost, dangerous river conditions, and the occurrence of actual rainfall exceeding 
one inch in twenty-four hours at selected stations.
17 The May 5, 1:20 a.m. probabilities read: "It is probable that on Friday 
northwest winds with cloudy, then clearing weather will prevail from Lake 
Erie southward and westward. Easterly' winds, followed by southwest winds 
and abating rains in the middle and eastern states," New York Herald.
May 5, 1871, p. 7.
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However, whatever reluctance there had been to use forecasts in 1871
soon disappeared. Commenting editorially in 1876, the New York Tribune accurately
asserted that the Signal Service was now an institution. Though its probabilities
did not always prove to be correct, they greatly aided in planning daily life.
Nevertheless, the House had cut recent appropriations at will so that purely
scientific advances would probably have to come outside of the Weather Service,
which would then apply the improvements.^ A noted scientist succinctly conveyed
the increasing reliance on the weather service when he declared:
While scientists cannot tell at what hours to carry an umbrella, they can 
tell when great storms and waves of intense heat or cold are coming so as 
to be of great value to all the industries of the land..,. All the 
discomforts of the weather cannot be avoided but the great disasters can 
be anticipated and obviated. ^
The press gained still another valuable means of disseminating weather 
news with the availability of a daily weather map in 1879. As is the aim today, 
an attempt was made to show the areas of equal temperature, isotherms? areas of 
equal pressure, isobars? weather conditions (clear, cloudy, raining) at certain 
stations? and the position of storm centers, with a large arrow denoting the 
expected future paths of storms. These maps were more complete than those used in 
Europe at the time, but lacked much coverage of the United States west of Denver.^ 
These press maps were an abbreviation of the Washington Daily Weather Man, with 
which we are still familiar today, and which was first issued as a tissue chart by 
manifold process in January, 1871. It was at first published three times a day, 
although the morning copy was the only one released to the public. By 1887, 175,
18 New York Tribune. August 11, 1876, p. 4» This newspaper maintained its own 
meteorological reporting network in a radius of one hundred miles around the 
city of New York.
19 Powell, Chautauauan. p. 297.
20 New York Tribune. May 17, 1879, p. 6
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387, maps were issued or a daily average of 4-80. Starting in the summer of 1888, 
the maps were published only twice daily.
In addition to the forecasts appearing in public places and in news­
papers, elaborate systems of display signals were developed to indicate tempera­
ture changes and precipitation. They became permanent equipment until replaced 
by the radio over forty years later. A common example to show a forecast of fair 
weather and higher temperatures consisted of two flags placed on one staff, the 
top flag white and the bottom yellow. Similarly for local rains and stationary 
temperatures a yellow flag rested on top of the blue flag. These all were used
by the railroads, for example, in Alabama. Variations of the above included sun, 
crescent, and star symbols, as used in Ohio and Pennsylvania. In this system red 
equalled temperatures while blue represented state of the weather. The red sun 
symbol foretold higher temperatures. The crescent stood for lower temperatures, 
and the star indicated stationary temperatures. The blue sun symbolized general 
rain or snow. A blue crescent stood for clear or fair weather, and a blue star 
signified local rains or snow. The 11*00 p.m. indications, or forecasts, for New
England were sent by the same code except that the flags were identified by
22numbers instead of symbols.
Despite constant practice, slow progress plagued meteorologists in their 
goal of attaining forecast verifications of more than eighty percent. They re­
mained confident of gaining eighty-five percent before too long and perhaps up to 
ninety percent sometime in the distant future. Professor Abbe, who was of the
21 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document 82, pp. 876-977 
(1886), to be referred to hereafter as Senate Document 82.
22 New York Tribune. January 8, 1878, p. 4, Prance was apparently the leader of 
the day in use of such weather symbols.
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impression that everyone should be pleased with accuracy of eighty-five percent, 
maintained that verifications probably never would attain an average above the 
coveted ninety percent* This prophecy certainly has held true for general fore­
casting to the present. It had always been a matter of deep concern as to 
methods of forecast verification. Under the Signal Service, conditions of 
precipitation and temperature were supposed to have covered three-quarters of the 
area of the forecast in order to be verified, while elements below twenty—five 
percent counted as zero. For instance, a foreeast of warmer today meant a six- 
degree change from the preceding day* In 1880 barometric pressure changes were 
counted as well* The whole system was quite detailed, much more so than at the 
present, and a statement of verifications was sent to the Chief every day by the 
board of forecast officers. By 1883 verification procedure was more rigid than 
in the earlier days, resulting in a lower record than in some previous years.
Forecast verifications for temperature changes and precipitation averaged seventy-
28
four percent during 1887.
Besides the forecasting of general weather conditions, special emphasis 
was soon given to sudden changes in weather which may affect large areas of the 
country. Of particular interest were cold wave warnings. Use of the cold wave 
flag, familiar to Americans until it was replaced by the radio as means of rapid 
forecast distribution, was begun at the start of 1878. This was the second 
official flag signal adopted by the Signal Service, the other consisting of the 
flag for high winds,^ By the end of 1886 the cold wave flag was available at 
290 cities and towns which then relayed the warnings on by telephone, railway,or
23 New York Tribune. December 21, 1887, p. 3»
24- New York Tribune. January 8, 1878, p. U*
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25telegraph to thousands of other localities. The cold wave warning flag 
measured six by eight feet, and was white with a black center two feet square. 
Aimed at giving thirty to thirty-six hours notice, it was based mainly on daily 
reports from fifteen Canadian stations. There was still a drastic need at the 
time for more Canadian northwest and northwest United States stations, a situation 
alleviated somewhat by opening of the Signal Corps Pacific coast telegraph service 
in January, 1885.
Expressing the hope that cold wave warnings could still be developed to 
a higher accuracy, General A. W. Greely, as chief, was not satisfied with this 
warning verification of approximately seventy-nine percent during 1887.*°
Meanwhile efforts were extended toward the improvement of storm warnings 
for coastal and inland waterways. One of the earliest innovations, the first use 
of cautionary storm signals for shipping, occurred on the night of October 2^ 1871. 
Twenty-four display stations were opened within the first year of operations, and 
red flags were hoisted at the expectation of winds exceeding velocity of twenty- 
five miles per hour.^ Chief Myer claimed sixty-nine percent storm warning 
accuracy during the first year of operations, the same as recorded for 1887. 
Station reports of the 1882-1883 period reveal the shortcomings of this type of 
weather service. For example the Buffalo, New York, personnel reported that 
during 1882 twenty-five times winds exceeded twenty-five miles per hour without th<
25 yew York Tribune. November 21, 1886, p. 9.
26 New York Tribune. December 21, 1887, p. 3.
27 Ingersoll, War Department, p. 169; see 17 Statutes at Large 366, allowing 
storm signals: Holland and Great Britain had employed storm signals in the 
middle of the nineteenth century.
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call for display of the red cautionary flag. Others complained that too often 
the flags were not hoisted soon enough, or were kept up too long after the d anger 
period.2*? Mariners sometimes reported difficulty in seeing the standard eight- 
foot square flag, and repeatedly expressed the need for detailed wind direction 
warnings as well as velocity.
Meanwhile the beginnings of another branch of service, ocean or marine 
meteorology, also originated within the first year of Signal Service weather 
duties. In June, 1871, Colonel Myer requested ships at sea to take three daily 
simultaneous observations, especially along the coasts. Still operating on a 
fragmentary basis, marine work of the Signal Service expanded slowly until 1887, 
when the Secretary of War issued an order to have it turned over to the care of 
United States Navy Hydrographic O f f i c e . P r i o r  to this the Signal Service 
attempted to perfect a system whereby ships would report weather data within
28 Senate Document 82, pp. 981-985 (1886), Chicago's report for 1882 added that 
reporters and correspondents seemed to ignore the constant value of the Signal 
Service but did not hesitate to criticize its defects. It requested the 
installation of a self-registering anemometer three miles out into Lake 
Michigan, presumably to aid in the verification of the storm warnings.
29 Senate Document 82, p. 466 (1886), Canada employed an inverted cone as a 
storm signal which indicated the intensity of the storm, not just the fact 
that there was to be a storm, as the American signal flag showed.
30 Duluth sergeant observers substituted a fifteen foot square flag, Senate 
Document 82, p. 466 (1886).
31 New York Daily Tribune. January 26, 1877, p. 4, In 1877 Navy vessels were 
ordered to provide observations for the Signal Service.
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forty-eight hours after arrival, a system also urged by Great Britain.32
Signal Service meteorologists coped with still a different phase of 
activity when they were called upon to correlate weather science with river and 
stream conditions in the country. River and flood data were not collected by the 
Weather Service until 1873, at which time daily stage readings were gathered by 
telegraph and p u b l i s h e d . T h e  first major floods encountered by the new branch 
occurred in the spring of 1874-, while floods of the mid-eighties caused the 
extension of river work and the establishment of forty-three special river stationsi 
in 1887. One of the first actual river warning systems was organized in 1881 by 
the community of Chattanooga, Tennessee, while similar systems were underway by 
1885 at Pittsburgh and St. Louis. The river gauge was fastened securely with 
railroad rails at Chattanooga to prevent it from washing away. These river 
stations sent weekly reports to the Signal Service section centers and also 
dispatched telegraphic reports in cases of excessive rain. Small in reality, the 
entire river branch administration was handled by only one Central Office 
employee in 1889.^
32 Senate Document 82, p. 580 (1886),Sergeant Penrod, in charge of the New 
York station, also supervised collection of observations from ships at sea, 
while ship weather instruments were checked at New York and Baltimore,
33 Park Morrill, "Floods of the Mississippi River," Weather Bureau Bulletin E 
(Washington, D, C., 1897) pp. 3,4-,28; see also Ingersoll, A History of the 
War Department, pp. 171-172, The first systematic investigation of river 
stages had been undertaken by the Delta Survey, organized by Congress in 
1850 and submitting its final report in 1861. Congress in 1871 requested the 
Secretary of War to have the Army Engineer Corps direct observations and 
place gauges on the rivers. The Signal Service acquired data from the Delta 
Survey on approximately ten major floods for the 1815 to 1874- period.
34- Willis L. Moore, "Work of the Weather Bureau and the Rivers of the United 
States," Weather Bureau Bui1etin No. 17 (Washington, D. C., 1896), p. 8.
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Interest in a hurricane service as part of a national meteorological 
organization appeared, but no organized warning system evolved until the late 
1890's. The Signal Service did begin accurate tracings and descriptions of all 
West Indies hurricanes in 1878. Here again past data proved valuable, as tables 
of previous hurricanes existed, expecially those taken by Andreas Poey for 
hurricanes in the West Indies, 1493 to 1855. On August 6, 1873» the Signal
35Service received cable reports from Cuba, the first from Father Benito Vines.
These were stopped in 1881, however, and American stations were closed because of 
a question as to the legality of weather stations outside the United States, even 
though costs of the service amounted to only $3»000 annually. During the 1872- 
1874 period six hurricane stations had been opened by the Signal Service in the 
West Indies.^ Colonel Myer and his successor, General W. B. Hazen, who served 
as Chief from 1880 to 1887, also encountered other difficulties with the West 
Indian program because of the imperfect cabling and incompetent foreign weather 
observers.
Besides tracing storm movement Father Antonio Cabre of Havana produced 
a printed hurricane forecast in 1875, apparently saving many lives, while the 
Signal Service had already delivered one warning during the August, 1873, Nova 
Scotia storm.37 Another attempt was initiated in the late eighties when General 
Greely, who was Chief from 1887 to 1891, supplied certain native observers with 
instruments, and they again maintained the daily observations. This procedure 
proved to be too expensive at the time and became a program of only special
35 Edgar B. Calvert, "The Hurricane Warning Service and Its Reorganization,"
The Monthly Weather Review, vol. 63 (Washington, D.C., 1935), pp. 85-88.
36 Senate Document 82, p. 296 (1886).
37 Ivan R. Tannehill, Hurricanes: Their Nature and History (Princeton University, 
1938), p. 112.
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observations, when conditions looked most favorable for hurricane development. As 
a result, the service lost most of its effectiveness.
Weather reports regarding floods, hurricanes, or lake storms benefitted 
commercial and maritime interests more than any other phase of the American 
economy. To offset this concentration of activity, efforts were turned toward the 
aid of agriculture in its perennial struggle against the elements. To augment the 
daily general forecasts and cold wave warnings originating at Washington, D.C., it 
proved necessary to employ some means of decentralization of authority in order to 
provide more timely service to the individual farmer. Use of weather signals, 
flag displays, and newspaper forecasts also proved insufficient to such highly- 
specialized needs. Signal Service officials decided that cooperation of state 
authorities was essential to coordinate agricultural services. The idea was not 
entirely new, as Pennsylvania had even appropriated funds in the 1840‘s for the 
collection of climatological records. Individual state weather services to 
supplement the federal service became the concentrated plan of Cleveland Abbe and 
Assistant Signal Service Chief Major H. H. C. Dunwoody. Though the Iowa law of 
1878 was the model for such services, by 1881 only Nevada and Iowa, had actual 
services in existence. However, new services were later started in Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Ohio, and by 1892 
these state services reported over 2,000 observers in their employment. Monthly 
records were sent to state colleges or university agriculture departments which 
in turn forwarded the data to the Signal Corps central office. The first 
Convention of State Weather Services was held at Washington, D.C., in 1885, 
originating with the idea of discussing common problems and coordination of
38 Senate Document 82, p. 127 (1886).
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activities.
Of foremost concern to agriculture were forecasts and reports of current 
data during the crop-growing seasons. To help this need, special cotton region 
observations were begun in 1883 through the addition of 6:00 p.m. Eastern 
Standard Time daily observations, relating daily maximum and minimum temperatures 
and area precipitation. Similarly corn and wheat region reports were inaugurated 
in the period during the Signal Service, and were based on extra observations at 
7:00 a.m. seventy-fifth meridian time. Starting around 1882, the temperature and 
rainfall data were also sent twice daily to boards of trade and cotton exchanges.
In addition an attempt was made to give fruit-growing areas frost warnings for all 
temperatures of less than forty degrees.
Another reason cited for the establishment of state weather services 
was to aid the Signal Service in the routine collection of climatological data 
from voluntary observers throughout the nation. This phase of operation 
experienced an extremely slow development. However, the new meteorological service 
received a boost in 1874 when the corps of 383 voluntary observers of the Smith­
sonian Institution was transferred to the Signal Service.^ Thereafter 
observations from these men became sporadic, and many ceased observing, until a 
revival of the voluntary observation corps followed under General Greely during 
the 1887-1891 period. Nevertheless, the Smithsonian Institution records have 
been described as quite accurate by later Weather Bureau officials. Although the 
corps of voluntary observers had been established by the Smithsonian Institution, 
and its system had been merely copied by the Signal Service, there were technical 
changes initiated from time to time. Original authority for the employment of 
cooperative observers was later given to enable the Secretary of War to issue sets
39 National Archives,»Folder on Weather Bureau Records," MS, in National 
Archives.
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of instruments, not exceeding #15.00 to any one county, to voluntary, vnpaj d 
observers, to secure data*^® General Hazen, who succeeded Myer upon the latter's 
death in 1880, issued detailed instructions in 1882 for the voluntary observers of 
his service.**1 Observers were urged to take readings at 7:00 a.m., 2*00 p.m., and 
9:00 p.ra. local time. If they were unable to comply with this procedure, readings 
could be obtained at 8:00 a.m. and 8*00 p.m., or 9:00 a.m. and 9*00 p.m.
Despite the elaborate instructions covering other data, voluntary 
observer records consisted mainly of temperature and precipitation records in 
addition to whatever extra comments the individual observer might enter. 
Standardization of observation times and equipment remained woefully lacking. To 
facilitate the central collection of all data a records division was established 
at Washington, D. C», in 1887 to tabulate and index all cooperative observations.
Regular Signal Service stations also contributed detailed data for the
purpose of climatological records as seven to eight daily observations were
entered for the period 1870 to 1881 at all such stations, including noon and local 
•  1*2
time observations. Climatological data of regular station records presented a 
E5 ¿6 Statutes at Large 398, enacted' in 1890.
1*1 W. B. Hazen, Instructions for Voluntary Observers of the Signal Service of the 
United States~Army (Washington, lb82), These instructions Inciuriftd d-i racTTcrjiT" 
for obtaining relative humidity, sea level barometric pressure, and other data 
beyond that actually received from the voluntary observers.
1*2 Senate Document 82, pp. 95U-958 (1886), includes roster of 1885. In 1885 
eight regular stations made observations six times a day, 109 stations took 
five a day, omitting the 3*00 a.m. observation, and thirty-four stations 
entered three observations a day. The extra observations, other than those 
telegraphed, were needed in order to record the diurnal changes in 
meteorological conditions•
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much more complete account of weather occurrences. Besides the standard data, 
special phenomena were also covered. The directions described the observation of 
the aurora borealis, dew, white frost, and especially the first and last frosts 
of the spring. Fog observations were also entered, as were times of thunderstorms, 
hail, tornadoes, and landspouts. Even rainbows, shooting stars, and fireballs 
were mentioned, showing the close ties with astronomy in those early days.
Special reports also accounted for the observations of initial appearances of 
locusts, and when buds first appeared on the trees in the spring.
At the same time the Surgeon General's office continued to take 
climatological observations, and by September, 1888, had increased the number of 
medical officers taking observations from forty to 160. Officers kept detailed 
data of maximum, minimum, and mean temperatures; time and quantity of precip­
itation; and wind direction records which later became available to the Weather 
Bureau. Unfortunately these army observations proved less valuable than those of 
the Smithsonian Institution because of the poor geographical distribution of 
stations.
From the above description of domestic weather services it becomes 
readily apparent that the majority of permanent phases comprising the routine 
activity of the national weather service were already started prior to 1891. 
Throughout these entire first twenty-one years of operation the keen mind of
43 National Archives, Climatolopiaal Records. 11, lix, Data included! barometric 
pressure readings, corrected and station; mmrfrmnn and minimum and mean 
thermometer readings; dry and wet-bulb temperatures and hygrometer readings, 
as well as the daily average; time and quantity of precipitation; wind 
direction and estimated force; direction, kind and amount of lower and upper 
clouds; weather; and other pertinent remarks. Approximately thirty sunset 
stations had been added during the period 1877-1885. They telegraphed 
observations to the nearest regular station at sunset.
Professor Abbe provided the impetus for the majority of seemingly bold attempts 
to translate the infant meteorological theory into practical application. In this 
respect the United States ranked second to no other modem nation in the availa­
bility of public weather information. At the same time European weather services 
generally devoted a larger proportion of time and appropriations to urgently 
needed research or to climatology. For example, Russia possessed approximately 
the same number of regular stations. Russia had very few voluntary observers, and 
offered only one-tenth of the amount of United States services.
Perhaps the leading foreign services of this period included France, 
Great Britain, and Holland.^ One sizeable advantage held by the United States 
was the existence of several stations west of the major centers of population, 
thereby giving some advance notice of the normal west to east progression of 
weather. The Atlantic Ocean prevented such protection to western Europe. Nearly 
all European services employed a civilian head and received observations from 
both civilian and military posts wherever possible. They had no rigid controls 
over observers and hence obtained too few daily reports compared to this
/ r
country. ^ Comparative costs of national weather services also reflect the 
presence of more extended service in the United States, even though a portion of 
higher costs this side of the Atlantic Ocean must be attributed to the larger
44 New York Daily Tribune. January 26, 1877, p. 4.
45 Senate Document 82, p. 252 (1886), Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden 
weather services were all under the navy departments while the Austrian 
service was independent, and in France the weather service fell under the 
Ministry of the Interior. Weather service in England was maintained by the 
Royal Society, and in Russia, by the Academy of Sciences*
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geographical area.^ The neighboring Canadian Meteorological Service featured 
considerably lower expenditures than those of the Signal Service through much
tn
greater dependence on voluntary observations.
Despite the difference of emphasis between Signal Service and European 
weather services, several examples indicated the fact that international 
meteorological cooperation could be obtained with much greater ease than the 
settlement of other conflicting interests. "While European nations ignored the 
United States role as a political threat in this era, it could not be denied that 
American weather observations would be helpful to European forecasters. Likewise, 
the Signal Service expressed the desire to receive European observations for their 
research value. One of the earliest instances of this interest was expressed at 
the International Meteorological Organization conference in 1873 at Vienna.
Nations agreed to maintain daily observations, taken simultaneously, in an effort 
to study weather conditions on a hemispheric basis instead of just for an 
individual nation's area.^ As a consequence, the Signal Service published the 
Daily Bulletin of Iaternational Simultaneous Meteorological Observations from 
1875 to 1884.
46 Senate Document 82, p. 314 (1886), For those portions of the 1885 expendi­
tures for signals, instrument shelters, maps, bulletins, and rents the 
following figures are givens Austria-Hungary $14,000, France $50,000, Great 
Britain $50,000, Germany $40,000, Russia $60,000,and the United States 
$82,500.
47 Senate Document 82, p. 466 (1886), Having started its service in 1869, in 
1885 Canada maintained 184 stations, and had two more signal cautionary 
stations than did the United States.
48 National Archives, Climatological Records, p. xxiv, A movement for gaining 
international simultaneous observations was undertaken in the infancy of the 
weather service. Colonel Myer attended the conference at Vienna and was one 
of the major proponents of such a plan.
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These simultaneous observations were first taken at 7i35 and later 
7:00 a.m., Washington, D.C., time, and included a larger number of simultaneous 
observations than those used later for the Daily Weather Map Of The Northern 
Hemisphere, which was begun by the Weather Bureau in January, 1914-« After 1884 
only a monthly bulletin was published. These bulletins, of course, were not for 
use in immediate forecasting, but served as a study of past situations revealed by 
the simultaneous observations. Actual publication followed approximately one 
year after the observations had been taken* Although such efforts for collecting 
data were discredited in some circles at that time, the true value of having such 
a long series of simultaneous observations was seen especially during World War II 
when efforts turned to what is known as applied climatology.
Another epoch-making example of international exchange of information 
materialized in 1885 when the Signal Service, in cooperation with the 
Meteorological Office of Great Britain, issued warnings of Atlantic storms. A 
British account of the service tells of the coincidence of many storms shortly 
after the inaugural of these alerts. A typical warning was that of December 19, 
1884, sent from the United States:
At 4s00 a.m. on the 16th in latitude forty-two degrees North longitude 
sixty degrees West with barometer at 29.4 inches, there was a fresh gale 
from the South veering to the West, eight hours later to the East North­
east.^
This was probably the same storm which swept the British Isles December
19, 20, having moved at the irate of twenty-six miles per hour, or 2,600 miles in
50
100 hours. The British were very happy to receive such a warning.
49 Nature. A Weekly Illustrated Journal of Science. January 1, 1885 (London, 
1885), pp. 197-198.
50 Nature. A Weekly, p. 198, The editors not only praised the United States 
Signal Service but also the enterprising owners of the New York Herald, who, 
they claimed, had probably done more than anyone else to popularize the
_____effects of Atlantic weather on British weather, for foretelling such storms.
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A third category of international meteorological planning expressed the
desire on the part of weather scientists to obtain detailed observations of polar
climate in order to farther the meager existing knowledge as to the formation of
extreme cold waves. Specifically the ensuing polar expeditions were the result
of conferences at Hamburg in 1879 and Bern during the following year where ten
nations agreed to take such observations. The United States Congress approved
two stations, one at Point Barrow and one on Lady Rranklin Bay. The idea of an
Alaskan weather service was not entirely new, as Russia had taken the first
weather observations there in 1828 at Sitka, with the United States continuing
these records following the purchase of Alaska from Russia. Most famous of the
expeditions was that trip to Lady Franklin Bay in 1881-1884 during which time the
leader, Lieutenant A. W. Greely, later the last chief of the Signal Corps weather
service, 1887-1891, completed meteorological observations, despite hardships and
51the death of many of his comrades.
Reports in the form of detailed journals kept by Lieutenant Greely and 
by Lieutenant P. H. Ray, who was at Point Barrow, have been retained. Greely's 
journal covers the period of July, 1881, to April, 1882, and his detailed observa­
tions contained barometric pressure, air temperature, wind, clouds, and weather 
conditions. While the initial entry is for July 7, 1881, at 7s00 a.m., other 
observations were made at 11:00 a.m. and then later at 3*00 p.m., 7:00 p.m., and 
11:00 p.m. Hourly observations were taken on occasion, during which times Greely
51 A. W. Greely, "Journal of United States Expedition to Lady Franklin Bay, July, 
1881-April, 1882," MS in Nations! Archives. Other expeditions included 
visits to Greenland. European nations also sponsored expeditions, for 
example, those by the famous Fridtjof Nansen.
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also recorded water temperature observations* Greely and his men were stranded, 
when the rescue ship Proteus was wrecked. The survivors were not saved from this 
frigid existence until 1884-. Subsequently General Hazen, in his annual report for 
1884, requested an impartial investigation into the reason for this inability to 
relieve the Greely Arctic expedition. Failure to salvage provisions to leave for 
the stranded explorers was the tragic error of the relief party, which had left 
the Arctic despite its rescue responsibility.^
Although stressing public services from the beginning, Signal Service 
research activities of the non-international variety centered around a number of 
projects, most of which were directed by Professor Abbe. One lasting innovation 
of the Signal Service was the publication of the Monthly Weather Review in 1873.
53This journal became a permanent and valuable reservoir of meteorological studies. 
By the middle eighties research studies were conducted at the Central Office study 
room, where studies included an index of meteorology, the distribution of moisture 
in the air, a treatise on the laws of meteorology, a report on tornadoes from a 
corps of special observers, and instructional material for Signal Service trainees
c I
at Fort Myer. *
Colonel ifyer, not overly interested in research, employed only one 
permanent, civilian professor, while Hazen added four senior and three junior 
professors after 1880. Of this enlarged staff one man was in charge of 
investigations on atmospheric electricity and the instruction at Fort Myer. 
Professor H. A. Hazen (no relation to the Chief) had studied with Professor Ellas
52 New York Tribune. October 23, 1884, p. 3; November 14, 1884, p. 2.
53 Senate Document 82, p. 260 (1886).
54 Senate Document 82, pp.247-263 (1886). Abbe had charge of the study room 
with ten assistants including enlisted men and civilians.
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Loomis at Yale, then joined the weather service in 1881, working mainly on 
thermometry exposure. Hazen later studied ballooning and made numerous test 
flights for the service.
Ballooning had proved to be one phase of research pleasing to i^ jrer,
whose Bureau aeronaut of the seventies was S. Ik, King, himself a student of
weather. Professor Abbe desired to ascend with King on his two flights, obtaining
permission from his life insurance company for such a novel risk. Another
aeronaut completed four Signal Service ascents from 7,000 to 10,000 feet in 1885,
finding relative humidity of eleven percent at 7,000 feet, or much lower than
readings in the seventeen years of records on Mount Washington, New Hampshire.
Professor Hazen followed with several balloon flights in 1886 and 1887 and even
suggested a transatlantic flight during the nineties. Numerous flights were
completed in Europe at the same time with a German plan, put into practice in
1888, far in advance of all others. It was led by Richard Assmann, who attempted
to find the true temperature and moisture in the air. Complaining that readings
taken inside the balloon were too high because of solar radiation and lack of wind
in the balloon, he compensated for this error by placing instruments outside of
55the car in order to get more representative readings.
Among the other research projects, Professor Charles F. Marvin, later 
chief of the Weather Bureau, was then undertaking a study of wet bulb temperature 
conversion tables while still further studies covered standards for thermometry 
and a lakes survey.
Of extreme interest to weather enthusiasts of the present era, as a
55 0. L. Fassig, ed., MReport of the International Meteorological Congress at
Chicago, 1893," Weather Bureau Bulletin jfo. 11 (Washington, D.C., 1896),
Fart Three, pp. 730-733.
I
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result of the 1950 inaugural of official tornado alerts, are the advanced ideas
on the subject in Signal Service days. Lieutenant J. P. Finley had become quite
interested in tornadoes and completed a manuscript on his project. Unfortunately
his manuscript has been lost* Finley actually practiced formulating severe storm
alerts according to the appropriate synoptic situation, but these efforts, started
in 1884, and forerunner of our vastly improved warning service of the last several
years, were never made public at that time. Finley kept rigorous verification
tables of his results and attained a fair degree of accuracy, all without the
later advantages of upper air data. A public release of the type, "Conditions are
favorable for severe local storms this afternoon," was the limit to which the
service would proceed in the way of an official alert, as the word tornado could
56not be used in public releases. Finley worked heavily on the theory of fore­
casting by local conditions for a few hours in advance of severe weather and aimed 
for forty percent accuracy on sixteen-hour forecasts.
Although these numerous research projects found enthusiastic support 
from General Hazen, several undertakings urged previously by various scientists 
had been rejected. During the first year of the national weather service Colonel 
'Myer refused to undertake atmospheric electricity measurements because of the 
imperfect electrometer used for such observations. In similar fashion an 
elaborate scheme designed in 1872 to produce rainfall by cannon barrages failed to
56 Senate Document 82, pp. 273-275, 280, 355-359 (1886), for an account of
Finley's work on tornadoes. Restriction on use of terminology are in Weather 
Bureau.Instructions No. 60. 1883.
I
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gain the necessary Congressional or Signal Service support.-^ After the flourish 
in research during 1880-1887 there followed a general reduction of like 
activities under General Greely, mostly because of the unsettled status of the 
weather service, as the country slowly waited its transfer to civilian operations 
throughout the four years. Congressional investigations conducted in 1885 also 
revealed opposition to research expenditures by several leading Signal Service 
officers.^
In retrospect the steady increase in public services and research 
activities is quite evident from a hasty survey of Signal Service appropriations 
for meteorology during the twenty-one years as the national weather service. Prom 
an initial appropriation of $15,000, annual expenditures in fiscal year 1885 
totaled #241,000, excluding salaries.^
57 New York World. January 2, 1872, page number missing, but the article is on 
an editorial page, Edward Powers, civil engineer of Chicago, cited the 
popular notion of rain caused by the American Civil War, Franco-Prussian War, 
and the Mexican War battles to suggest that the Signal Service fire 300 
pieces of ordnance simultaneously during fair weather conditions in order to 
test this theory.
58 Senate Document 82, pp. 963, 226 (1886), Lieutenant H. H. C. Dunwoody 
rejected the idea of further research. He similarly opposed research in the 
1890’s under the civilian Weather Bureau.
59 Senate Document 82, pp. 105-107 (1886), for fiscal 1885, Chief Hazen was 
given $241,000 for the observation and reporting of storms, $24,000 for the 
maintenance and repair of military telegraph lines, and $20,000 for the 
establishment of a Signal station on the island of Nantucket. An additional 
$245,158 was given by the Paymaster General of the Army to cover salaries. 
Under the items for observation and reporting of storms the individual amount) 
included: instruments $5,500} storm signals (lanterns, flags, observers) 
$10,000} telegraphic reports $136,000} cotton belt reports, including 
observers, $7,000} lifesaving stations $5,500} instrument shelters $2,000} 
rent, offices, civilian observers, heat, and ice $40,000} observations at 
river gauges $10,000 for 2,000 river gauges and 200 rain gauges} maps and 
bulletins $25,000.
I
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To coordinate all activities the administration of the headquarters at 
Washington, D.C., in addition to the important indications division and study 
room, involved routine clerical duties» In addition a training center for nev 
recruits was maintained nearby at Fort Myer, Virginia. Enlisted trainees assigned 
to the meteorological branch of the Signal Service were given six months of 
lectures and study from Loomis’ Treatise on Meteorology, as well as Signal Service 
reports, and instructions on observation techniques.^® For the task of controllin) 
field operations throughout the country, enlisted men, usually sergeants, were 
placed in charge of all but five percent of the stations.^ Three to five 
enlisted men were employed at each station the size of Chicago, San Francisco, and 
Boston, while many one-man stations also existed. Following the Signal Service 
unrest of the mid-eighties, rigid discipline was maintained in an effort to 
bolster efficiency, and, starting in 1889, the official in charge wherever possible 
gave employees a daily numerical grade. To meet the perennial need for 
additional officers, twelve weather observer sergeants were selected each year to 
compete for two officer commissions, although those with only common school 
education had little chance of rising above the rank of sergeant. The vital 
telegraph communications were maintained for the weather service by Signal Corps
corporals.^
60 Senate Document 82, pp. 209-230 (1886), Each man also attained a fair knowl­
edge of telegraphy and international signalling. Approximately twenty percent 
of the trainees failed the final examination and had to repeat the course of 
training. Mathematics requirements did not exceed decimal fractions, but 
applicants were also tested in English grammar, geography, and history.
61 War Department, Signal Office, Roster of January 1, 1891, shows employees 
outside of Washington, D.C., Civilians were in charge of the other seven of 
the total 155 stations. In 1885 the Signal Service employed sixty-five 
civilians.
62 National Archives, Administrative Records of the Weather Bureau, MS, at the 
National Archives, p. 11.
63 _Senate Document 82. pp. 325-326 (1886).__________________________________
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Life at the field stations was not always without its excitement, 
especially during the very first years of operations. Signal Service personnel 
participated in a number of unexpected events including the suppression of labor 
riots in 1873 and isolated Indian wars including the Geronimo campaign. They also 
performed extra public services during several emergencies including yellow fever 
epidemics.^ In another case operations at the key Chicago station were 
interrupted by the famous 1871 fire.^
Despite the obstacles encountered, the important weather observations 
reached the headquarters at Washington, D.C., with amazing regularity. Though 
starting a forecasting service in 1870 with little precedent and few employees 
with practical experience, the Signal Service proved to the skeptics that 
weather prognostications were worthwhile.
64- National Archives, ÇJ-in^to^ogL^.?. Records, p. xxiii.
65 Signal Service, Annual Report. 1871-1872. p. 17, A splendid account is given 
of the great fire in Chicago, October 8, 1871, by one of the observers 
there. Station instruments were destroyed by the fire,and no reports were 
received from Chicago until October 14.
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CHAPTER IV
The Struggle for Civilian Control
Despite its rapid extension of public services, the Signal Service, or 
Signal Corps, as it was often called after 1880, did not escape a series of com­
plaints, especially from Congress. In the final analysis, this period of con­
troversy confirmed the opinion held in 1870 by Cleveland Abbe and others that the 
national weather service properly belonged under civilian control.
Fortunately for all concerned, the first few years following 1870 were 
comparatively free from large-scale attempts to alter the internal structure of 
the service. It is only natural that the crescendo of dissatisfaction increased 
throughout the succeeding years as the Signal Service expanded its meteorological 
activities.
Much of the credit for this peaceful beginning must rest with Colonel 
A. J. Myer, who served as chief of the Signal Service until his death in 1880.
Myer possessed the ability to organize his service in a seemingly effective 
manner to his contemporaries. This helped him to avoid excessive criticism from 
without as well as internal strife. For example, Myer prevented misunderstanding 
between civilian and military personnel under his command by retaining only one 
civilian professor, Cleveland Abbe. After Abbe relinquished his forecasting 
duties in 1873, officers of the Signal Service maintained complete control over 
this phase of activity. Throughout the 1870-1880 period ifyer stressed public ser­
vices. Therefore, development in the line of research, except for the Monthly 
Weather Review, was lacking. This negative policy fostered administrative tran­
quility, however, as it provided no basis for internal quarreling between those 
who measured the success of the Weather Bureau strictly by its general forecasts
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and those who believed that services must also be supported by scientific growth 
along all lines of meteorology.
In contrast to the absence of internal strife, there were isolated com­
plaints from without. Apparently as soon as the weather service began to be taken 
seriously by the majority of Americans, it was forced into a permanent defensive 
role against those people who blame the weather service for the weather instead of 
merely the forecasting aspect of meteorology. The meteorologist quickly realized 
that public opinion judges the value of the weather service by the frequency of 
incorrect forecasts, and not by the many occasions on which the predictions hold 
true. Critics fail to remember that there is no surer way to appreciate the dif­
ficulties of forecasting than to try it themselves.1
For those who did not rely on the forecasts issued by the Signal Service, 
there were several examples of rival prognostications. Issued by people ranging 
in status from cranks all the way to competent scientists, these private fore­
casts included daily, monthly, and seasonal predictions. Newspaper editors al­
lowed space for selected samples, but the press generally criticized any unworthy 
attempts. Henry G. Vennor, a private forecaster in Montreal, Canada, gained wide 
attention in the late seventies and early eighties for his long-range predictions. 
Vennor claimed to provide accurate monthly forecasts. In addition, he also gave
extra attention to special features of the weather, including the foretelling of
2the general thaw in spring. Vaguely-worded and often entirely inaccurate, these
1 Charles F. Brooks, Why the Weather? (New York, 1924), p. 53.
2 New York Tribune. February 2, 1881, p. 5.
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private forecasts gradually lost favor with the major newspapers.
In a lengthy review of Vennor*s forecasts for July, 1881, the New York
Tribune concluded that these efforts had proved less accurate than blind guessing.
They were rife with ambiguity, and contained only a few verifications in the 
3
entire effort. Whenever, as in this case, newspapers discontinued the publica­
tion of inaccurate predictions, the forecasts issued by the federal government 
were given increased attention. This aided in the reduction of unjust criticism 
directed at the Signal Service.
In addition to the usual complaints about incorrect forecasts, there
were also occasional attempts in Congress to readjust operations of the Signal
Service. One or both of two basic reasons, inefficiency of administration and
the necessity for the reduction of costs, were given in all cases. As early as
February 11, 1873, Representative John lynch of Maine entered a resolution to see
if it would not be best to consolidate the Signal Service with the Lighthouse
and Lifesaving agencies.^ In April, 1876, the Senate unanimously passed a
resolution for the Secretary of War to advise the Senate in detail as to the costs
of the Signal Service, with views about its transfer to the Department of the 
5
Treasury. The House had passed a similar* resolution in February, 1876. The 
reasoning behind these suggestions involved the similarity of services provided by
3 New York Tribune. August 24, 1881, p. 5.
4 Congressional Globe. 42d Congress, 3d Session, vol. 46, part 2, p. 1270 
(House, February 11, 1873).
5 Congressional Record. 44th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 4, part 3, p. 2793 
(Senate, April 27, 1876).
82
the two organizations. The Lifesaving Service was under the Department of the 
Treasury, and the Signal Service was part of the Department of War. Both, how­
ever, existed for the aid of shipping.
A third effort at consolidation was undertaken in January, 1878, when
Representative John B. Clark, Jr. of Missouri presented a resolution as a result
of the recent disaster on the coast of North Carolina involving the steamer USS
Huron. Clark believed that terrible inefficiency, for the lack of warnings,
existed in the Lifesaving and Signal Services, although their telegraph line
6
ran nearby. Clark wished to have the Committee on Military Affairs see if the 
efficiency could not be increased by transferring the Signal Service to the 
Treasury Department, or by consolidating it with the Lifesaving Service. As 
was the case in the previous discussions in Congress, nothing resulted from this 
suggestion.
These complaints failed to produce changes, but other Congressional 
action, of the variety designed to cut expenditures, led to further public dis­
satisfaction. In 1875 an appropriation item of $5,000 for health purposes in 
combating yellow fever was rejected by the House, to the dismay of people in 
areas affected. This refusal proved to be minor in comparison to general reduc­
tions forced onto the Signal Service in the summer of 1876. Several weather 
stations were closed, as appropriations for the new fiscal year had been cut by 
approximately $115,000. In order to meet this adjustment, for example, the im­
portant New York City station curtailed the printing of weather maps. The number 
of observations received from other stations in the country was also greatly re-
6 Congressional Record. 45th Congress, 2d Session, vol. 7, part 1, p. 448 (House, 
January 21, 1878).
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dueed. Daily recipients of this type of data immediately voiced their disap­
proval. Included were complaints in the New York area from cotton and produce 
exchanges, Maritime Association, Chamber of Commerce, and the National Board of 
Fire Underwriters.^
This was the first of several retrenchment drives which have frustrated 
the growth of the national weather service. They have all resulted in much public 
criticism of the curtailed services provided under economy restrictions, and the 
pendulum has then inevitably swung the opposite way with increased expenditures 
for additional facilities.
Although complaints were not entirely lacking, as described in the fore­
going account, the 1870-1880 period was, nevertheless, extremely calm in compari­
son to the ensuing administration of General William B. Hazen. The responsibil­
ity for all of the approaching difficulties did not by any means belong entirely 
to General Hazen. Many sources of controversy remained masked during the pre­
vious ten years, only to burst into the open with shocking violence after General 
layer's death late in 1880.
Perhaps the foremost example of inherited adversity emerged during the 
stammer of 1881, when Captain Henry W. Howgate, disbursing officer of the Signal 
Service, was arrested by federal authorities while visiting at Mount Clemons, 
Michigan. The initial charge in this prolonged scandal, a devastating blow to 
the prestige of the weather service, was that Howgate had embezzled #4-0,000 of
g
government funds by use of fraudulent vouchers. Howgate was subsequently in-
9
dieted for embezzlement of #90,000. Although the total sum of missing funds
7 New York Tribune. August 2, 1876, p. 5.
8 New York Tribune. August 17, 1881, p. 5.
9 New York Tribune. October 22, 1881, p. 1.
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was not determined, General Hazen later told the House Committee on Expenditures 
in the War Department that Howgate had relieved the government of possibly 
#237,000.10 Officials of the Signal Service believed that the money had been 
stolen over several years at the rate of approximately $60,000 per year.^^
Quite unconcerned about the whole procedure, Howgate was confined to his 
home in the nation’s capitol with illness two days after his arrest. Later in­
dicted by a grand jury, Howgate managed to stay free at home until late in 
October, when his $30,000 bond was forfeited, and he was sent to jail. The next 
news about Howgate came the following April when the accused escaped his guard 
while visiting his daughter, who was home from her studies at Vassar. A $500 
reward was posted immediately.^ Howgate, through the use of aliases, remained 
a fugitive for over twelve years. He was finally captured in 1894.^ After one 
acquittal, federal officials succeeded in obtaining the conviction of Howgate, 
who was sent to the penitentiary at Albany.^
Meanwhile, the Howgate case resulted in a number of repercussions for 
the Signal Service. To the charges that employees of the Signal Service aided 
Howgate, General Hazen issued a press release on September 21, 1884, in which he 
denied that the Signal Service had obstructed the law suit of the Department of 
the Treasury against Howgate's bondsman. Hazen reminded his critics that the 
Signal Service had aided in securing Howgate*s indictment.^
10 New York Tribune. March 25. 1886r p. 2.
11 New York Tribune. February 27, 1882, p. 5.
12 New York Tribune. April 14, 1882, p. 1.
13 few York Tribune. September 28, 1894, p. 1.
14 few York Tribune. November 23, 1895, p. 4.
15 New York Tribune, September 21, 1884, p. 2.
85
Of more serious nature was the effect of the Howgate case on annual ap­
propriations for the Signal Service* An immediate appeal arose, among those 
hostile toward General Hazen, to reduce the expenditures by the amount of missing 
funds. Actual reductions began during fiscal year 1883. Appropriations for all 
functions of the weather service, exclusive of salaries, totaled approximately 
$375,000 in 1882. Ey 1885 the figure had been reduced to $311,569.63.16 The main 
impact of the reductions was felt already in the beginning of fiscal year 1884, 
when eighteen stations were closed, including those located at several forts and
such cities as San Antonioj Tucson; Springfield, Missouri; Burlington, Vermont;
17and Santa Fe.
Reduced appropriations were not the only results of the fiscal scandal.
Throughout the period following Howgate’s initial arrest in 1881, came petitions
to Congress for a thorough investigation of the Signal Service. Representative
Benjamin Butterworth of Ohio responded early in the case by asking the House in
18
December, 1881, to check the operations of the weather service. The Chicago 
Board of Trade petitioned Congress for a more efficient Signal Service. These 
matters were all referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. Several bills 
were presented during the spring of 1882 asking for the reorganization of the 
Signal Service, but none of them received favorable action. One proposal suggested 
an increase in the number of officers and retention of military control.1^
16 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, p. 22 (1886).
17 New York Tribune. June 14, I883, p. 2.
18 Congressional Record. 47th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 13, part 1, p. 217 
(House, December 19, 1881).
19 47th Congress, 1st Session, House Report 1156, p. 188 (1882).
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While the clamor for investigations and reorganization was prevalent,
Secretary of War Robert T. Lincoln decided to evaluate the situation within his
department. Following the disclosure of missing funds, Lincoln had ordered his
own investigation of the Signal Service for activities during the period of
August-November, 1881. After completion of the probe, Lincoln advised Senator
John A. Logan of Illinois about the general inadequacies of the Signal Service.
Lincoln noted that while the late Chief of the Signal Service, General Myer, had
in 1870 secured the meteorological service for the Signal Corps, yet in 1881 only
eight people knew the indications and instrument work. There prevailed a lack of
20
audits and other routine safeguard measures in the weather service.
General Hazen answered these charges in a statement of August 17, 1882, 
claiming that the results of the investigation were entirely inaccurate and mis­
leading. He defended the Signal Service, stating that it was not just a lobbyist 
organization as had often been charged. Colonel Absalom Baird, who submitted the 
report of investigation to Secretary Lincoln, in turn scoffed at Hazen'3 answer, 
declaring that all the original data were obtained from Hazen's own subordinates. 
Baird also reported that there was lots of saber practice and other types of drill 
in Hazen1s service, but meteorological training was lacking. By December, 1882, 
Senator Logan was convinced of the need for a change, as he introduced a bill for 
the transfer of the weather service to the Department of the Interior,22 Although
20 47th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No, 39, PP* 4-8 
(February 15, 1883), This letter and the complete reports are part of MA 
Collection of All the Material Public Papers Bearing on the Subject of the 
General Weather Service and its Civilian Reorganization,” MS, assembled by 
T, J, Brown, and is on file at the National Archives,
21 Baird to Lincoln, October 5, 1882, Material on the,,,Civilian Reorganiza­
tion, p. 27, National Archives.
22 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2d Session, vol. 14, part 4, p. 3035 
(Senate, December 21, 1882), Senate Bill 2281,
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his fellow senators later agreed that considerable difficulties existed within 
the Signal Service, Logan’s bill received no attention.^
Reorganization or transfer of the national weather service did not come 
about at the time, yet a growing controversy within the Army was brought before 
the public, leading to further official investigations. The question involved the 
position of the Signal Service in relation to the Army of the United States, or 
essentially what degree of automony the Signal Service enjoyed as a component of 
the Army,
The problem had already been recognized during the 1870-1880 era, but 
General Rjyer had not encountered serious controversy over the situation. General 
Myer had urged legislation which would limit the size of his organization and 
furnish a definite policy of promotion as an attraction for new recruits. Actual^ 
the promotion of Myer in 1879 to brigadier-general was the only noteworthy ad­
vancement in prestige for the Signal Service*
General Hazen faced the unsettled question in 1880, as new aspects of 
the controversy arose. Other branches of the armed forces sought a portion of the 
appropriations assigned to the federal meteorological service. Senator George G. 
Vest of Missouri presented a resolution in December, 1880, which would allow Navy 
appointees and civilians into the weather service instead of solely Army ap­
pointees. Senator Allen G. Thurman of Ohio retorted that the observations were 
taken at the land military posts, hence the need for Army personnel. This 
answer evidently represented the majority of Congressional opinion for nothing
23 Congressional Record. 47th Congress, 2d Session, vol. 14, part 4, p. 3035 
(Senate, December 21, 1882).
24 Congressional Record. 46th Congress, 3rd Session, vol. 11, part 1, p. 90 (Sen­
ate, December 23, 1880).
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further came of the measure. General Hazen immediately sought an answer to the 
perplexing situation. He maintained that the Signal Service should enjoy the 
status of a separate corps, and, therefore, more freedom of controlling its own 
actions, as did the Army Engineers. Hazen was backed in this interpretation by 
Attorney General Wayne MacVeagh, despite the opposing beliefs of General of the 
Army William T. Sherman and Secretary Lincoln. The appropriation bill for fiscal 
year 1879 had specified that the Signal Service was to select two of its non-com­
missioned officers annually to become officers instead of leaving the selection to
25
regular army channels. This action gave support to Hazen*s contention,and ap­
parently led General Sherman and Secretary Lincoln to shift their support to 
those in favor of detaching the weather service, the major activity of the Signal 
Service, from military control. The New York Tribune staunchly supported General 
Sherman's suggestion that the approximate #1,000,000 used annually by the weather 
service should no longer be charged to the military budget.
Another portion of the controversy, also connected with the internal 
struggle in the Army, centered around the past procedure for maintaining an ade­
quate staff of officers for the Signal Service. In 1882 sixteen officers from 
the regiments worked for the Signal Service. This caused readjustments within 
the regiments, and left unsettled the question as to when the officers might be 
returned to their original organizations.
25 New York Tribune. August 17, 1881, p. 5.
26 New York Tribune. November 21, 1881, p. A.
Supporters of the present system attempted to explain a saving of ap­
propriations from this method. At the same time they realized the need for addi­
tional officers within the Signal Service.^ This dilemma was partially solved by 
the adoption in fiscal year 1884 of a system whereby sergeants in the Signal 
Service continued to fill the two officer-commissions each year.^® The compromise 
plan further consisted of the provision whereby two officers were released each 
year to return to their own regiments. This action provided the one genuine effort 
during the long struggle prior to 1887 to adjust the internal structure of the 
existing system.
While the preliminary steps toward the compromise regarding assignment 
of officers were taken in the spring of 1882, it was during the next session of 
Congress that a vicious attack was levied against the general administration of 
the Signal Service. The debate developed into a sharp exchange of charges and 
countercharges. Representative Frank E. Beltzhoover of Pennsylvania opened the 
assault by reiterating the charges of fraud against Captain Howgate.^ Beltz­
hoover aimed his attack especially at General Hazen, claiming that Hazen's of­
ficers went around soliciting favors from Congress for the service. In defense of 
Hazen, Representative William H. Calkins of Indiana replied that officers did 
visit boards of trade to gain sentiment in favor of a separate corps, but that 
this was perfectly legal. Among other things, Beltzhoover charged that Hazen 
collected $2.50 each from men in his service for a book costing him only twenty-
27 47th Congress, 1st Session, House Report 1156, pp. 181-182 (1882).
28 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, p. 216 (188$,
29 Congressional Record. 47th Congress, 2d Session, vol. 14, part 4, pp. 3068- 
3074 (House, February 21, 1883).
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seven cents, and that Hazen used government funds to have an article published in 
a foreign periodical. Beltzhoover even mentioned the previous courtmartial of 
Hazen in regard to his alleged cowardice in the battle of the Civil War at Shiloh. 
The Representative charged that although not technically, it had found Hazen 
morally guilty. Another charge against Hazen was that he had confined a dying 
man in a dungeon on suspicion of spying on the Chief.
Representative George L. Converse of Ohio labeled all these petty ac­
cusations as the holdover from General Hazen's testimony, which caused a house­
cleaning years earlier in military planning. President Rutherford B. Hayes 
removed Hazen from immediate charge of the army to give him peace in his present 
office, but spies followed him all over. Converse challenged the opponents 
instead to ask for a financial investigation. This ended the prolonged attack. 
Beltzhoover's resolution for an investigation failed, as did another effort to 
secure the publication of correspondence between General Hazen and the Secretary 
of War.
Hazen categorically denied all of Betzhoover's accusations, blaming it
all on the resentment of dismissed employees, who took their woes to the Congress-
30man, Hazen publicly invited an investigation. Hazen later charged that the
31attack was actually started by friends of Captain Howgate.
Besides the outbreak of new assaults with each session of Congress, 
General Hazen faced disagreement in policy with Secretary Lincoln. General Hazen 
suffered a rebuke over his refusal to consider a Negro applicant for the weather
30 New York Tribune. February 9, 1883, p. 2.
31 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, p. 797 
(1886).
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service. In April, 1884, W. Hallett Greene, a senior and first colored graduate 
at City College, New York, forwarded a letter to Hazen requesting enlistment.
v
He obtained the Civil Service exam papers and returned them to Washington, D. C.,
only to receive a letter from General Hazen stating that the Signal Service was
32not yet covered by laws allowing mixed-color enlistments.
General Alexander S. Webb, Greene's college president, referred the 
matter to Secretary Lincoln, who was highly displeased. Lincoln told Hazen that 
Negroes had been accepted in Congress, were employed as civilians in the War 
Department, and were already in the ranks of the infantry and cavalry. Lincoln 
declared that the Signal Corps should make no exception, and must allow a renewal 
of the application.
With the numerous differences of opinion and the examples of Congres­
sional attempts to promote an inquiry into the functions of the Signal Service, 
it was only a matter of time before a full-scale probe might result. Throughout 
the 1880-1884 period petitions had been received from boards of trade and cotton 
exchanges asking for improved services. Beginning in 1882, interests on the west 
coast petitioned unsuccessfully for better protection in that area. Finally, a 
joint congressional commission was named in 1884 to investigate conditions in the
Signal Corps and other agencies, with an eye to increasing the efficiency of all
33these organizations. The commission was created by a Congressional act of
32 New York Tribune. June 14, 1884, p. 5.
33 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82* It was 
provided for in the Sundry Civil Appropriations bill of July 7, 1884. Other 
organizations investigated were the United States Geological Survey, the 
Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Navy Hydrographic office.
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July 7, 1884, and renewed through the act of March 3, 1885. The commission 
chairman was W* B. Allison of the Senate, and other Senate members were Eugene 
Hale and George Pendleton* House members consisted of Robert Lowery, H. A. 
Herbert, and Theodore Lyman* Under the second commission, John T. Morgan re­
placed Pendleton, and John T* Wait succeeded Lyman. The testimony was taken dur­
ing the period of December 4> 1884, to December 28, 1885*
The hearings taken before this joint commission were voluminous, and, 
in reference to the personnel of the Signal Service, presented a noticeable 
split among the officers and enlisted men either for or against the present 
administration* Several officers and enlisted men testified violently against 
the service, while others quietly consented to the status quo* The individual 
complaints indicated at the time were the usual type heard by members of military 
forces* They included such charges as poor food, mistreatment, poor training, 
and no incentive for advancement* Several enlisted men claimed they were 
punished by assignment to isolated stations* Others claimed that they were
brought before a courtmartial for having instigated charges against a blaspheming 
34
officer. One of the individual complaints brought before the commission in­
volved the alteration of weather records, or erasure of errors, in order to 
escape reprimand*^
In answering these charges General Hazen denied the instances of harsh 
treatment and inefficient supervision of personnel* Morale was at an extremely
34 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No* 82, pp* 717- 
751 (1886)*
35 49th Congress* 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, pp* 504, 
509-527 (1886)*
93
low ebb when Hazen became chief in 1880. Hazen found Fort Myer a mud hole, the
fiscal records in poor shape, administrative records four years behind, property
scattered all over, and a poor type of influence among local boys at the Central
36
Office, who used all types of intrigue to remain at Washington, D. C. To 
restore order General Hazen initiated strict accountability in all phases of op­
erations. This created discord among those individuals accustomed to less 
stringent control.
Not all the complaints from the officers of the Signal Service were 
directed at Hazen*s disciplinary methods. Strong resentment existed over the 
stimulation of research undertaken by Hazen. As mentioned in the previous chap­
ter, Hazen employed several additional civilian professors, and placed an 
emphasis on scientific development, which had been lacking prior to 1880. Sev­
eral officers informed the Congressmen that the civil lists cost the Signal
37
Service #100,000 annually for research which could well be eliminated.
Tn addition to the personal complaints against the Hazen administration, 
the hearings also brought divided opinion on the necessity of the training center 
at Fort Myer, Virginia. Opponents contended that observers were in reality 
trained at the regular stations, and the time spent at Fort Myer was entirely 
unnecessary.^ In speaking of Fort Myer, General of the Army P. H. Sheridan 
emphasized emphatically that the Signal Service did not need this place because
36 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, pp. 784— 
815j 934-945. (1886).
37 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, p. 226 
(1886).
38 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, p. 469 
(1886).
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signalling was taught at all posts anyway. On the other hand, Professor Abbe 
defended his chief by stating that the men used signalling in the field if the 
telegraph lines were down. He failed, however, to explain in what manner sig­
nalling was used in connection with meteorological duties.
Of a more basic nature than the arguments over Fort Ifyer was the ques­
tion as to the merits of military versus civilian control of the weather service. 
Once again officers, enlisted men, and civilians differed in their views. Sev­
eral Congressmen requested Professor Abbe to commit himself as to whether or not 
the service should remain under the army. Abbe retorted that the British did it
that way and saidj "I think the Signal Corps as organized at present is capable
39
of doing the meteorological work assigned to it in 1870." He admitted there 
was a vast decrease in the number of government telegraph lines, the main reason 
for choice of the Signal Service in 1870. Military telegraph lines decreased 
from 6,000 miles in 1882 to 3,000 miles in 1885.^  Abbe added that physical ex­
ercise and military drill are necessary, and that the physical culture school was 
then in good repute. Abbe maintained that military discipline led to strict ac­
countability from each man for fear of summary treatment. Although not neces­
sary, it was advisable to have the weather service in the War Department.
General Hazen also stressed the need for discipline to supervise the 
far-flung organization. He felt that only military rule could retain men at 
their posts during emergencies like epidemics of yellow fever. If a civilian
39 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, p. 98 
(1886).
40 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, p. 294 
(1886).
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bureau controlled the weather service, expenditures would increase by approxi­
mately $350,000 per year, with a resulting decrease in accuracy of warnings by 
twenty percent. Hazen produced a letter signed by 146 of his enlisted men op­
posing a transfer to civilian s t a t u s . T h e  majority of officers also backed 
Hazen by requesting retention of the military supervision*
Opposed to the existing system of military control were several Army 
officers, scientists, and government officials. One of Hazen*s subordinates, 
Lieutenant William A. Glassford, presented an alternative plan of civilian-con­
trolled service. Glassford, who had been in the service for eleven years, 
claimed that the change to civilian status might eliminate approximately $300,000 
annually from the federal budget. Glassford asserted that he was thinking of a 
plan similar to that employed in Canada. He admitted that several stations 
would have to be closed, and suggested elimination of those in the central 
portions of Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota. In the East, Glassford 
would have placed four along the New Jersey coast, and consolidated other sta­
tions with the Lifesaving Service. One hundred well-spaced stations would do 
instead of 132. He even listed the proposed stations with the number of person­
nel needed at each. Glassford considered military control of the national 
weather service an accident of circumstance in the beginning, and there was no 
need to continue it. Incompetent civilians could be discharged from their jobs
in similar fashion to the way poor soldiers were discharged from the Signal 
42
Service, General Hazen promptly refuted Glassford’s plan as a reduction of ser-
41 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, p. 938
(1886).
42 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, pp. 460- 
497 (1886).
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vices and a certainty to offer teenage boy results*
Glassford*s testimony in favor of civilian status* but not the exact 
plan, was backed by General Sheridan, who had succeeded General Sherman at the 
top position in the Array, Secretary Lincoln reiterated his opinion, held for 
over four years, favorable to the transfer of the weather service. Lincoln 
claimed that there was lots of confusion between the military and meteorological 
work in the Signal Service, making the budget extremely difficult to handle.^
An example of the opinion prevailing among scientists was reflected in a petition 
to the Commission from the Committee of the National Academy of Sciences. This 
group recommended that the Signal Service, Coast Interior Service, and Geologi­
cal Survey all be placed under a new Department of Science, an executive depart­
ment. It was signed by M. C. Meigs, chairman.^
Appearing on June 8, 1886, the final report of the investigating com­
mission was an indictment of the existing state of affairs. The Congressmen 
reported, in summarizing the hearings of the joint Commission, against the system 
of mixed military and civilian regime in the weather service as injurious to the 
nation and in need of change. Evils and jealousies that were so apparent in the 
workings of the system, however, would only increase with a slow attempt to sup­
plant the military with the civil service. Members of the commission believed 
that a change could be made, and they should abolish the corps of soldiers in
43 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No* 82, p. 1002 
(1886).
44 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, p. 82 
(1886).
45 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 82, pp. 8, 11 
(1886).
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name who were not soldiers in fact, but a mere uniformed police force to watch 
the weather and to watch each other
There was abundant evidence of discontent, jealousy, and wrangling among 
the men of the service, both officers and enlisted men* From the very inception 
of the Signal Service strong rivalries sprang up between the two factions, mili­
tary and civilian, and to harmonize the two had been one of the most difficult 
and zealously undertaken tasks . Military men resented working under civilian 
heads. Speedy commissions angered graduates of West Point. Discontent, insub­
ordination, and resistance were invited by all of these factors, as did training 
under the Articles of War.
The report summarized the history of the weather service in the United 
States by saying that the meteorological methods were simple, and the only 
reason that the service came under the Signal Service was because the Army de­
tailed it the task. The Army received no benefit from the service. General 
Sheridan and former Secretary Lincoln both urged civilian status. The present 
Secretary of War, William C. Endicott, believed that the meteorological service
/ g
was technical and scientific. It should no longer be under the Army. Since 
the postal, internal revenue, lighthouse, and lifesaving duties were all under 
civilian jurisdiction, the weather service should have similar status. While
46 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report No. 1285, On findings of the 
Joint Commission, pp. 55-64 (1886).
47 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report No. 1285, On findingsof the Joint 
Commission, p. 60 (1886).
48 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report No. 1285, On findings of the Joint 
Commission, p. 59 (1886).
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admitting the necessity of the change to civilian supervision, the commission 
members did not present a clear plan whereby such action might follow. They 
submitted a money-saving bill to abolish the Signal Service, and to place the 
weather service in a civilian agency, effective July 1, 1886. Here the positive 
suggestions ended, for instead of assigning the new agency to another department, 
the report recommended the continued control of the service by the Department of 
War.49
In order to curtail expenditures, the commission suggested the reduction 
of the total force from the present 534- to 373 employees. Elimination of Fort 
Myer as the training center meant the discharge of over 100 men and savings of 
$100,000 per year. In contrast to the suggestions of the joint commission, the 
Signal Service was not abolished, and the meteorological operations remained with 
this organization. The only portion of the final report to be enacted Immediately 
was the abandonment of the training program at Fort Myer.
For an answer to the failure of more complete action resulting from the 
long investigation, several factors must be considered. In the first place, 
General Hazen maintained a large number of supporters both in and out of Congress 
Shortly before the release of the final report of the joint commission, Hazen 
had once again emerged victoriously from another investigation. This episode 
originated when officials in the Department of the Treasury claimed insufficient 
vouchers to account for various expenditures during the 1880-1884-period. Once 
more Hazen flatly denied any irregularities, explaining that all expenditures, 
including I m p  sum appropriations, were accounted for. Hearings were continued 
on the matter by the House Committee on Expenditures in the War Department.
4-9 49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report 1285, p. 63 (1886).
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Hazen was exonerated of all charges in its final report.^
The fact that Hazen1s fiscal record was clear gave much support to his 
followers. Critics were forced to admit that neither the joint commission nor the 
investigation during the spring of 1886 revealed actual irregularities of a 
financial nature. Viewed objectively, the worst fault of the Hazen administration 
was the attempt to employ strict military discipline. This certainly was not un­
common practice in military circles. Hazen was unfortunate in taking command of 
the Signal Service when the struggle for civilian control was coming forth. He
was hampered in another way by an unruly corps of officers.
While Hazen*s own record tended to give new life to his followers,
another reason becomes apparent in explaining the failure to achieve civilian 
status for the meteorological service in 1886. No agency pressed for the transfer 
of the weather duties at this time. Congressmen, therefore, frankly did not know 
what to do with the weather service. When no department requested the agency, it 
was much easier for Hazen to maintain his influence and retain supervision. The 
soundest suggestion, the one proposed earlier t$r the National Academy of Science, 
meant the creation of a new department, a move which the administration of Grover 
Cleveland wished to avoid. Therefore, the status quo prevailed in 1887 when 
General Hazen died.
General A. W. Greely was chosen to succeed Hazen. Proceeding to seek a 
solution to the perplexing situation, the Greely administration failed to quiet 
the storm of protest resulting from the previous seven years of discord. Several 
unusual examples of incorrect forecasts only aggravated matters.
50 Ngïï XsrjS Tribune. April 28, 1886, p. 2j also cited in Congressional Record. 
49th Congress, 1st Session, voi. 17, parts 1, 2, U, PP. 956, 1099, 3889 
(House, 1886).
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Despite the forecast for fair and warmer, New York City residents ex­
perienced snowfall of four inches on January 13, 1888. Teams of double horses 
were used on the Third Avenue streetcar line, yet moved with difficulty.'*'1' The 
prediction of winter storms accompanying systems of low pressure, as they pass the 
New York City area, remains a difficult task for forecasters. Unexpected heavy 
snows have fallen there on several occasions since World War II. In another case,
Senator Preston K. Plumb of Kansas criticized the general forecasts as very diffi-
52cult to interpret.
Other portions of meteorological activity in the Signal Service were 
criticized. Among the petitions received in Congress during 1888, were those from 
the Engineer*s club of Philadelphia, which called for automatic rain gauges at all
Signal Service stations. The Engineer’s club of Kansas City, Missouri, also sent
53a similar request.
Coupled with the increasing amount of external criticism were new mani­
festations of internal disorder within the Signal Service. One display of the 
discord reached the public when Lieutenant John C. Walshe, inspector for the 
Signal Service, told reporters that the man in charge of the predictions at Wash­
ington, D. C., was too much a scientist and too little a weather observer, prevent­
ing the transfer of his theories into accurate forecasts.^
51 New York Tribune. January 'LL. 1888. p. 3.
52 Congressional Becord, 50th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 19, part 5, p. 4.876 
(Senate June4, 1888).
53 Congressional Record. 50th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 19, parts 1-2, 
pp. 1004, 1939 (House, February 6, I888j Senate March 12, 1888).
54- New York Tribune. January 14-, 1888, p. 3.
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By 1889 General Greely became convinced of the futility of attempts to 
reconcile the opposing factions within his organization. Greely pointed to the 
very unsatisfactory conditions of the Signal Service and to the inefficiency of 
the present lieutenants. He expressed embarrassment for the lack of facilities 
for training enlisted men and officers. To alleviate the situation Greely recom­
mended elimination of military signalling, and favored the reorganization of his 
officer corps, whereby thirteen competent officers might be selected to perform 
the work of the present twenty.^ These admissions by the top official of the 
military weather service could do no other than solidify the adverse criticism 
brought forth during the Congressional hearings, as well as recognize the authen­
ticity of later complaints.
In addition to his determination to reduce the number of officers,
Greely actively undertook a program of replacing numerous enlisted men with civil­
ians. Starting in 1888, Greely aimed eventually to discharge approximately fifty- 
eight percent of the enlisted men, leaving a total of only 200 enlisted men.^
During the time while General Greely employed measures of administrative 
reorganization to enhance operations of the weather service, Congressional forces 
combined to continue the agitation for a civilian meteorological service. In 
1887 the drive for civilian control gained strong support from a contemporary 
battle on the part of agricultural interests for the creation of a Department of 
Agriculture. Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama and Senator William B. Allison of 
Iowa, both members of the joint commission in 1885-1886, were major leaders of 
this effort to place the weather service under a Department of Agriculture. A
55 Congressional Record. 50th Congress. 2d Session, vol. 20, part 2, p. 1764 
(House, February 11, 1889). See also New York Tribune. November 7, 1889, p. 3.
56 T. J. Brown, "A Collection of All the Material,” p. 33.
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bill including such a transfer to a new Department of Agriculture was placed before 
Congress in 1887. After passage in both houses of Congress, the measure was 
blocked in the conference committee. Minor details involving the future status 
of enlisted men and officers were used by Congressmen favoring military organiza­
tion to delay the transfer.
Similar efforts were undertaken in 1888. This time proponents of the 
change were successful in obtaining the creation of a Department of Agriculture 
to replace the former office of the Commissioner of Agriculture. On the other 
hand, the portion of the same bill in regard to the transfer of the weather ser­
vice was omitted.^
Following the pattern of the previous three years, on December 18, 1889, 
Senator William B. Bate of Tennessee introduced a bill to increase the efficiency 
of the Signal Corps by transfer to the Department of Agriculture,^ During the 
same month a Senate resolution requested additional statistics on annual salaries 
and the possible increase of funds required for a transfer. Secretary of War 
Redfield R. Proctor estimated the need of an additional #211,127. This was to 
include #53,000 for the Central Office and its new personnel. The remainder ap­
plied to the employment of 150 civilians outside of Washington, D. C.^° The lack 
of proper equipment at field stations was cited as a major shortcoming, with the
57 Congressional Record. ¿9th Congress. 2x1 Session, vol. 18, parts 1-3, pp. 29, 
542, 631, 1306, 2114-2122 (House, Senate, 1887).
58 Congressional Record. 50th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 19, part 5, p. 4876 
(Senate, June 4, 1888).
59 Congressional Record. 51st Congress, 1st Session, vol. 21, part 1, p. 215 (Sen­
ate, December 18, 1889). Senate Bill 1454» this measure finally became law 
the next year.
60 51st Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document 28, pp. 2-18 (January 14,
1890).
l!
103
conclusion that a transfer might well lead to more liberal support for such as-
¿ “I
pects of the service. Members of the House of Representatives also endeavored 
to draw up effective legislation for the purpose of placing the weather service 
under the Department of Agriculture.
By this time, supporters of the change maintained a vast majority of 
sentiment. General Greely at no time exerted pressure to forestall the impending 
crisis. From all outward appearance it might be concluded that Greely was now 
anxious to lose the meteorological branch of his organization. Secretary of Agri­
culture Jeremiah M. Rusk was fully as interested in securing the service. In 
Congress only a few technicalities had to be considered before a law of transfer 
could be passed. For one thing it was decided to provide honorable discharges to 
those military personnel who wished to remain with the civilian weather service. 
General Greely, fourteen second lieutenants, and fifty privates were retained in 
the Signal Corps. The final bill, however, allowed the Secretary of Agriculture 
to request the temporary services of General Greely and four other officers to aid 
in the training of civilian personnel. Finally, the effective date of the trans­
fer was delayed until July 1, 1891, in order to enable the Department of Agricul­
ture to obtain separate appropriations for the new Weather Bureau, as it was to be 
called.
With these details allowed for, the conference report on the transfer 
was passed by the House on September 29, 1890. The Senate concurred on the fol­
lowing day, and on October 1, 1890, President Benjamin Harrison approved the 
measure.^
61
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51st Congress, 1st Session, Senate, Report 4.02 on the Transfer of the Weather 
Service, p. 305 (March 6, 1890).
51st Congress, 1st Session, House, Report No. 1043 on the Transfer of the 
Weather Service, pp. 2-5 (march 25, 1890).
Congressional Record. 51st Congress, 1st Session, vol. 21, part 11, pp. 10691, 
10725, 10772 (Nouse-Senate, September 29-0ctober 1, 1890).
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The pertinent text of the law, which, with amendments, forms the legal
basis of the Weather Bureau to the present is:
The Chief of the Weather Bureau, under the direction of the Secretary 
of Agriculture, on and after July first, eighteen hundred and ninety- 
one, shall be charged with the forecasting of weather, the issue of 
storm warnings, the display of weather and flood signals for the benefit 
of agriculture, commerce, and navigation, the gauging and reporting 
of rivers, the maintenance and operation of sea-coast telegraph lines 
and the collection and transmission of marine intelligence for the 
benefit of commerce and navigation, the reporting of temperature and 
rainfall conditions for the cotton states, the display of frost and 
cold wave signals, distribution of meteorological information in the 
interest of agriculture and commerce, and the taking of such meteor­
ological observations as may be necessary to establish and record the 
climatic conditions of the United States, or as are essential for the 
proper execution of the foregoing duties.^
After twenty years of operation, the last half of which was marred by 
bitter controversy, this early contribution of the Signal Service to American 
meteorology came to an end.
64 26 United States Statutes at large. 653, Act of October 1, 1890.
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CHAPTER V
Civilian Control of Operations, 1891-1895
In 1891 the Weather Bureau became a civilian agency under the Department 
of Agriculture. Its new Chief, Mark Walrod Harrington, was born in Sycamore, 
Illinois, and attended Northwestern University and the University of Michigan, 
where he received his bachelor of arts degree in 1868, and the master's degree in 
1871. He was employed at the University of Michigan as assistant curator of the 
museum and teacher of mathematics, geology, zoology, and botany. Harrington spent 
the summer of 1871 in Alaska as astronomical aide to the United States Coast and 
Geodetic Survey. He studied at Leipzig during 1876-77, and spent part of the 
latter year as professor of astronomy at Peking, China. Harrington had been on 
leave from his appointment as professor of astronomy and director of the observa­
tory at the University of Michigan. Always interested in meteorology, he es­
tablished the American Meteorological Journal in 1884, and maintained close 
contact with Professor Cleveland Abbe and other meteorologists.^
Commenting editorially, the New York Tribune had expressed the desire 
that President Harrison would select a competent scientist for the position. 
Politics were not needed in either the Weather Bureau or the Post Office, which 
affect more people than any other governmental organizations. The United States 
was merely ready to follow the example of other nations by having a civilian 
weather service. At the same time the Tribune held no reproach for General A. W.
1 Dictionary of American Biography (New York, 1932), vol. 8, pp. 301-302, 
article by William J. Humphreys.
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Greely, who relinquished his post as chief of the Weather Service. Secretary 
Jeremiah M. Rusk certainly did attempt to secure a man with scientific background 
in his choice of Harrington, who served as chief until 1895#^
The advent of civilian control under Chief Harrington presented a peace­
ful transition from military administration. The actual change of weather service 
operation to civilian status involved no interruption of the daily collection of 
weather observations or public forecasts. As provided for in the basic transfer 
law, the sergeant observers on station were honorably discharged from the Signal 
Service, and remained at their same posts as civilian employees of the federal 
government. It will be recalled also that the Signal Service already had a number 
of civilian technical employees, located mostly in Washington, D.C., prior to 1891« 
Several Signal Corps officers were also retained temporarily. There was sufficient 
time for Chief Harrington to study the organization and general operation of the 
Weather Bureau without instituting drastic changes. Despite all the adverse 
criticism of the Signal Service, this army organization did set up a workable 
system embracing the basic features of our weather service.
A cogent example of just how beneficial Weather Bureau services had 
become to business and industry is revealed by the vast number of petitions sent 
to Congress in early 1892, requesting adequate appropriations for the Department
2 New York Tribune. March 23, 1891, p* 6.
3 Jeremiah M. Rusk to President Benjamin Harrison, June 29, 1891, Secretary of 
Agriculture Correspondence, in National Archives. Although records have not 
been located to determine the procedure employed in selecting the new chief, 
there was no apparent haste in concluding the matter. It was not until two 
days before the July 1, 1891 transfer, that Secretary Rusk recommended the 
appointment of Harrington as Chief of the Weather Bureau.
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of Agriculture and the civilian Weather Bureau in particular.^ All such petitions 
were referred to the Committee on Agriculture in the House, which held appropri­
ations hearings for the Weather Bureau at that time* Appropriations for the 
weather service had decreased during the ten-year period, starting with fiscal 
year 1883, when the total was 1993,520«'’ Periodic reductions had been made as a 
result of the Congressional investigations of the mid-eighties. By fiscal year 
1892, the first budget for civilian Weather Bureau, appropriations totaled 
$889,753*50* The change to civilian status did not cause an immediate change in 
appropriations, except to bring an end to annual deficits occurring during the 
188U-1891 period*
The transition to civilian control encountered little administrative 
difficulty, and the public services of the Weather Bureau likewise continued with 
but minor change* Forecasting procedure had not altered materially since the 
start of the service in 1870. Telegraphic observations, collected at the forecast 
centers, gave the experts data concerning weather conditions throughout the 
country. Of particular importance were various charts used to depict areas of 
changing barometric pressure, temperature, dev point, and wind, both direction and 
velocity* Eight charts were utilized in studying such synoptic situations prior 
to issuance of the forecasts* Isotherms and isobars were drawn to show lines of 
equal temperature and pressure, while a farther glance at groups of figures
U Congressional Record, $2d Congress,- 2d Session, vol. 2U, part U, pp. 2292,
2678, 2806, ¿9^ 0," 3'lh8, 3367 (1892)* Petitions included those from the 
Wisconsin State Cranberry Grower's Association, village boards of Oceola 
Mills, Wisconsin, boards of trade or chambers of commerce in Wichita, Mil­
waukee, Chattanooga, Davenport, Kansas City, Des Moines, and Omaha, and other 
requests from Massachusetts, and Minnesota. The Syracuse Grange also asle d 
for a more general distribution of weather reports.
5 53d Congress, 2d Session, House Report 80it, p. 2 (April 30, 189U)i 53d 
Congress, 3d Session, House Document 1722, p. 2 (January 30, 1895)*
6 Ingersoll, A History of the War Department, p. 17l*.
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clustered around each Weather Bureau station on the particular chart told the 
forecaster variations of the above. Places where precipitation had fallen or was 
occurring since the last observation were listed. The next procedure was to 
consider the speed of movement of both high and low barometric pressure systems, 
in order to foretell which areas of the United States would receive the advancing 
weather conditions, as shown from the charts at the moment. With the later 
addition of upper air data and frontal terminology, this is still the essence of 
general forecasting today.
One change, often discussed but not effected at this time, involved the 
possibility of producing seasonal forecasts. Chief Harrington was perhaps unduly 
optimistic for his day, or even for ours, because he felt that accurate seasonal 
forecasts could be made before many years.^ Harrington did not receive much 
support for these views. Assistant Chief Major H. H. C. Dunwoody asserted that 
even changing the forecast period from thirty-six to forty-eight hours would make
g
the last twelve hours mere guesswork. The Hew York Herald then printed private 
long-range forecasts, but Dunwoody was quite certain such interest would diminish.
To facilitate this program of public forecasts, the field operations of 
the Weather Bureau continued to be organized around regular stations, of first and 
second order, each with full-time, commissioned employees. In addition, part- 
time employees maintained cautionary flag signal display stations along the Great 
Lakes, the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and serviced river gauging stations along
7 Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of 1894 (Washington, D.C., 1895), p. 120.
8 Weather Bureau, "Report of the Third Annual Convention of the American 
Association of Weather Services," Bulletin 14 (Washington, D.C., 1894), p. 18.
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some of the nation’s main inland streams* Others were employed at a nominal fee 
to give observations for special cotton, rice, wheat, and c o m  reports during the 
crop season. In addition, voluntary observers sent in monthly reports of daily 
temperature and precipitation data for climatological purposes. In 1892, first 
and second order stations totaled 172. Their employees telegraphed daily observa­
tions for use in the regular forecasts.^ One of the stations caught in the 
prevailing budget slicing was the one on Pikes Peak, which had been remodeled sine* 
Signal Service days.1® Establishment of new stations was out of the question at 
this time,11
Despite the failure to increase the number of regular observation 
stations, a policy of decentralization in forecasting fostered general progress in 
services provided to the public. Public weather forecasts still originated at 
Washington, D.C., being issued twice daily to cover the next thirty-six hours in 
each case, as had been practiced since 1888. Since 1890, however, Weather Bureau 
officials at local stations could amend forecasts when necessary to adapt them to 
varying local weather conditions, which were difficult to include in forecasting 
for a large geographical area. B7 1894-, a system of district forecast centers 
had evolved, stressing the further decentralization of public forecasting. The 
enlarged system transformed the trained corps of forecasters from a nucleus of
9 Weather Bureau, Annual Report of the Chief. 1893. p. 71} Annual Report. 1894.j 
p. 67} Annual Report. 1895-1896. p, 61, The number of stations was reduced 
to 14-6 in 1895, all through reduced appropriations. It was not until 1900 
that the total again reached the 1892 level.
10 Harrington to Morton, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence, mentions 
Morton’s order of March 13, 1894-» closing the Pikes Peak station. This 
station had been in operation since 1885, and was the object of detailed 
snowfall studies at the time it was closed.
11 Harrington to Morton, August 22, 1893» Secretary of Agriculture Correspond­
ence. One such request for a station at Champaign, Illinois, was refused.
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12only four in July, 1891, to forty within three years. Under this plan it was 
necessary to shift several of the best talented forecasters to the larger cities.
This transition did not always work to perfection. A Weather Bureau 
inspector's report discussed the rivalry between officials of the Minneapolis and 
the St. Paul stations. Although the former station had only been in operation 
since 1880 and the latter since 1870, Minneapolis personnel were apparently 
jealous of the fact that state forecasts were made at the St. Paul office.^ This 
is an early example of the several cases throughout Bureau history where local 
pressure had necessitated operation of two offices in close proximity, regardless 
of the fact that one office could well handle essential operations. The Weather 
Bureau can hardly be blamed for this peculiar phenomenon.
Although the enlarged corps of Bureau forecasters created by the 
decentralization procedure provided greater attention to local community needs, 
forecast distribution remained a question of deep concern and a topic discussed at 
all conventions of Bureau officials. Essentially, the local systems of indicating 
changing conditions by flags and other signals, used prior to the 1891 transfer, 
were continued with further modification and elaboration by some communities. 
Public flag display men received warnings by telegram. Electric searchlights were 
employed as signals in some Massachusetts areas, and whistles were used in many 
other locations. Fire alarm systems and use of bombs and rockets to foretell cold 
waves were also introduced in the early nineties. Another plan, also in the realm 
of special warning services, was that of sending telegrams to nearby localities
12 United States Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of 189A (Washington, D.C., 
1895), p. 117.
13 Harrington to Morton, May 10, 1893, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
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east of towns where thunderstorms were already occurring. The Weather Bureau 
dropped this suggestion after it proved ineffective, although the State of 
Michigan experimented with a similar system involving use of the telephone.
General daily forecasts, stamped on cards by the logotype system, were 
still mailed. The logotype process consisted of type already set with such stand­
ard phrases as fair and colder, or warmer and showers. These were quickly stamped 
on the cards as soon as the forecast was available. The major objection to this 
method persisted in the fact that many people did not receive the cards until the 
foreeast period was one-half or more over. Secretary Morton’s economy drive had 
eliminated the sending of a number of forecasts by telegraph. The policy followed 
after 1893 was to telegraph general forecasts to industries, flag display stations, 
and other interested recipients only if decided changes appeared likely. Never­
theless, Weather Bureau officials were almost unanimous in their desire to return 
to the former system of telegraphing all daily forecasts to these users.^
Another difficulty facing the Weather Bureau was the fact that many telegraph 
stations were not open all night, further complicating the distribution of regular 
as well as special forecasts.
While the distribution of forecasts plagued meteorologists because of 
slow communications, another problem, the consistency of observation techniques, 
also persisted. Few improvements followed during 1891-1895. The most suitable 
time of day to read the instruments was continually a subject of considerable 
debate, with no decision reached on the question at the International Meteorolog­
ical Conference at Munich in September, 1891.^  Lack of uniform observation time
14- Weather Bureau, Bulletin 14. p. 19.
15 Weather Bureau, Bulletin 11. pp. 710-715.
112
was also reflected among the voluntary observers. While observations were taken 
at sundown in one locality, they were taken at different times in a neighboring 
community.
Weather elements comprising official station observations remained the 
same as those listed under the description of the military weather service* An 
outstanding example of inadequate observations involved the ground measurement of 
snowfall. Although these entries were summarized by the Weather Bureau, no common 
time of snowfall observations was instigated until after the turn of the century^
In addition to the observational shortcomings, meteorologists understood 
at this early stage of Weather Bureau history the necessity for an improved method 
of collection and processing of weather records. Although apparently little was 
done beyond the planning stages, Professor Harrington realized the potential use­
fulness of machine punching of weather records some forty years before the Weather 
Bureau actually undertook this task. Use of the Hollerith punching machine was 
mentioned for compilation of station meteorological reports^
While failing to modernize data collection, notable aid was provided for 
other scientists and laymen in general, when Weather Bureau research papers and 
summaries of past meteorological and climatological data came to be issued in 
three major publications, in addition to routine annual reports. The Monthly 
Weather Review continued to be used, as it had been under the Signal Service, for
special, short studies • Monthly station summaries and the Weekly Weather and Crop 
Bulletin were also published. Professor Harrington's administration also saw the
start of two series of research bulletins, which were to be expanded in scope and
16 ' Weather Bureau, "Daily Local Record for Chicago," MS at Chicago Weather 
Bureau station.
17 Harrington to Morton, June 1$, 1895* Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
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18value by the following administration. Professor Abbe continued to serve as 
editor of the Monthly Weather Review, and to receive many public and private re­
quests for publications and for answers to meteorological problems.^
Although the generalized forms of forecasts, warnings, and advices al­
ready described were the best known contributions to meteorology, the civilian 
Weather Bureau attempted to strengthen its rather weak prior efforts in the way 
of specialized services. As in Signal Service days, the Weather Bureau attempted 
to warn by telegram areas in the path of cold waves, especially in parts of the 
country where such occurrences were rather infrequent. Chief Harrington was 
particularly proud of a twenty-four hour advance notice given in Florida before a 
cold wave in early 1895.^°
Less satisfactory than the cold wave alerts was the river and flood 
forecast service, which had grown slowly under the Signal Service. It was 
reorganized in 1893 by an attempt to place forecasting responsibility under local 
station officials, who were charged with a specific river territory. River fore­
casting had been done previously only from Washington, D.C. Now local officials
18 United States Weather Bureau, Bulletin C, issued in 1894, the last one of 
this series under Harrington. Appearing in 1894, the first issue of the one 
series was Bulletin A, a summary of the past international simultaneous 
observations. Another bulletin presented past precipitation and snowfall 
records.
19 Alexander G. Bell to Abbe, April 4, 1894? Bell to Abbe, November 4, 1894? 
Cleveland Abbe Papers. Bell was one of these weather enthusiasts who 
frequently contacted Abbe. Other examples include a steady exchange of 
letters with such noted foreign meteorologists as A. Lancaster of France,
Lord Kevin of Scotland, E. Douglas Archibald of India and the famous Austrian, 
Julius Harm. Abbe obtained detailed annual reports from Trieste as early as 
1892.
20 Harrington to Morton, January 5, 1885, Secretary Correspondence.
1 H
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were provided with past flood and terrain data to aid in their important task.
Zero readings had been placed on river gauges at the lowest known water level 
while gauges were then fastened to a bridge, pier or piling. 22 The danger line 
at Cincinnati was forty-five feet above the zero line because of steep shores, for 
example, while the dangerous level at New Orleans was only thirteen feet. Fif­
teen feet was considered precarious for the upper Mississippi region.
Besides the initiation of at least the beginning steps toward a better 
flood service, Chief Harrington also turned his attention to the lack of 
facilities for hurricane warnings. Even so, no well-organized hurricane warning 
service existed when Harrington left the Weather Bureau in 1895, though some 
progress was made when a hurricane warning signal was adopted and went into 
effect first in 1895.
Even more difficult to predict than hurricane occurrence was the
specific behavior of thunderstorms. In an effort to produce better forecasts of
thunderstorm activity, the Weather Bureau conducted a special reporting system
of thunderstorms during the summer of 1892. This information was entered on
postal cards, and collected at Washington, D.C. Observers at selected stations
in New England and the Middle west were requested to enter the time thunder was
heard, precipitation, if any, wind and temperature data, direction of storm
23
movement, and any photographs of the storm, if possible.
21 Moore, "Work of the Weather Bureau," Bulletin 17. pp. 6-9.
22 Moore, "Work of the Weather Bureau," Bulletin 17. p. 5, By 1896 the Bureau 
maintained 135 special river stations, and twenty-two regular Weather 
Bureau stations were also used as flood forecast centers.
23 Weather Bureau, "Report of the Forecasting of Thunderstorms During the 
Stammer of 1892," Bulletin 2 (Washington, D.C., 1893), PP. 9-10.
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Beyond the routine nature of both the general forecasts and special 
warnings issued by the Weather Bureau were the basic foundations of a research 
program during the four-year Harrington administration, ¿long this line of 
accomplishment, climatological studies received a position of considerable im­
portance by Chief Harrington, as reflected by the publication of useful past data 
as well as pioneer findings. Rainfall and snowfall records for the country were 
placed in one volume.^- Another project, carried out in cooperation with the 
University of Michigan and Johns Hopkins University, discussed physical properties 
of s o i l s . A l s o  presented was a study on temperatures injurious to food crops, 
while several other efforts involved local climatological studies which gave 
summaries of past weather records for each city.
In 1892 Harrington created a new Division of Climatology and Hygiene 
under Dr. W. F* R. Phillips. Effects of climatological phenomena upon the health 
of individuals had long remained a subject of deep concern among scientists, much 
more so, indeed, than in the twentieth century. Professor Abbe had frequently 
expressed his interest in this field of research. Just as physicians had for 
years correlated temperature and humidity factors with the occurrence of yellow 
fever, employment of a medical doctor at the Weather Bureau aided the extension 
of further research into relationships between climate and cases of morbidity and 
mortality.
24 Weather Bureau, "Rainfall and Snow ... to the End of 1891," Bulletin Ç (Wash­
ington, D.C., 1894), see also: M. W. Harrington, "Currents of the Great 
Lakes" ... Bulletin B (Washington, D.C., 1895).
25 United States Weather Bureau, Bulletin 4 (Washington, D.C., 1892).
26 Other examples are, H. A. Hazen, "Climate of Chicago," Bulletin 10. and 
"Climate of Death Valley," Bulletin 1, 1892, and H. E. Williams, "Temperatures 
Injurious to Food ...," Bulletin 13 (Washington. D.C., 1894).
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Soil moisture and temperature investigations were also recommended by 
Harrington. Use of existing Weather Bureau stations was made for these projects 
in the interest of economy.^ Professor Abbe presented a survey study, "Relations 
Between Climate and Crops," to the Department of Agriculture in 1895.^®
In addition to research undertakings of the climatological nature, 
extended plans were formed to promote a systematic program in aerology. One early 
attempt featured Professor H. A. Hazen's experiments with fog and the possible 
introduction of fog signals, by undertaking balloon ascensions on Little Gull 
Island, near New London, Connecticut.2^ Primary interest in aerology continued to 
be centered in experiments with manned balloons, both in Europe and the United 
States, but all such efforts were still in the early stages of development. They 
produced nothing in the way of continuous, daily observations. Professor Hazen of 
the Weather Bureau continued his flights, which had been originated in the 1880's, 
but completed only an average of one ascension in almost two years. Of more 
future interest to meteorology were the wind data observations, taken by means of 
free, unmanned balloons, at Berlin and P a r i s . Forerunner of the later pilot 
balloon, which was to be a regular tool of upper air research, these balloon tests 
were not conducted by the Weather Bureau at this time, even though such efforts 
were known to our government meteorologists. Harrington stated one objection in
27 Harrington to Morton, April 14, 1894, Secretary Correspondence, A policy 
board with the Weather Bureau had suggested this plan.
28 Abbe to C. W. Dabney, Jr., Assistant Secretary, April 3, 1895, Secretary 
Correspondence.
29 Aeronautics, vol. 1, no. 5 (February, 1894), p. 687.
\
30 Weather Bureau, "Report of the International...," Bulletin 11. pt. 3, p. 733, 
One flight reached a height of 16,000 meters on March 21, 1893.
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that a balloon could be used at night only if a safety lamp were devised. ' 1
In a discussion of the general problems of aerology and its relation to 
meteorology, Chief Harrington reported that mountain top stations had proved 
Inadequate, and that knowledge of the upper air at the time was insignificant and 
purely theoretical.32 in one attempt to measure the upper air, meteorological 
observations on the Eiffel Tower proved useful for the 1,000 foot level, but the 
real concern of meteorologists at the time was to obtain frequent observations at 
levels up to 15,000 feet. Along this line of planning, Harrington presented 
estimated costs of taking kite observations to that desired height, concluding 
that it would cost $16 per day to take one observation.^ it will be seen 
presently that kite observations never proved as satisfactory as had been thought, 
mainly because of costs and the difficulty in maintaining regular flights when 
low wind velocities prevailed. Professor C. F. Marvin initiated the Weather Bureau 
kite observations in 1895.
Manned balloon flights could be made twice daily, covering most of the 
upper air to perhaps 20,000 feet, for annual costs of approximately $20,000. A 
majority of meteorologists supported this proposal and urged Congress to allow 
this sum to be used by the Weather Bureau. Harrington realized the necessity of 
daily flights instead of the sporadic aseents that had been undertaken previously.
31 Harrington to Morton, December 19, 1894, Secretary Correspondence.
32 M. W. Harrington, nProeeedings of the International Conference on Aerial 
Navigation. August 1-4, 1893," American Engineer and Bail road Journal (New 
York, 1894), pp. 349-354.
33 Harrington, "Proceedings," American Engineer, p. 351, Instruments to be used 
in the kite flight would total $171.70, while the necessary 23,000 feet of 
cable would come to $54.70. The thirty-three kites used in tandem style, 
required to ascend that far, would be $91.00. A windlass and the wages of 
the four laborers added another $26.00. Current expenses for one year under 
such a plan would amount to $10,000, including instruments.
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A French balloonist had recently attained the height of more than 50,000 feet* 
Professor Hazen entertained a profound optimism for the capabilities of manned 
balloons and even contemplated a flight across the Atlantic in a 100,000 cubic 
foot balloon, if funds to finance the trip could be raised.31* Hazen completed 
one flight to 16,000 feet in 1887 and another to 10,000 feet on October 27, 1892* 
The latter flight was made in conjunction with a Department of Agriculture ex- 
périment in raiimaking*
The third type of upper air observation under consideration t« s the 
unmanned or free balloon* Called the pilot balloon by meteorologists, this means 
of observation was rejected because of high costs, although Professor Harrington 
informed his followers that pilot balloon observations could be taken at twenty 
colleges scattered throughout the nation*
While lending general support to the future of aerological observations, 
Weather Bureau officials offered only token support to the efforts of the 
Department of Agriculture at rainmaking* Experimentation for producing rainfall 
through artificial means could not be considered a new idea by any means at this 
time, but certainly was novel in the respect that Congress appropriated $9,000 for 
the tests conducted in Texas* The belief that man can produce rain had been
3ii Aeronautics," vol* 1, no* U (January, 189U), pp* 53-5U*
35 H. A. Hazen to Harrington, June, 1893, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence
36 Harrington, «Proceedings,n American Engineer, p. 352, Total costs of 
balloons and automatic instruments were 'estimated at $5,000 per year for one 
flight per week to 20,000 feet and one flight per month to 50,000 feet* In 
terms of daily observations, this type of aerial flight cost more than either 
manned balloons or kites because of the gas necessary for inflation, and the 
fhct that the pilot balloons explode upon reaching high altitudes. Therefore, 
a new balloon is necessary for each observation*
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popular for some time. Examples of local rains caused by heated air over forest 
fires had aroused considerable curiosity. Since the more widespread use of gun­
powder, many amateurs had brought forth the theory that rain followed heavy 
cannonading in large-scale battles.
In 1839, Professor James W. Epsy built fires to test the theory, and 
efforts have already been cited for the cannon barrage method in the early 1870*s. 
In 1880, General Daniel Ruggles of Virginia obtained a patent for rainmaking by 
the process of setting off explosives from balloons in the air. Senator Charles 
B. Farwell of Illinois was also interested in the possibilities of such a theory 
and spearheaded the 1891 drive in Congress for the appropriations necessary to 
make official tests. The Secretary of Agriculture appointed R. G. Dyrenforth, 
special agent, to carry out the experiments.
In the summer of 1891, Dyrenforth traveled to a ranch near Midland, 
Texas, for the first attempts. He reported that these tests proved inconclusive, 
as the forecasts of the Weather Bureau had called for light rain anyway. ^  
Dyrenforth engaged kites to send up one-half pound sticks of dynamite, which were 
detonated by means of an electric fuse. Each test required hundreds of pounds of 
dynamite, rackarock, and other explosives. In September, the scene was shifted 
to near El Paso, where two-pound charges of dynamite were exploded from a manned 
balloon at an altitude of 4,300 feet. The only test which drew great praise from 
the special agent was one at San Diego, Texas, later the same autumn. The 
immediate area received .47 inch of rainfall during the October 4-November 16 
period, the only rain reported for a much larger immediate area. One Weather 
Bureau official at San Antonio admitted that the blasts probably hastened the
37 5 2d Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document 45, Report of Department
of Agriculture for Experiments in Rainmaking (February 24, 1892), submitted 
by R. G. Dyrenforth.
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production of precipitation.^
Summarizing the entire project, Dyrenforth mentioned the inconclusive 
results and the need for long-term experiments before reaching conclusions, 
positive or negative, concerning this method. Although different means of rain­
making are used in the 1950's, the same need for additional experiments is ad­
mitted by most competent meteorologists.
Just as research activities in climatology, aerology, and artificial 
production of rainfall received Bureau attention at this time, there persisted 
the urgent necessity of more elaborate means by which meteorologists could 
improve the recording of weather data. Instrumentation had been developed slowly 
toward the acceptance of automatic, recording instruments, and most of this 
progress was due to Professor Marvin's efforts. As late as 1888, the Signal 
Service had still used no self-recording instruments, with the exception of those 
for measuring wind movement«^ Even in 1895, nearly » n  Weather Bureau instru­
ments could not be purchased in the open market.4° For sixteen years prior to the
38 Senate Executive Document 45, p. 38 (1892).
39 Marvin to Harrington, June 5, 1893» Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence. 
Among his contributions Marvin perfected an improved recording rain gauge and 
devised a system for obtaining more accurate records from charts on several 
recording barographs owed by the Weather Bureau. The system consisted of a 
ruled card of corrections, adjustable by use of a rubber band. Marvin also 
adapted an electric sunshine recorder, and improved the wind movement recorder 
so it would reeord a full week's data instead of just one day. Additional 
inventions, or practical adaptations for Weather Bureau use included a soil 
temperature thermometer and a self-registering apparatus used at the Mount 
Washington, New Hampshire, station.
40 Marvin to Harrington, May 9, 1895, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence,
I
121
Harrington administration, recording rain gauges had been employed solely at the 
Central Office in Washington, D. C. By 1895 Harrington secured the installation 
of similar equipment at a number of field stations.^
Mich experimentation had been undertaken, and was to continue without 
success in search of an accurate snow gauge* Since 1883 snow had been collected 
and melted in order to get the precipitation equivalent. In 1887 it was decided 
to determine an average depth of snowfall on the ground, and record one-tenth of 
this as precipitation, a practice which still presented considerable error. The 
value of the cooperative records was still hampered also, because only two-thirds 
of the observers possessed standard thermometers or rain gauges. -^2
Problems of instrumentation as well as the exchange of all meteorological 
information became topics of prime consideration at various international 
conferences during the period. Continually since 1871, Professor Abbe had 
furthered American meteorological interests in Europe through correspondence, and
41 Weather Bureau, Annual Report ... 1891-1892. p. 31, and United States Weather 
Bureau, "Rain and Snow" ... Bulletin C. 1894, pp. 8, 20, self-registering 
instruments were sent to the Pikes Peak and Colorado Springs stations. The 
rain gauges were of the weighing-bucket type, although Marvin was experiment­
ing with an improved tipping-bucket rain gauge in 1894. Recording thermo­
graphs and the sunshine recorders were also included in the new plans for 
field stations. Instrument shelters consisted of standard dimensions, the 
same as in use today.
42 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1893. p, 157; United States Weather Bureau, 
"Report of the First Annual Meeting of the American Association of State 
Weather Service," Bulletin ? (Washington. D.C., 1893), pp. 9-20; See also 
United States Weather Bureau, "Report of the Third Annual Meeting (Washing­
ton, D.C., 1894), p. 23, Shelters cost between $5.00 to $10.00 at that 
time. Local Bureau officials had long urged their general use for voluntary 
observers.
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had traveled abroad in order to visit many of these national services.^ Abbe 
attended the international meeting at St. Petersburg in 1886, and, with Chief 
Harrington, also represented the United States at the ifunich conference in 1891.^4 
The 1893 meetings in the United States were the first of international level to be 
held outside of Europe. This accomplishment brought much pride to Harrington, 
Abbe, and other leading Weather Bureau scientists, who were interested in obtain­
ing firm cooperation and exchange of all necessary weather data on a world-wide 
basis.^ Harrington earlier tried unsuccessfully to get regular Mexican weather 
observations sent from Juarez, by messenger, to our El Paso, Texas, station. In 
1892, the Chief visited Mexico City to arrange this, but later informed the 
Secretary of Agriculture that he had failed to get the exchange of data into 
operation. Mexican officials did not answer his letters.^ These exchanges of 
international information were more firmly established under Harrington's 
successor.
While the foregoing services and research activities during the first 
years of civilian control represent a general improvement in Weather Bureau
43 Harrington to Morton, May 13, 1893, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence, 
International conferences had been held at Brussels in 1853j in Vienna, 1873, 
Rome, 1879; St. Petersburg, 1886; and Munich, 1891.
44 Abbe Papers, included are souvenirs and miscellaneous data collected on the 
trip. After arrival at Hamburg, the continental itinerary included: Berlin, 
Dresden, Nuremburg, Munich, Vienna, Prague, Cologne, Brussels, Paris, and 
then London, via Dieppe. Abbe kept daily weather notes during several days 
on the way to Europe.
¿vj Harrington to Morton, May 13, 1893, Secretary of Agri cuiture Correspondence, 
Leading nations with meteorological services, and which received invitations 
to the congress were: Canada, China, France, Italy, Mexico, Great Britain, 
the Netherlands, Australia, Barbados, Greece, Norway, and Sweden.
46 Harrington to Morton, December 27, 1894, Secretary of Agriculture
Correspondenee, In the meantime, Harrington was considering a proposal for 
for obtaining data from the Jesuit fathers of Merida.
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operations, certain personnel and management problems created an atmosphere of 
instability not unlike the preceding military administration. In order to gain a 
better understanding of the reasons for this instability of the 1893—1895 era, 
certain extraneous factors must be considered.
In the first place, economically the nation was entering an era of 
depression during which governmental deflationary policies were certain to reduce 
Weather Bureau appropriations. This in itself often leads to an unusual amount 
of friction among agency heads and superiors wherever operations have been cur­
tailed. From the fiscal year 1892 appropriations of $889,753«50, Chief Harrington 
obtained annual increases for the next two years, with the total appropriations 
of $951,100 in 1894-. The succeeding economy drive reduced the appropriations in 
fiscal 1895 to $876,823.06 and to the lowest figure of the decade in fiscal year 
1896, the total of $860,610.“47
In addition to the economic difficulties, Chief Harrington also faced 
the change in political administrations created when Grover Cleveland and the 
Democrats were victorious in the 1892 elections. Since Harrington was an 
appointee of the Benjamin Harrison administration, it is easily tinderstandable 
that Democrats were anxious to fill such posts from their own ranks, despite the 
scientific nature of the position.
Although confronted with this political and economic pressure, Chief 
Harrington continued to adequately and capably administer both the scientific 
services and regulation of Bureau personnel. Critics, however, often pictured 
Harrington as having entered the Weather Bureau fresh from the academic field, and
47 53d Congress, 2d Session, House Report 804, p. 2 (April 30, 1894)» 53d
Congress, 3d Session, House Document 1722, p. 2 (January 30, 1895).
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as being unable to wield the authority the Bureau was accustomed to under the
Signal Service. Thus, his usefulness as an executive was undermined.4® This is
an inaccurate oversimplification of the troubled situation.
Reflecting his desire to promote sound personnel management, Harrington
maintained rigid control over misconduct or alleged inefficiency of employees,
despite the inability to rely upon the Articles of War for punishment since the
1891 transfer.Harrington apparently gave personal attention to the majority 
*5(1of these cases. It is also evident that Harrington would refuse to inflict
punishment if he thought the accusations were untrue. In one instance Harrington
resisted an attempt of political persuasion to hasten the transfer of a Weather
52Bureau employee to a desired location.
48 D. A. B.. vol. 8, p. 302.
49 Helen Finneran, Administrative Records of the Weather Bureau, MS, pp. 9, 11, 
in National Archives.
50 Weather Bureau, Personnel (Washington, D.C., 1894), Neglect of duty, in­
subordination, grave robbing, amending of an original telegraphic report, 
non-payment of debts, and ommission of isotherm lines on weather maps were 
all accompanied by penalties ranging from dismissal to sizeable reductions in 
salary? Harrington to Morton, December 23, 1893, and Harrington to Morton, 
May 5, 1894, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
51 Harrington to Morton, November 29, 1894, Secretary of Agriculture Corre­
spondence, Charges that the fourth floor Weather Bureau room at Pittsburgh 
was used for a political club room were denied and Secretary Morton decided 
to drop the investigation? Harrington to Morton, August 28, 1894, Instead 
of suspending a night watchman on duty at the Central Office, when a fire 
broke out and spread before discovery, Harrington transferred the victim.
The man’s mother was ill, and he had been without sleep.
52 C. S. Hamlin to Morton, December 19, 1894, Secretary of Agriculture Corre­
spondence, Hamlin, Assistant Secretary in the Treasury Department, requested: 
"Many good Democrats in Massachusetts would like to have Peter Porter trans­
ferred from Milwaukee to Boston...trusting you can arrange this." Harrington 
gave Porter permission to see if any Weather Bureau man stationed at Boston 
would trade positions? Weather Bureau, Personnel. 1894-1895, Porter failed 
in the attempt and resigned from the service.
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In spite of Harrington's sincere efforts to keep order within the
Bureau, Secretary of Agriculture J. Sterling Morton, the Cleveland appointee,
indicated from the beginning that his office would firmly control all phases of
Weather Bureau operation. What rapidly developed into a Harrington-Morton feud
gained public attention as early as April, 1893, when Secretary Morton allowed
information of his Weather Bureau investigations to be used by the press.^
Morton investigated with the aid of Assistant Attorney General Leonard W. Colby,
whose eventual report covered operations of the Weather Bureau in general, and
included charges of malfeasance in office, misrepresentation of facts, improper
diversion of funds, incompetent employees, and faulty promotions.^ Harrington
would not yield his position in the light of this assault. ^  Welcoming the
investigation, Harrington advised President Clevelands
The report is a wilful and malicious falsification of the testimony taken 
in the case....It is useless for me to demand hearing from the Secretary 
of Agriculture....As the President appointed me, I appeal to the President 
for a f air hearing.56
Harrington received no reply, and subsequently Morton announced the 
assignment of Signal Corps Major H, H. C. Dunwoody to replace Major S. S. Rockwood 
as Assistant Chief. Morton, however, denied the accusation that he desired 
Harrington's job for one of his own favorites. ^
53 New York Tribune. April 21, 1893, p. 3. Four Army officers were allowed to be 
retained temporarily with the Weather Bureau after the 1891 transfer; The 
Secretary had requested and received the resignation of Major S. S. Hockwood, 
Assistant Chief of the Weather Bureau. Rockwood considered his Republican 
party status as the major reason for his dismissal.
54- New York Tribune. April 21, 1893, p. 3.
55 New York Tribune, letter of Harrington to Morton, dated April 25, 1893, p. 3.
56 New York Tribune. May 26, 1893, p. 3, contains Harrington's letter of the 
previous day to President Cleveland.
57 New York Tribune. April 26, 1893, p. 9.
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As is the case in political smear campaigns up to the present day, 
results were quite inconclusive. The prosecution featured a few minor cases of 
misconduct in the Weather Bureau in an attempt to show the need for a new chief# 
Little further was heard publicly of the investigation until Secretary Morton 
announced that Chief Harrington was exonerated of the charges, and the officer 
preferring the charges against Harrington had been relie v e d . T h i s  concluded for 
two years the public presentation of the personality and political struggle between 
the secretary and the chief.
Following the failure of this public investigation, Secretary Morton 
resorted to further painstaking scrutiny of Bureau activities. Having already 
indicated his intentions to reduce research expenditures, Morton requested de­
tailed information from Professor Abbe and the other professors as to their 
official duties. Abbefs reply did not conclude with merely the job description:
General Myer copied everything I did at Cincinnati in military style.#.. 
Nearly every real advance in the progress of the Weather Bureau since I 
entered it, January 3, 1871, has gone through the following steps, viz«, 
first I have suggested and urged it} next I started the work and showed 
how it ought to be done} finally I found the best man, or organized a 
system, by which the work should be carried on as a permanent feature#
I labored for years to establish independent state weather services but 
now they are pushed aside for the splendid system of assisted state 
weather services####I have urged meteorology but none teach it###.This 
is the first opportunity you have given me to speak.59
Stressing the point that the services of all the present research staff 
were urgently required, Abbe threatened to conduct the weather service as a private 
enterprise if the government were to abandon the Weather Bureau. In the face of
58 New York Times, July 3, 1893, p. 4, and New York Tribune. July 4, 1893, p. 2, 
Morton planned to vacate two research positions while Professor Abbe was to 
be reduced from senior to junior professor, all for economy reasons#
59 Abbe to Morton, June 17, 1893, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
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such resistance Secretary Morton withheld immediate action, When later in the 
same year Morton suspected Abbe as the instigator of newspaper attacks on the 
Department, Abbe informed the Secretary: "I am a student and not a politician, 
and I wish to build up meteorology, not to pull down anybody,Nevertheless, 
Morton proceeded to reduce Abbe's salary. The entire significance of the Abbe- 
Morton differences is not the salary cut but rather in the cause of further 
controversy between Harrington and Morton, as the Chief indicated his disapproval 
of this action.
While opposing Abbe's salary reduction, Harrington had attempted to 
impress upon Morton the fact that the Weather Bureau, since civilian control, had 
become a most prudent organization, Harrington had conducted Weather Bureau 
functions at an average of $400,000 less annually than suggested earlier by 
military authorities. In contrast to the annual deficits of the military service 
days, Harrington had returned a surplus to the Treasury Department in the fiscal 
years 1892-1893. * Accepting reductions affecting river and flood service and 
some other minor examples, Harrington did not respond eagerly to Secretary 
Morton's more extended economy measures, which, as Harrington reasoned, summarily 
dismissed loyal employees without cause. Another area of disagreement Included 
the twenty-five-year-old system of the Signal Service and Weather Bureau involving 
the inspection of field stations,^ Several other issues reflect a similar
60 Abbe to Morton, November 14, 1893, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
61 Harrington to Morton, March 16, 1894, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence,
62 Harrington to Morton, February 5, 1894, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence.
63 Harrington to Morton, July 12, 1894, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence, 
Morton eventually curtailed this work by reducing the number of inspectors.
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pattern of conflict.^ So tense grew the situation that Harrington even felt 
obliged to obtain permission from Morton in order to pasture his horse for six
weeks and to hire a replacement.^5
Throughout the investigations, reductions of expenditures, and the 
resultant controversies enumerated above, Secretary Morton received help from with­
in the Weather Bureau. Morton frankly acknowledged the assistance of Major 
Dunwoody in this tasks "Dunwoody, kept on by the President, is in charge of the 
Forecast Division, also Assistant Chief and Executive Officer. He reduced the 
appropriations for the next year by #95,000."66 It is not strange to witness this 
action on the part of Dunwoody, who, as mentioned earlier, was one of the major 
opponents to Signal Service research expenditures in the 1880's. Beyond expend­
iture reductions, Harrington continually voiced disapproval of Dunwoody's actions, 
especially the making of broad policy decisions while the Chief was away.6?
Perhaps the most cogent illustration of Dunwoody's role during the 
Harrington-Morton struggle was displayed in a series of forecast examinations. A 
source of friction between the Bureau and Department for the entire 1893-1895 era, 
the system of practice forecasts forced onto the research professors provided the 
immediate cause for the Harrington dismissal. Major Dunwoody, chosen by the
64 Harrington to Morton, April 13, 1894, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence, 
Harrington refused to assign Alexander McAdie to forecast verifications, 
stating that he was too valuable for that work? Harrington to Morton, June 4, 
1894» Professor Harrington was quite perplexed when he received a reprimand 
for asking Senator James Z. George about the pending appropriation legislation 
because he claimed an earlier letter from Morton had sanctioned such 
procedure.
65 Harrington to Morton, July 10, 1894» Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
66 Morton to Senator F. M. Cockrell, April 21, 1894, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence.
67 Harrington to Morton, January 3, 1894, Secretary of Agriculture Corre­
spondence.
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Department to administer this program, claimed that neither Abbe nor Marvin 
attained the standard established by Secretary Morton during the practice peri­
ods.^ This led Harrington to stress a point, which became a leading factor in 
causing his own discharge within two months. Asserting that Dunwoody was no 
Longer his best forecaster, but was exceeded by E. B. Garriott, a Harrington 
trainee, the Chief declared: "Dunwoody is a selfish intriguer and a source of 
iiscord in the Weather Bureau. I request that the President recall him. We do 
not need military control of the Weather Bureau."^
This outburst accurately describes the breaking point in the Harrington- 
'■lorton impasse. Having failed to remove Harrington for official reasons two years 
previously, Morton now sought aid from President Cleveland. There followed news 
of Harrington1s release from the service, which did not reach the press until 
July 2, 1895, when Harrington made public the course of events during the previous 
two weeks. A storm of protest greeted the announcement but could, of course, do 
little to change the accomplished deed. Certainly the removal was based on 
personal and political reasons instead of facts. Secretary Morton refused to re­
joice in or explain his coup de grace: "This is a matter that belongs properly 
to the White House. I have nothing whatever to say upon the subject."^
The only excuse Democratic party followers could offer was that the head 
of the Weather Bureau should be in personal, as well as official, accord with the
68 Dunwoody to Morton, April 30, 1895, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence. 
Amazingly enough, Dunwoody ranked highest of all participants, regular fore­
casters included, for each month of his participation. Dunwoody1s forecasts 
were for only thirty states, while the practice forecasts covered all forty- 
four states.
69 Harrington to Morton, April 30, 1895, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
70 New York Tribune. July 3, 1895, p. 1. President Cleveland advised the Weather 
Bureau head that his resignation would be acceptable. Harrington refused, 
and Cleveland then informed the Chief that he was removed.
71 New York Times. July 3, 1895, p. 5.
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72Secretary of Agriculture. Partisan, but not incorrect in emphasis, was the 
description of the event by the New York Tribune: "Cleveland wields his axe and 
Professor Harrington's official head falls. Partisan politics and science come 
into collision.”73 It later threw more vengeance on Morton for using the official 
guillotine on Harrington without reason and for violating Civil Service rules. It 
is certain that there was insufficient reason for firing Harrington, but it is also 
true that the Tribune ignored the fact that the position is filled by presidential 
appointment, not through Civil Service channels. The same press account recalled 
how far the Weather Bureau had advanced since its $15,000 appropriation in 1871, 
when most people considered the project a huge joke.74
Editorial comment, not confined to the two New York dailies, sounded a 
variety of indictments: "If Cleveland were the man his partisans say he is, he 
would never allow such shameful betrayal of the Civil Service. Instead of passing 
an exam now, candidates will have to know habits of cats, dogs...when weather is 
about to c h a n g e . A l s o  stressed was the fact that the Weather Bureau had been 
more economically managed than the Signal Corps weather service, and the assumption 
that Secretary Morton desired the position for a friend.
Perhaps in an effort to evade the whole unsavory business and in hope not 
to lower the esprit de corps among Weather Bureau employees any further, official
72 New York Tribune. July 3, 1895, p. 1»
73 New York Tribune, ibid, Morton was apparently back in White House favor after 
receiving an official rebuke several months previously for misinterpreting 
one of Cleveland's sound money manifestoes. Cleveland had hesitated for two 
years before yielding to Secretary Morton's pleas.
74 New York Tribune. August 12, 1895, p. 5.
75 New York Tribune. July 9, 1895, p. 7, a collection of the above comments came 
from the Boston Journal. Philadelphia Inquirer. Chicago Tribune. Providence 
Journal. Watertown Times, and Cleveland Leader.
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recognition of the dismissal was not even entered in Personnel, the monthly report 
of the Weather Bureau, which listed all salary changes, promotions, demotions, 
suspensions, and dismissals*
Although Harrington was to suffer from failing mental and physical 
health starting near the turn of the century, he showed no signs of these 
limitations while Chief of the Weather Bureau. Indeed, after leaving the Bureau 
he served as president of the University of Washington until 1898, and in that 
year he was reemployed by the Weather Bureau as section director fbr the West 
Indian service with headquarters at San Juan, Puerto RLco.^
He was transferred to the New York City office in early 1899, and be­
cause of poor health, was discharged for unsatisfactory services in June of the 
same year. How much his mental and physical failings of this time were a result of 
the strain during the struggle while chief is a moot question. There can be little 
doubt, however, that at the time of his dismissal in 1895, he was in full command 
of his faculties.^
76 Weather Bureau, Personnel. July 1, 1899.
77 Washington Star. February 17, 1902} Harrington disappeared later in 1899. 
After taking a trip to the Orient, he worked on a Louisiana sugar plantation 
before becoming a day laborer in a North Pacific coast lumber camp. His 
health improved, and he had hopes of returning to the intellectual and 
scientific world, D. A. B.. vol. 8, p. 302, Instead, however, his condition 
grew worse and he was committed to an asylum in 1908, where he remained until 
his death October 9, 1926.
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CHAPTER VI
Expansion of Public Services,
1895-1913
Former Chief Mark Harrington had been absent from the Central Office 
only five days, ?;hen, on July 5, 1895, it was announced that Willis Luther Moore 
would be Chief of the United States Weather Bureau.^- Although Secretary J, 
Sterling Morton left no evidence as to ho?/ the selection was made, it is fairly 
certain that he had been studying the qualifications of Weather Bureau personnel 
throughout the two-year feud with Harrington. Through specific inquiries, he had 
been advised of the qualifications and duties of the research scientists and was 
in touch with the assets of top forecast officials in the field as a result of 
examinations conducted in 1894, in which Moore tied for top honors.
As recent as May, 1895, Morton had asked Harrington about the scientific 
background and training of Professor C. F. Marvin.2 From his outspoken replies to 
Morton during the previous two years, plus a salary cut, it is not difficult to 
understand why the Secretary would not, without a complete reversal of attitude, 
choose Professor Cleveland Abbe for the position. Another likely candidate, and 
probably the department favorite, Major H. K. C. Bunwoody, decided to retain 
military status, preventing his selection.
1 New York Tribune. July 5, 1895, p. 2.
2 Marvin to Harrington, May 9, 1895,’ Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
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Thirty-nine years old and youngest professor in the Weather Bureau at 
the time he became Chief, Moore had joined the Signal Service on April 21, 1876.^
A native of Scranton, Pennsylvania, Moore worked his way up through the ranks of 
the Signal Service and Weather Bureau to attain the position of local forecaster 
at Milwaukee during 1891-1894-, prior to his promotion to official in charge at 
Chicago. Originally a printer by occupation, Moore had sold newspapers to Union 
troops during the Civil War. Morton’s choice brought favorable reaction, even 
from his most violent opponents. The critical New York Tribune accepted the be­
lief that Moore would prove as good a selection as Harrington in 1891, even though 
usually in the past an outsider had been brought in as Chief.4-
Energetic and continually operating on the premise that all public 
services and research must be broadened, Moore expanded operations noticeably 
while head of the Bureau. The most widely known service, the general forecasts, 
were still issued twice daily at 10s00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m,, each covering the usual 
thirty-six hour period, -until March 1, 1899, when the night forecast was extended 
to include the next forty-eight hours. Several Weather Bureau officials had 
requested this extension as early as 1894- at the Bureau convention in Chicago.
Forecast terminology still remained quite restricted in order to conform 
to the logotype symbols used to issue card forecast copies, although criticism of 
this procedure was widespread. Maximum and minimum temperatures were not included 
in the public forecasts. With the use of only the terms warmer, colder,
3 Weather Bureau, BEmployees in the Weather Bureau of the Department of 
Agriculture July 1, 1906, Whose Appointment precedes July 2, 1900”,
Personnelf July, 1906.
4- New York Tribune. August 12, 1895, p. 5.
5 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1899. p. 3.
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stationary temperatures, or cold wave, the whole system was left open to indef­
initeness. 6 Just four numbers added to the forecasts could present maximum and 
minimum temperatures, which the forecaster should know anyway. Under existing 
rules, a forecaster might include this material if he wished, but in actual 
practice only a few brave souls used this amplification. Indeed, some forecasts 
were issued as late as the 1940's without specific maximum and minimum tempera­
tures.
The hierarchy of forecasters continued to be similar to the previous 
administration. National forecasters issued their predictions for the whole 
country from the Central Office, while district forecasters then released fore­
casts for the several states under their jurisdiction.7 In turn, forecasts for a 
community and its local surrounding area were made by section directors, local 
forecasters, and even observers, if they had special authorization.2
To accommodate the growth of public interest in the Weather Bureau and 
provide the best possible observation coverage to enhance forecasting, constant
6 Weather Bureau, Proceeding? of the Third Convention of Weather Bureau Off i Mala 
Held at Peoria. Illinois. 1904 (Washington, D. G., 1904), pp. 50-51.
7 Weather Bureau, "Station Roster, July 1, 1908", Personnel (1908), E. B.
Garriott continued as Chief of the Forecast Division at the Central Office 
until his death in 1910. District forecasters and centers in 1908 included* 
John W. Smith, Boston? Henry J. Cox, Chicago? F. H. Brandenburg, Denver?
F. J. Walz, Louisville? I. M. Cline, New Orleans? E. A. Beals, Portland,
Oregon? A. G. McAdie, San Francisco. By 1912, Boston and Louisville had been 
consolidated with other existing districts. Boston, New Orleans, and Denver 
had been added in 1901. One of the leading local forecasters in 1903, was 
Edward Bowie, of St. Louis, who became a district forecaster in 1910 and 
national forecaster in 1913.
8 To give one example, the district forecaster at Chicago watched the tele­
graphic observation reports come into his office, and then had thirty minutes 
to prepare a forecast for twelve states. Officials at local stations would 
in turn review his forecast and adapt it to their own situation, with the 
advantage of a two-hour time lapse since the district forecaster's observa­
tional data had been gathered*
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attention was directed toward the network of field stations. Each year requests 
for both new first-order and cooperative stations reached the Central Office. 
Despite the increase of nearly sixty first-order stations during his tenure,
Chief Moore usually considered only a few of these pleas for this phase of expan­
sion. He was not without sound reasoning in this policy, for he took into account 
actual service needs of a community and its proximity to the nearest other regular 
station, before giving final approval. For example, commercial interests de­
manded a station at Sandy Hook, New Jersey, which, although close to the New York 
station, was of great value for obtaining wind data to use in admiralty cases. 
Another station was necessary for seven months a year at Devils Island in Lake 
Superior, in order to warn ships on the route to Duluth. On the other hand, 
Lansing, Michigan, and Fort Wayne, Indiana, failed to obtain stations because of 
other nearby offices, while Canton, New York, and Tonopah, Nevada, proved favor­
able sites because of their surrounding unprotected areas. Of fifty requests for 
permanent first-order stations, Moore conceded that only eight were actually 
necessary.9 Moore generally would neither recommend a new station without special 
Meteorological cause, nor for any location within 100 miles of another office. He 
did, however, admit that cities of over 50,000 population should have a station, 
if for nothing else, to satisfy civic pride.10
The network of cooperative stations, largely climatological, but also
9 59th Congress, 1st Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1907, pp. 1-15 (Jan­
uary 12, 1906). In another instance, Moore closed the Hannibal, Missouri, 
station because of its close location to another office at Keokuk, Iowa.
Upon receipt of much earnest protest, Moore visited the town, and found such 
widespread use of its services to warrant reopening.
L0 62d Congress, 3d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1914-, p. 20 (December 9, 1912). While Dallas, 
Texas, was the city in question at this time, Moore brought no pressure for 
new stations in 1912.
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containing the river and frost types, underwent vast revision during the 1896- 
1913 era to reach a point of growth more nearly similar to that of the present 
day.11 Each ensuing year new stations were established and additional older 
locations, mostly east of the Mississippi River, were closed, until there were 
4,200 cooperative stations in the country in 1912. Moore, satisfied with the 
reorganization, would consent to open but very few new voluntary stations in the 
future.12
While station changes occurred, forecast terminology remained unchanged. 
Although the public was hardly aware of the verification procedure, a forecast 
for temperature change meant any expected modification to equal or exceed six 
degrees in the summer or ten degrees in winter. To further complicate matters, 
morning and evening current temperatures were used in verifications, instead of 
the daily maximum and minimum readings, which were utilized later.1^ Verifica­
tion rules for precipitation specified, among other things, that if a dry thunder­
storm occurred during a forecast period calling for rain, the forecast was 
considered correct. A prediction of possible or probable rain meant that precipi­
tation would equal or exceed .01 inch during the forecast period, while a forecast 
without mention of rain proved a failure if even a trace fell.^
Moore had a section of one division devoting its entire time to verifi­
cation of forecasts. A report on each man came to the Chief every six months.
11 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1901-1902. p. xii, In an effort to space 
stations more advantageously, 209 stations were dropped and 230 new ones 
added by the summer of 1902. The Weather Bureau had inspected only 268 
voluntary stations that year.
12 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1911-1912r p. 28.
13 Weather Bureau, '‘Second Triennial Convention at Milwaukee, August 27-29,
1901." Bulletin 31 (Washington, D.C., 1902), p. 116.
14 58th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on De­
partment of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1905, p. 216 (January 9,19C4)
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During one six-month period, four local forecasters exceeded the state forecasters, 
while twenty-five other local forecasters" work was about equal to the state fore­
casters. Moore had revoked authority to make local forecasts from twelve others, 
who had failed to maintain an adequate record. A number of additional men were 
cautioned to better their predictions in this system involving survival of the 
fittest.
Forecasters were urged to anticipate the unusual, and learn more about 
what constitutes normal local seasonal variations in addition to only the usual 
storm tracks. J Individual disturbances should be studied in relation to 
seasonal patterns, which involved knowledge of the place of development of 
various high and low pressure centers. This in turn would aid in answering such 
questions as whether a particular area of high pressure would stagnate the 
forward movement of a low pressure area. A classic example of embarrassed fore­
casters involved an occasion when the President tried to review a west coast city h 
school children. The Weather Bureau issued a forecast of fair weather, but it 
rained. Some employees felt that this happened too frequently and could be 
partially corrected. Another suggestion to help forecasters called for a tabula­
tion of all useful data to have available for a new forecaster moving to the 
station. This form would include the prevailing wind direction during twelve to 
twenty-four hours before precipitation, effects of nearby terrain on approaching 
storms, and other similar local weather signs.16 Chief Moore carried on personal 
correspondence with his forecasters in an effort to increase accuracy of this
15 Weather Bureau, Peoria Convention, pp. 4-6-A9.
L6 Weather Bureau, Peoria Convention, p. 52.
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service. He advised St. Paul and Minneapolis local forecasters to work together 
and compare their forecasts instead of going their separate ways.1? Another 
local forecaster, who apparently had not impressed the Chief with his predictions, 
wrote that his forecasts were not too poor. Moore disagreed! "Very few have the 
faculty to forecast and your record is poor even for a beginner."-^
This idea that forecasters are born and not made was fairly popular for 
a number of years, and of course, is still appropriate, if one believes that 
inborn qualities are always predominant over environmental effects.
Each local forecaster made a daily forecast for his own station as well 
as another practice forecast for one other location, designated by Bureau offi­
cials. As a result, several people would be issuing forecasts for each station 
in order to provide a better basis for the comparison of ability.-^ This system 
is not radically different from the practice forecast program used at present in 
an attempt to find additional forecasters among personnel of the Weather Bureau.
Moore claimed an increase in forecast accuracy from eighty-three percent 
in 1893 to eighty-eight percent in 1905, all because of this fierce competition, 
which, he claimed, sent more of his men to the insane asylum than from any other 
governmental bureau.20
17 Moore to U. G. Pursell and Moore to J. N. Ryker, June 5, 1911, Weather 
Bureau Correspondence.
18 Eric Miller to Moore, February 13, 1 9 U  and Moore to Miller, February 17, 
19H, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
19 Weather Bureau, "Milwaukee Convention", 1901, p. 116.
20 59th Congress, 1st Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1907, p. 28 (January 12,
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Despite Moore’s claim, at least one authority asserted that accuracy percentage
21
had not increased during the 1897-1912 period.
Long-range forecasting, always a challenging area to anyone interested 
in the advancement of meteorology, persisted as a topic of consideration by the
Weather Bureau under Moore, First of the official efforts were the three-day
22forecasts for the Worth Atlantic, which began on July 7, 1901, This project
was of great benefit to ocean-going traffic, and also to European nations in the
path of such weather movements. Planned in 1900, the undertaking became a reality
23upon completion of the ocean cable from Lisbon and the Azores to New York.
Warnings were cabled to London, and fog was forecast, whenever possible.
Long-range forecasts were usually mentioned by meteorologists at their 
various Weather Bureau conventions,^  A. B, Crane of Pensacola told the One.ha 
group that such attempts may be applicable only for specific areas. He ventured 
the belief that a standing forecast of fair weather and stationary temperatures 
would present a verification average of nearly seventy-five percent, presumably 
for his area, and not be so harmful as all the prophetic efforts. Crane concluded 
it was impossible to apply a cycle theory that would explain past Florida freezes,
21 Willis I. Milham. Meteorology (New~Xork. 1923), p. 407, Milham was Professor 
of Astronomy at Williams College, and was quite favorable to the Weather 
Bureau, He believed that forecast percentages depend upon the area involved, 
California being the easiest and New England the most difficult location,
22 Apparently only thirty-six hour Atlantic forecasts are issued in 1956,
23 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1899-1900. p. 9$ and Annual Report. 1900-1901. 
p. 9.
24 Weather Bureau, "Omaha Convention," p, 159. He listed the following 
freezes: 1747, 1766, 1774, 1799, 1828, 1835, 1850, 1880, 1884, 1886, and 
1894-1895.
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Several forecasters had experimented occasionally with long-range general fore­
casts, each with varying success.2^ Patrick Connor, local forecaster at Kansas 
City, Missouri, issued several forecasts based on the solar magnetic theory. They 
proved quite adequate for a carnival week at Kansas City. No mention was made of 
longer periods than one week to ten days.
Chief Moore was not as optimistic as his predecessor in foreseeing 
practical seasonal and yearly forecasts, although he felt that research on the 
vast changes in solar radiation held hopes in that direction.2^ Many private 
monthly and annual forecasts had appeared at the turn of the century. Moore gave 
little praise to these efforts* "We ignored these charlatan long range forecasts 
for years until they sprang up like mushrooms. Now we must not attack the In­
dividual but attack the system. "27 Verification checks for much of this work 
failed to reveal significant correlation.2^ Planetary meteorology, moon phases, 
cycles, stars, and animal habits were all branded fruitless in solving the 
problem. Even weekly forecasts were characterized as too ill-defined for use at 
this time. Professor Frank Bigelow, expert in the Weather Bureau on solar 
physics, stressed the point that an abundance of work was conducted in this phase 
of study throughout the world, but the data used in the research was always too 
old to be of aid to the general forecaster.29 Bigelow felt confident that, after
25 Weather Bureau, "Omaha Convention," p, 4-5.
26 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1902-1903. p. xviij See also E. B. Garriott, 
"Long Range Weather Forecasts," Bulletin ¿5 (Washington, D.C., 1904).
27 Weather Bureau, Peoria Convention, p. 4-3.
28 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1903-190A. p. xiii-xvii.
29 Weather Bureau, Peoria Convention, pp. 15-21.
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further research, a code of solar data could be devised to enable the use of 
yearly forecasts.-^ 0
Despite its reticence of prior years, the Weather Bureau experimented in 
1908 with weekly forecasts, much like the present five-day forecasts, except that 
these early ones were even more general.31 Upper air data from kite and balloon 
observations was considered of possible future aid in this pioneer phase of fore­
casting. Observations at the 10,000 foot level had shown that the wind direction 
often shifted from the normal northwest to west, then to southwest two days prior 
to rain in the area.32 These weekly forecasts remained on a permanent status and 
were issued every Sunday, starting in late March, 1910. 33 They were based mainly 
on observation data received from Alaska, where stations were then maintained at 
Nome, Tanana, and Eagle.3^ The more widespread reception of weather observation 
data from Europe and Asia had also enabled meteorologists to realize that high 
pressure areas in the Atlantic and reversal of the usual flow pattern over Europe 
and Asia could affect the United States, and must be considered in future fore­
casting techniques.
In the realm of special public forecasts, cold^wave warnings were 
issued by district forecasters to citrus fruit growers, cranberry and tobacco 
interests, iron ore shippers, and other sources, requesting such vital information.
^  d^°SfatlSr!POtS t0 indi0ate W9t Periods while w®ak sun spots indicated
31 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1907-1908. pp. xiv-xv.
32 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1908-1909. p. u .
33 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1909-1910. p. 15.
34 Weather Bureau, Annual Reportr 1910-1911. p. 17.
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Though not as extensively as today, low-temperature forecasts were sometimes 
35given.
Forecaster I. M. Cline, then of Galveston, had used minimum-temperature 
warnings since 1895. Cline considered them verified if within four degrees of the 
forecast. He issued these only for dangerous, low-temperature situations, and did 
not advise the use of temperature forecasts for complete districts. Iron ore 
shippers expressed special interest in getting adequate warning for temperatures 
of twenty-five degrees Fahrenheit or lower. ^  Frost warnings had been anxiously 
awaited in the South to signal a break in the yellow fever epidemic of 1898.
Chief Moore claimed ninety percent accuracy for frost and cold-wave warnings, even 
though verification of frost as such was not practiced on any systematic scale. 
Cold-wave warnings were naturally checked by temperature verifications.37 in­
tensified efforts were begun in 1896-1897 to extend frost and cold-wave warnings 
into the area from the east slope of the Rocky Mountains to Nebraska and Texas.38 
Weather Bureau officials estimated that cold wave and frost warnings saved ap­
proximately #15,000,000 annually in property damage throughout the United 
States.39
During this period, the number of special observations taken in the 
fruit-growing areas was small in comparison with later amplifications of the 
system. Several special observations of air and soil temperatures were begun
35 Weather Bureau, "Omaha Convention", p. 166.
36 Weather Bureau, Peoria Convention, p. 97.
37 58th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1905, p. 215 (January 9, 
1904); Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1898-1899T p. 6.
38 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1898-1899. p. 8.
39 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1895-1896r p. xvii.
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during 1906 in the cranberry bogs of Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.
These growers could flood their bogs and still salvage a saleable harvest, if
they knew in advance the approach of low temperatures. By 1912, there were
fifty-nine special, or part-tin© observation stations for the fruit-frost areas.
The variety of frost warning activities included Weather Bureau cooperation in a
project of covering trees with canopies in Provo, and Salt Lake City, Utah. One
freeze in Louisiana was predicted forty hours ahead of time for the benefit of the
sugar growers. There was considerable damage from the freeze, and winds of forty
to fifty miles per hour, but the Weather Bureau could only forecast, not prevent
damage.^ Methods of forecasting frost in the Pacific Northwest were summarized
41
for application in 1912.
While considerable attention was given to frost and cold waves, other
specialized areas of meteorology also benefitted in this era of esqpanding services,
The nation’s river and flood service, barely in its infancy during the Barrington
/o
administration, reached a notable stage of development. Chief Moore summarized 
the flood service’s slow growth by describing the annual cost to the government 
as less than the flood loss of one corner of the basement in an average, commer­
cial business building. A serious flood was experienced in the Lower Mississippi 
Valley during the spring of 1897, with warnings issued two weeks prior to the
4.0 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1911-1912. p. 17.
41 Edward Beals, "Forecasting Frost in the North Pacific States," Weather 
Bureau, Bulletin ¿¿L (Washington, D.C., 1912). Another similar publication 
appeared earlier in W. H. Bammon, "Frost," Bulletin 23 (Washington, B.C., 
1898); Professor Garriott summarized work in this field from 1888 to 1902 
with a list of cold waves, in some cases dating back to 1717, and reviewed 
what was known about frost; E. B. Garriott, "Cold Waves and Frosts in the 
United States", Bulletin P (Washington, D.C., 1906); Cleveland Abbe felt that 
radiation effects, and the clear sky had much to do with causing frost, 
Garriott, Bulletin P, p. 8.
42 Willis L. Moore, "Work of the Weather Bureau and the Rivers of the United 
States," Bulletin 17 (Washington, D.C., 1896), p. 8.
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first break in levees.43 After the 1897 flood an effort was made to get an even 
more continuous record of river gauge readings, while during the same year the 
first Weather Bureau publication of normal river stages was compiled.^- Stages 
were then recorded at intervals of approximately fifty miles along the Mississippi 
River.
Rules for forecasting were empirical, and the rate of flow past a 
station could not as yet be checked. The first factor to consider was the pre­
cipitation pattern over the whole river district in relation to its departure from 
normal totals. Other factors of equal importance concerned temperature conditions 
following general rains or snows and the time intervals between such rains and 
snows.45 In an effort to help foresee possible flood danger, rainfall observa­
tions were collected by special observations for heavy storm totals of near one 
inch/6
Despite these accomplishments Kansas City, scene of an extremely serious
43 Weather Bureau, Annual Reportr 1896-1897. p. 6. Other major floods of the 
Mississippi in the nineteenth century had occurred in 1815, 1828, 1844, 1849, 
1850, 1851, 1858, 1862, 1865, 1867, 1874-, 1882, 1884, 1890, and 1893. 
Reasonably good gauge readings had been obtained for all those starting in 
1874.
44 Park Morrill, ’Floods of the Mississippi River," Weather Bureau Bulla-Hn E 
(Washington, D.C., 1897).
45 As an example location, to forecast the crest at Cairo, Illinois, it was con­
sidered of extreme importance to also keep a detailed cheek on stage readings 
at Cincinnati, Mount Carmel, St. Louis, Nashville, and Chattanooga, Weather 
Bureau, Peoria Convention, p. 102.
46 Weather Bureau, "Omaha Convention," 1898, p. 51; Officials at the Omaha con­
vention requested that all one-half inch rains be telegraphed immediately, 
and that these reports for river work should be used in the regular word code 
instead of the extra code in use at the time,58th Congress, 2d Session, House 
Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations 
for fiscal 1905, p. 202 (January 9, 1904;, The Weather Bureau paid these 
special river and rainfall station observers #7 a month for their reports.
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flood in 1903, was not protected because of insufficient funds. This led Moore to 
present several pages of newspaper testimonials which showed appreciation for the 
great flood work of the Weather Bureau elsewhere. Edward H. Bowie, who had 
already won acclaim from Moore as top local forecaster, also showed prowess as a 
river forecaster by correctly foretelling the stage of the 1903 flood at St. Louis, 
worst there since 1844.47 During the 1903 flood, there was little repetition of 
the 1897 criticism that the Weather Bureau had needlessly alarmed the people in 
threatened areas»48
Apparently still unimpressed, Congressmen refused to allow money for the 
reorganization of the river and flood service into a separate unit away from 
within the forecast division.49 Nevertheless, significant advancement followed. 
Attempts were started in 1906 to extend the river warning service to California 
and South Carolina. In the following year a new district river and flood center 
was established at Phoenix, Arizona, for the Gila watershed, and to coordinate
4-7 Moore to Secretary Wilson, June 4, 1903, Secretary of Agriculture
Correspondence, Bowie called for a crest of thirty-seven to thirty-eight 
feet, while the actual stage reached thirty-seven and one half feet.
48 H. C. Frankenfield, “Floods of the Spring of 1903 in the Mississippi Water­
shed," Bulletin M (Washington, D.C., 1904), p. 9, Cairo received warning 
four days in advance and New Orleans twenty-eight days ahead of time. Stages 
were predicted within one-half foot each at Cairo, Memphis, Helena, Arkansas 
City, Greenville, Vicksburg, and New Orleans.
49 58th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1905, pp. 197-202, 206 
(January 9, 1904), Moore cautioned committee members about the limitations 
of forecasting. He reminded them, that despite the fact that the flood 
service had doubled since 1897, cloudbursts, such as one which sent the 
Delaware River rising at one point by forty feet in twenty-four hours, could 
not be predicted.
U6
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with government Reclamation Service work in the valley of the Colorado River.
By 1909, past stages had been studied to give normal readings for the Ohio River 
from Pittsburgh to Louisville. Further aids to river forecasters were published 
on river data at Cincinnati, for the Sacramento, and for the San Joaquin water­
sheds."51 However, additional river districts were extremely necessary for parts 
of Texas, Oklahoma, Illinois, and Indiana.
To increase the efficiency of river service at Weather Bureau offices, 
remote reading equipment was perfected, which allowed the employee to glance on 
the wall to observe the river stage. In limited use under Moore, many stations 
still did not possess this time-saver for some years.3 Professor S. B. Garriott 
aided Moore in the expansion of the river service, which was taken over then as a 
separate section by Professor Harry C. Frankenfield, with the aid of one assistant 
in the Central Office.53 In Moore's last year as Chief, 433 regular Weather 
Bureau and special stations existed in the river and flood network, sixteen of
50 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1906-1907. p. xviii, Twenty-three gauging 
stations were erected on the Colorado, Sacramento, and San Joaquin Rivers. 
Additional stations appeared on the Cumberland River in 1908.
51 J. Warren Smith, "Precipitation Over Watershed and Stream-flow at 
Cincinnati," Weather Bureau, Bulletin 40 (Washington, D.C., 1912), and N. R. 
Taylor, "Rivers and Floods of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Watersheds," 
Weather Bureau, Bulletin 43 (Washington, D.C., 1913).
52 This also did not aid in situations where the river gauge was located a 
considerable distance from the regular weather station. Another new 
improvement came with the automatic, recording river gauge, which showed 
a continuous record. It too was not used widely as yet because of its 
cost - $100. Weather Bureau, "Milwaukee Convention, 1901," p. 221.
53 Weather Bureau, "Central Office Roster, July 1908," Personnel, p. 11.
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which operated in cooperation with the United States Geological Survey.^-
As the public became more conscious of the numerous damaging floods, 
theories were advanced to explain their increase in frequency and severity. Some 
voiced the claim that denuding, or removing timber in watersheds had increased 
the length and severity of floods. Weather Bureau officials denied this, assert­
ing that floods were neither higher nor of longer duration than those of forty 
years earlier.'5 Nevertheless, the question of climatological effects of land 
clearance remained quite debatable. Chief Moore stated once that denuding of 
Wisconsin forests may have caused higher temperatures in summer, and colder and 
drier winters.However, Moore reported later that a study in Wisconsin showed 
no effects on temperature and precipitation.'*^ In a similar question Moore be­
came unpopular with real estate interests for his estimate of land values in the 
arid West. He advised many people against buying land which was unproductive ten 
years earlier.56
In addition to the special type of facilities covered by river-flood 
forecasting, Bureau meteorologists turned their attention to hurricane warnings.
5A Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1911-1912. p. 17, A new river district center 
was originated at Fort Wayne, Indiana. Also in 1912, the Mississippi 
Valley experienced its worst flood in past history. Another serious flood 
followed along the Ohio and Mississippi rivers in larch, 1913.
55 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1909-1910T pp, 17-18, The leather Bureau and 
Forestry Service collaborated on a study of the theory in the Rio Grande 
National Forest, Colorado.
56 59th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1908, pp. 199-200 (January 8, 1907), He would not 
support the popular theory of a definite, rainfall cycle.
57 60th Congress, 1st Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1909, p. 30 (January 13, 1908).
58 60th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1910, p. 32 (December H ,  1908), When advised that 
Arry Engineers disagreed, Moore decided to withhold his final decision.
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Although the Signal Service leaders and Chief Harrington had fully understood the 
necessity of an adequate network of special coastal and island stations during the 
June-November hurricane season, little had actually been accomplished, at least of 
a permanent nature, prior to the Moore administration. In his first annual report 
of activities as Chief, Moore claimed that three West Indian hurricanes developed, 
and that the Weather Bureau warned of all three. In 1896 one hurricane swept 
inland, killing 114 people on its path from Florida to Pennsylvania. This storm 
caused property damage of #7,000,000. Stating that such inland passage was rare, 
but not new in meteorological annals,59 Moore chided architects for not building 
with an eye to resistance of such storms.^* Just as the inland hurricanes of 
1954-1955 have aided the Weather Bureau in getting badly needed funds, the inland 
storm of 1896, together with the war against Spain in 1898, helped promote the 
first genuine establishment of hurricane service.
Stations had been erected at three West Indian locations for the purpose 
of sending special observations from July 15 to October 15, 1895. Although 
legislation was adopted in the summer of 1898, the war was over before much actual 
extension of the service in the West Indies could be undertaken.^- Moore called 
it an act of Providence that no hurricanes interferred before the United States 
fleet saved Americans from the "oppressors of humanity." West Indian data was 
first entered on the Washington Daily Weather Map on August 11, 1898. By 1901 
stations were opened at thirteen other locations, with headquarters for the West
59 E. B. Garriott, "West Indian Hurricanes," Weather Bureau,Bulletin 2 (Wash­
ington, D.C., 1900), Professor Garriott summarized West Indian hurricanes in 
a monograph, which listed all such storms recorded from various sources 
during the previous four centuries.
60 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1896-1897. p. 5.
61 Weather Bureau, "Omaha Convention", 1898, p. 56.
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Indian service at Havana, Cuba. All were one-man stations, with the exceptions 
of Havana and San Juan, which both were also Climate and Crop Service centers. 
Havana and San Juan stations each employed three or four regular Weather Bureau 
men.^ The Weather Bureau also attempted to gather whatever it could in the way
of special reports from the French on Martinique, and from the British at Nassau. 
Four stations in Mexico also reported during the hurricane season. After such 
rapid progress, retrenchment followed by 1908, when the Weather Bureau eliminated 
five of these fourteen West Indian stations, and further reduced general efficiency 
at the other nine stations by replacement of its own men with local employees 
during the hurricane season.^
Meanwhile, on the mainland of the United States, the worst hurricane on 
record occurred at Galveston, Texas, on September 8, 1900. This storm then swept 
northward as far as Iowa, before swinging northeastward to the Great Lakes. The 
death toll reached the estimated high figure of 6,000 while property damage was 
figured at $30,000,000. 3 Weather Bureau personnel were also among the victims. 
Doctor Isaac M. Cline, forecast official in charge of the Galveston station, lost 
his wife in the catastrophe, while another leather Bureau official and his wife
62 Weather Bureau, "Omaha Convention", 1898, p. 150, Stations were opened by 
summer 1899, at Port of Spain, Trinidad; Willemstad, Curacaoj Santo 
Domingo, Santa Domingo; and Santiago de Cuba. Within two more years, 
additional stations with Weather Bureau personnel were in the reporting 
network at Basseterre, St. Kitts; Bridgetown, Barbados; Cienfuegos and 
Puerto Principe, Cuba; Hamilton, Bermuda; Kingston, Jamaica; Roseau,
Dominica; San Juan, Porto Rico,and Turks Island.
63 Weather Bureau, "Roster of Station Officials and Employees, July 1, 1901", 
Personnel.
64 "Station Roster, July, 1908," Personnel.
65 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1900-1901. pp. 9-10.
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66were also killed. The Clines, along with forty-eight others, took refuge in 
the seemingly-safe Cline home before a twenty-foot tide sent the level inside 
rising one foot per second, until thirty-two persons were drowned. Warnings of 
the approaching hurricane had been issued as early as September 4, but the high 
tide had not been anticipated.^
Because observations taken at sea are of most essential value in hurri­
cane forecasting, Weather Bureau officials asked steamship lines to report by 
wireless to Washington, D. C., any sight or trace of hurricane conditions. The 
first radio observation received from a ship at sea was on December 3, 1905.^  
Many ships did not have wireless facilities and would dodge storms if at all pos­
sible, which showed a weakness in getting data from this reporting system.^ A 
disastrous hurricane struck Miami and Key West on October 11, 1908, causing many 
fatalities in areas beyond handy communication facilities. Another hurricane 
swept away the Sandy Key, Florida, weather station in 1909. An organized vessel 
weather-reporting service was opened on April 1, 1912, with thirty ships on the 
New York-New Orleans route sending in two observations per day, via Navy wireless, 
without communications costs to the Vieather Bureau.^
Chief Moore realized the need of an expanded reporting network in order 
even to begin a sound hurricane-warning system. It was his habit to include let­
ters and press clippings of praise for the Weather Bureau when he appeared before
66 Weather Bureau. Annual Report. 1900-1901T p. 10.
67 Moore to Cline, September, n. d. 1900, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
68 Tannehill, Hurricanes, p. 8.
69 leather Bureau, Annual Report. 1909-1910, pp. 13-14, The Bureau did pay 
fifty cents per observation and furnished barometers on board ship.
70 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1911-1912, p. 25.
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Congressional committees, or compiled his annual reports. At one hearing Moore 
was rather irked at Representative Willis C. Hawley, who questioned whether some 
of these testimonials had been inspired. Moore answered in the negative, announc­
ing with all correctness: "Son© day a hurricane will slip between our West
71Indian stations and hit the Gulf or South Atlantic coast entirely unannounced.”
The next season a hurricane struck Charleston, South Carolina, with Weather 
Bureau warnings issued only four hours in advance, prompting Moore to request in­
creased appropriations for night observations along the coast to help remedy the 
situation. However, another major revision of the hurricane program was not 
effected until 1935.
With hurricane service provided as indicated by the above description, 
other severe storms were considered in a variety of ways. Weather Bureau fore­
casts and special warnings still did not include specific mention of the word 
tornado. Indeed, they did not until the present decade. This is not to say that 
forecasters did not at times recognize a situation from which dangerous storms 
could generate. The morning forecast for St. Louis on May 27, 1896, warned: 
•'Conditions are favorable for severe local storms, or severe local thunder­
storms.”^  However, morning newspapers carried the previous evening's forecast of 
only local thunderstorms. A tornado struck the area that day, killing over 100 
persons each in St. Louis and nearby East St. Louis, Illinois. Another tornado 
swept through Cook County, Illinois, the same year, prompting laymen to believe 
that tornado frequency had increased. Meteorologists denied this by declaring 
that these storms had merely struck recently in more heavily populated areas, a
71 62d Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ...
Appropriations for fiscal 1913, pp. 25-26 (December 11, 1911).
72 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1S95-1896. p. xviij St. Louis Globe Democrat.
May 27, 1896, p. 3.
I
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fact which was repeated by the disastrous series of tornadoes in 1953.73
Nautical interests fared better, for shippers on the Great Lakes were 
provided with a reference aid which described storms on those waters during 1876- 
1900, in an endeavor to help navigators recognize dangerous current synoptic 
weather situations, by comparison with the atmospheric conditions present prior to 
those earlier cases of cyclonic disturbances.74 A new small-craft storm warning 
was inaugurated at nine display stations in 1912, with use of a red pennant to 
indicate moderate to strong winds. Actually the annual losses to small craft were 
greater than those of the more spectacular loss of the Titanic.75 Another im­
provement came with the erection of steel towers at 150 storm-warning display 
stations by 1910.
In still a different area of special interest, ocean meteorology, the 
Weather Bureau caused a major realignment of responsibility within the federal 
government. In the final analysis, however, little was accomplished in the way of 
modernization in reporting of weather phenomena at sea. In 1904-, marine meteor­
ology was returned to the Weather Bureau from the Navy Hydrographic Office, in 
exchange for wireless experimental facilities established by the Weather Bureau.
As indicated earlier, the Signal Service had inaugurated marine meteorology during 
the military control of the national weather service. The primary purpose, to 
collect data with which to supply ocean traffic with pilot charts of normal weather 
conditions at sea, had then been assigned in 1887 to the Navy Hydrographic Office.
73 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1895-1896. p. xiii, xxiii, A descriptive
summary of recent tornadoes was included in this report; see also, Cleveland 
Abbe, wProgress of Science as Illustrated by the Development of Meteorology,” 
Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution (Washington, D.C., 1908) p. 305.
74- Garriott, «Storms of the Great Lakes,” Bulletin K (Washington, D.C., 1903).
75 62d Congress, 3d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on...
Appropriations for fiscal 1914, p. U  (December 9, 1912).
153
President Theodore Roosevelt had appointed a board, consisting of General A. W. 
Greely, Admiral R. D. Evans, and Moore, to settle this conflict of responsi­
bilities.76
Accompanying the expansion of special types of forecasting were in­
creased communications facilities enabling more Americans to receive all the 
above Weather Bureau benefits. Distribution of daily forecasts was given an 
impetus by use of rural free delivery service at the turn of the century. Within 
two years, over 1,000,000 forecast cards, two by four inches, were distributed to 
farmers on 10,000 rural free delivery routes. One disadvantage arose in that 
most mail carriers left at 7:00 a.ra. with an old forecast issued the previous 
night. Only those starting out at 11:00 a.m. and later could distribute the new 
10:00 a.m. forecast. Then too, the entire country was not yet covered by these 
routes, Indiana being an example of only limited service.77 Another means of 
modernized distribution came with the steady increase in the number of telephone 
lines. Upon request, operators read the weather forecasts to their subscribers.^
76 59th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1908, p. 189 (January 8, 1907), Under the existing 
system, one daily observation at noon Greenwich mean time was taken by the 
crews of approximately 1,216 vessels during fiscal year 1907, while 2,168 
ships cooperated in 1910. These observations were not usually collected 
until after the completion of the voyage.
77 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1904-, pp. 6-10 (December 8, 1902) j Weather Bureau, 
"Milwaukee Convention," 1901, p. 208, Weather symbols could be placed on 
rural free delivery mail wagons, but would cost 14»50 a set, and still give 
the same twelve-hour old forecast included on the mailed postcards. It would 
have cost the Weather Bureau $100,000 to equip wagons with flags on the 
20,000 rural free delivery routes in 1904»
78 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1906-1907. p. xxi-xli, By summer 1907, 1,633 
companies serviced 2,000,000 Americans in this manner, a true forerunner of 
the later electronic phone forecasts reports.
154
In Iowa, where almost fifty percent of rural hoses already possessed telephones, 
forecasts were phoned to the farmers by 10s30 a.m.^9
An older form of communication, the telegraph, continued to represent a 
shortcoming in the way of special warnings because most telegraphic offices were 
closed all night. Telegraph costs also increased under the Moore tenure, when 
weather information was sent to a considerable number of new places and in more 
rapid fashion. Although individual message rates were the same as fifty years 
earlier, the Weather Bureau had a difficult time remaining within the funds 
allocated for telegraph operations.^- Several other problems of public service 
arose from the extreme dependence on the telegraph. The Weather Bureau cable to 
Farallone Island, California, was cut by a steamship in 1904, and a labor strike in 
1908 curtailed facilities. Perennial winter delays resulted from ice and sleet on
79 Weather Bureau, Peoria Convention. 1904, p. 99, Iowa Weather Bureau Section 
Director George M. Chappel considered this the best possible means of 
distribution because of the slow mail service, and the fact that rural 
people seldom saw weather flag warnings, or even the Farmers Bulletin, 
which was also issued by the Weather Bureau.
80 Moore to Morton, January 29, 1896, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondencej 
58th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1905, pp. 217-218 (January 9, 1904), In early 
1896, James Watson, a telegraph operator at the Central Office, designed a 
plan to combine four telegraph circuits into two. Western Union approved 
the operation, and the Weather Bureau saved the delays of previous trans­
mission besides $4,000 per year. At Chicago the plan eliminated three hours 
of delay in relays. This allowed transmission of 600 forecast messages in 
twenty-five minutes or less. The Weather Bureau paid rates of twenty cents 
per message of twenty words and ten cents for each message of ten words, 
sent less than 300 miles.,
81 61st Congress, 3d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1912, p. 13 (December 7, 1910), Only one-half
of the near 200 daily observations were sent out to the other field stations, 
in an effort to save appropriations.
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the lines*
Further modifications in distribution of information were also necessary 
at weather stations to meet the increased demands from individual citizens and 
businesses. Individual requests increased annually to the point where employees 
at the Central Office answered over 4,000 letters in 1910. Public interest in 
weather prompted the Weather Bureau to install kiosks at twenty-nine cities.
Built on iron stands, and placed along thoroughfares or in parks, kiosks con­
tained instruments, which showed the passer-by at a glance the current tempera­
ture, humidity, and rainfall data. Many Weather Bureau instruments, especially in 
larger cities, were placed on rooftops, and the kiosk answered the popular demand 
for ground-level readings.
Newspapers, very slow in earlier days to asstime the initiative, under­
took the printing of daily weather maps. Less than two dozen papers provided 
readers with this service in 1897, while the number rose to 149 in 1 9 1 1 . This 
enabled the Weather Bureau to suspend printing of the daily weather map at almost 
one-half of its field stations. Maps were mimeographed at these stations, but 
the finished product was inferior. Reproduction by the improved chalk-plate 
process was then employed at twenty-seven places. The Washington Daily Weather 
Map was issued just once daily, beginning September 30, 1895. It continued to 
show isotherms and isobars, pressure and temperature changes, and regions of 
precipitation during the previous twenty-four hours. Maps were posted throughout
82 Moore to Wilson, January 12, 1905, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence,
In 1902, the Weather Bureau still maintained 367 miles of its own lines. 
Commercial telegraph companies paid the government in order to send messages 
over these lines. One of the few such lines still owned by the Weather 
Bureau in 1913 was the one from Cape Henry to Hatteras, North Carolina.
83 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1910-1911. p. 29.
84 62d Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1913, p. 3 (December 11, 1911).
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the country in hotels, railroad stations, and other accessible places, and it was 
a daily task at field stations in larger cities to plot weather data on the large, 
permanent glass maps on display at boards of trade. Great care was taken to get 
the data to these exchanges at a synchronized time so that people at no one loca- 
tion would capitalize on the advantage of early clues as to weather influence* 
There was then very little fraudulent use of weather data for advertising purposes, 
hut in the past there had been several instances*
Use of unofficial, daily weather forecasts by some newspapers disturbed 
government forecasters*^ Chief Moore, nevertheless, urged his men to be tactful 
to newspaper editors, and to get the monthly summary to the press on the last day 
of the month*^ He realized that a few people in Boston considered forecasts of 
the Blue Hill observatory of several years earlier as better than government fore­
casts, and that a minority of interests in New York preferred the local forecasts 
of the Daily Herald* ^
In all fairness to the Herald, it must be added that Weather Bureau 
forecasts were also published* However, Moore requested, without success, that 
the Herald^ privilege of using Weather Bureau data be discontinued because the 
forecaster used only official data*^9
Another source of service came from a steady demand for official 
weather data in court* The policy often used to meet this need was to submit
85 59th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on .** 
Appropriations for fiscal 1908, p. 185 (January 8, 1907)*
86 Weather Bureau, Peoria Convention, p* 105*
87 Weather Bureau, "Milwaukee Convention," pp* 46-4*7.
88 Weather Bureau, "Milwaukee Convention," p. 143*
89 Moore to Wilson, November 29, 1904, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence, 
The meteorologist involved had suffered a pay reduction from Moore in 1897, 
while stationed at New York, and later 3-eft the Weather Bureau*
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certified copies of original data, a practice still maintained.90 in many cases, 
though, officials in charge of large stations were still summoned for personal 
appearances.
In a more generalized aspect in the dissemination of meteorological 
information, was the major impediment to the public lise of weather station records 
caused by the lack of revision and uniformity of meteorological forms. This 
proved to be another problem at least partially solved during the period. The 
consolidation of hourly data into more accessible forms, and keeping of station 
records on local standard time instead of seventy-fifth meridian time must be 
considered major accomplishments.91 As one example, the Bureau station at Chicago 
adopted the new local form January 1, 1905.92
The improvement of public services through the technological advance­
ments in communications and the easier availability of weather statistics played 
no small role in aiding the policy of expansion as advocated by Chief Moore. The 
type of rapid extension in public services experienced during 1895-1913 was not 
matched during the next twenty years of operations.
90 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1903-1904. p. xxxviii.
91 Weather Bureau, Peoria Convention, pp. 59-61, Uniformity of form size was as 
major a problem as was a technical problem like recording of cloudiness at 
night.
92 Weather Bureau, Instruction 210, 190-4; Comparison shows that the old daily 
forms provided no space for maximum and minimum temperatures, barometer 
adjustments, or snowfall depth, which was written in the margin. Prior to 
1902, the record for one day was scattered over four to five pages. No 
percentage of hours with sunshine or average wind speeds were entered, and 
all observations were for 7:00 p.m. Precipitation was recorded on a 
midnight to midnight basis, but snowfall was measured at 7:00 p.m. until 
1909, when a change was made to midnight. The new form presented each 
day’s data on one page, provided for two corrected barometric pressure 
readings,and added useful wind gust data and hourly temperature informa­
tion from a thermograph; Weather Bureau, Daily Local Record. Chicago, 
Illinois, 1905.
CHAPTER V H
The Development of Research,
1895-1913
Chief Willis Moore realized that the Weather Bureau existed primarily 
as a service organization, established by law to provide useful warnings and 
information about various meteorological phenomena* He conceded that the 
Weather Bureau had not attempted to be the world leader in research, but con­
tended that his bureau did lead in practical application of the young science 
of meteorology. Despite this belief, Moore earnestly promoted research within 
the organization, which paralleled similar efforts in Europe as well as private 
attempts in this country. Foremost of the research investigations were those 
in the fields of aerology, evaporation, solar radiation, cloud studies, and 
wireless telegraphy.
Following former Chief Mark Harrington*s plans, the Weather Bureau ex­
perimented with kite observations in the summer of 1895, under the direction of 
Professor C. F. Marvin. The greatest height attained was 7,000 feet. Activ­
ities were limited because wind speeds of ten to fifteeen miles per hour were re­
quired in order to raise the kites to at least 1,000 feet* Nevertheless, kite 
observations proved more practical than the earlier efforts with manned balloons. 
Meteorologists considered the best method to follow would be to send up instru­
ments simultaneously for readings at perhaps twenty different stations in the 
country. Sixteen such stations, all equipped with the Marvin kite meteorograph, 
were opened in 1898. Ascents were made during the April-November period with
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the beat height at 8,000 feet.1 Professor Marvin taught the class of special
observers at Washington, D.C. Plight heights of the kite were measured by the
angular elevation of the kite and length of the line used. To implement the
above program, the Weather Bureau employed twenty-seven aerial observers, with
2salaries contingent upon successful kite observations.
In 1904, the major scene of kite activity was shifted to Mount 
Weather, Virginia, situated at an elevation of 1,725 feet above sea level, and 
site of the new Weather Bureau research center. Cleveland Abbe had proposed 
this type of center fifteen years earlier. Although Moore backed the develop­
ment of the Mount Weather installation with his usual enthusiasm, he realized 
even at the beginning that upper air observations in Virginia alone would not 
suffice for a survey of the air, or as a forecast tool for the nation in general.
Permanent observations at Pikes Peak, Mount Washington, New Hampshire, and other
• 3points, especially west of the Appalachians, were of absolute necessity* 
Meanwhile, Weather Bureau officials claimed a new world’s record with a kite 
flight of 23,111 feet at Mount Weather on October 3, 1907.
Despite the emphasis on kites, Moore had not dismissed the possibili­
ties of captive balloons for observational work here, which were similar to
1 H.C. Frankenfield, "Vertical Gradients of Temperature, Humidity, and Wind 
Direction, Preliminary Report of Kite Observations, 1898," Bulletin F 
(Washington, D.C., 1899), Kite stations were located at Cairo and Springfield, 
Illinois; Cincinnati} Fort Smith, Arkansas} Knoxville and Memphis, Tennessee} 
Dodge City and Topeka, Kansas} Omaha and North Platte, Nebraska} Dubuque,
Iowa} Sault St. Marie, and Lansing, Michigan} Cleveland, Ohio} and Pierre, 
South Dakota.
2 Weather Bureau, Personnel. April and July, 1898, An additional $3» 000 was 
given by Congress for 1899 operations.
3 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1906-1907. pp. vii-ix.
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successful flights in Europe. Professor Abbe started the project with a special 
study of this type balloon, which was inflated with hydrogen. Captive balloons 
were especially good to obtain constant recordings during periods of very light 
winds, and were used along with kites at Mount Weather. Temperature, barometric 
pressure,and wind direction were all determined by these kite and balloon 
ascensions. Pilot or free balloons as a means of upper air research also gained 
consideration, and presented the Weather Bureau with perhaps the most astounding 
results. After two years of records from kite and captive-balloon experiments 
at Mount Weather, it became apparent that neither proved suitable for the 
higher altitudes needed. The average level attained by kites was 8,737 feet 
while captive balloons reached an average height of only 6,575 feet. Other 
difficulties encountered with kites included their poor resistance to fog and 
rain.
Although proposed much earlier, it was finally decided in 1909 to 
expand the major scene of activity westward with the aim to send up one free 
balloon into the center of a storm at the same time another was launched 
a considerable distance east of the disturbance. Using free balloons, eight 
ascensions of ten miles or higher were completed during October, 1909, from 
stations near Omaha, Nebraska and Indianapolis, Indiana. The highest altitude 
attained was fifteen miles at Omaha, while a balloon at Indianapolis, sent up 
almost into the center of a high-pressure area, drifted southwest for over 
thirty miles. This indicated to meteorologists that systems of high pressure 
extend higher than had been formerly thought, and confirmed results of similar 
flights already undertaken in Europe.^- 3h 1910, Chief Moore summarized thirteen 
years of aerologieal work, when he declared:
A Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1908-1909. p. U .
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In 1897 we used seventeen kite stations but found them 
impractical on bad days....Daily synoptic charts of upper 
air were abandoned....At Mount Weather it is now usually 
good but on some days wind and fog hamper it....Nine times 
last year we could not launch anything....because of bad weather 
or lack of hydrogen gas in winter.5
Moore and his subordinates, however, showed much enthusiasm for their 
recent flights with free balloons. By use of parachutes attached to the balloons, 
which makes them sounding balloons, twelve of thirteen recording instruments 
were recovered in the Fort Omaha area and six of seven launched at Indianapolis.0 
The Weather Bureau completed two additional sounding-balloon campaigns at Fort 
Omaha, Nebraska, and Huron, South Dakota, in the autumn of 1910. Lowest 
temperature recorded was ninety-two degrees belcw zero Fahrenheit, above Huron 
during September. Highest ascent was to eighteen and nine-tenths miles at 
Huron, but very few balloons reached the nine-mile level. Progress made with 
sounding balloons led the Weather Bureau to curtail daily kite and captive-ballom 
ascensions at Mount Weather in 1912, and continue such flights only on special 
occasions.*^
Some of the theoretical conclusions reached by this time tended to 
indicate that: l) Stratification of the lower part of the atmosphere is 
higher than previously thought; 2) Thickness and horizontal extent of warm air 
masses may vary greatly, some warm air columns being ever one mile in vertical 
extent; 3) Different strata of air vary as to wind direction; 4) Depth of 
easterlies here is less than in Europe; 5) Temperature changes occur
5 Weather Bureau. Annual Report. 1909-1919. p. 9.
6 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1909-1910. p. 10, This sounding-balloon type of 
ascent had been used first in Europe in 1893 and by Professor A. L. Botch at 
St. Louis in 1904.
7 Weather Bureau, Bulletin of the Mount Weather Observatory, vols. 1-5 (Wash­
ington, D.C., I9O8-I913), This summarized all of these flights since 1904.
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practically simultaneously at the surface, at one, and two-mile altitudesj
6) Heat waves are usually confined to the air strata next to the earth’s surface 
and up to less than one-half mile altitude. They do not advance abruptly as a 
wall of high temperatures, but rather build gradually over the region affectedj
7) Causes of changes in wind direction aloft are not always apparent from the 
surface distribution of barometric pressure and temperature.
The greatest contribution of this free-balloon experimentation, both
in Europe and United States, was the discovery of the upper-air inversion, that
region approximately seven miles high where temperatures cease to fall with
increasing altitude. Ascensions into one point of this region at Mount Weather
indicated a temperature of sixty-two degrees below zero Fahrenheit, regardless
of season. That temperature was similar around the world at the same latitude.
Upper-air research in the United States had shown that the lower limit of the
8
upper-air inversion is found at less latitude in winter than in the summer.
Contemporary European data from upper-air research was more complete than that
9
of the United States.
Of equal importance as the experiments of the Weather Bureau involving 
observations of the upper air, was the help provided to the brave aeronauts, who 
first launched flights with heavier-than-air craft. Weather Bureau personnel 
were consulted frequently to provide statistics, especially wind records, past 
and present. Correspondence of Octave Chanute contains numerous letters of 
inquiry for weather data, all addressed to Professor Marvin of the Instrument 
Division.10 Marvin ted written of his long experience with anemometxy, efforts
8 Weather Bureau. Annual Report. 191.0-1911. pp. 9-13.
9 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1911-1912. p. 10.
10 "Aeronautical Correspondence of Octave Chanute," MS in Library of Congress, Wash­
ington, D.C., letters are dated from November 25, 1896, to July 29, 1908.
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which proved invaluable to Chanute, the Wright brothers* and other fliers. Wil­
bur and Orville Wright soon began their famous experiments, and discovered the 
usefulness of weather records. Writing from the Wright Cycle Company of Dayton, 
Ohio, Wilbur addressed Marvins
We want to experiment with kites for one to carry 
a man...need wind velocity of Chicago or vicinity for 
August, September, October and November, average and 
maximum daily....Your Cincinnati forecaster, Mr. Bassler, 
told us you had it.^-
In 1900, the Wrights obtained daily wind data from a nearby weather
station, but bought their own anemometer the following year, when their scene
12
of activity was too far away for suitable comparison of readings. Orville 
Wright noted wind speeds obtained from the Weather Bureau at the time of their 
actual experimental flights.13 Professor Abbe was also in correspondence with 
the Wrights, while on the west coast Doctor Ford A. Carpenter, in charge of 
the Weather Bureau station at San Diego,gave assistance to Chanute and later 
to a flying school, which was opened there in 1911
11 Wilbur Wright to Marvin, November 27,1899, The Papers of Wilbur and Orville 
Wright (New York, 1953), vol. 1, p. 12, Within one week Chief Moore sent 
the Wrights a copy of the Monthly Weather Review with hourly wind records, 
and data on Weather Bureau kite experiments during 1898.
12 Wilbur Wright to Octave Chanute, March 19, 1901, and October 24, 1901, The 
Papers of Wilbur and Orville Wight. Wright was extremely interested in 
Marvin's kite experiments, and even used a clinometer indented by the latter.
13 Wilbur Wright to Chanute, The Papers of Wilbur and Orville Wright, pp. 273, 
362, 385, 410, The brothers advised the Associated Press of the official 
wind speeds received from the nearby Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, Weather 
Bureau station for the flights on December 17, 1903.
14 c. L. Edholm, “Airmen and the Weather Bureau, Partners,” Scientific 
Am«THwn, n.s., vol. 116 (New York, 1917), PP. 343-355, Weather Bureau _ 
officials were frequently in demand for addresses before local aeronautical 
clubs* Chief Moore delivered one such speech before the Jamestown 
Aeronautical Congress in October, 1907.
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While aviation covered a new realm of special endeavor, another category 
established earlier but much neglected, was attacked with the usual vigor dis­
played by Chief Moore* In the vast field of climatology, previous data were 
fragmentary and inconsistent in comparison to the improvements and expansion 
of this branch of the Weather Bureau during 1895-1913* Accomplishments were
so pronounced that further enlargement practically ceased during the 1913-1946 
15
period* Professor Abbe and J. Warren Smith were the primary leaders of this
early program, which presented much of the information to the public in the
numbered and lettered-series bulletins.16 In contrast, one phase of the service
suffered a death blow in 1895, when Moore abolished the practice of answering
17inquiries relating weather and health* Another problem,which demanded corre­
lation with weather data, resulted from the effects of smoke on city climate.
The University of Pittsburgh undertook a study of the matter, and requested 
Weather Bureau aid on this project, the solution of which has gained only token 
support from many localities today.-*-®
While scientific studies utilizing climatological data were a natural 
product of meteorology, an unexpected type of work started when the Weather
15 Charles F. Sarle, «Climatological Services," MS, study compiled in June,
1946, for the Secretary of Commerce, Weather Bureau library.
16 Considered in the Weather Bureau bulletins were such topics ass rainfall 
in arid regions, temperature and relative humidity data, frost in the Wis­
consin cranberry bogs, daily normal precipitation and temperatures in the 
United States, temperatures and vapor tensions, climate in relation to crops, 
and individual climatic summaries for Cuba, San Francisco^ and Death Valley, 
California,
17 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1904, pp. 22-23 
(December 8, 1902), This saved #13,000 per year. Afterwards, personnel 
diagnosed only for general medical cases,
18 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1911-1912. p. 11.
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Bureau began experiments on wireless telegraphy in 1900. During the next year
attempts were made to maintain contact between Hatteras and Roanoke Island, North
Carolina, a distance of forty-seven m i l e s . S i g n a l  Corps and Navy personnel
also conducted tests during the same period. Beginning in 1902 forecasts were
radioed to Cunard Liners from Nantucket, Massachusetts. However, Weather
Bureau experiments had not passed beyond the trial stage, when this work was
transferred, as already described, to the Navy department in 1904 as part of the
20
exchange for ocean or marine meteorology.
Another effort at research failed when attempts to expand Weather
Bureau studies in seismology were blocked because Congress refused to allocate
the required appropriations. The Weather Bureau owned but one recorder, located
at Washington, D.C., when the disastrous earthquake struck San Francisco on
21April 18, 1906, destroying Weather Bureau stations there and at San Jose.
Funds were maintained for an older type of study, as research in solar 
radiation continued to be supervised by Professor Frank H. Bigelow. Forecast 
officials hoped for practical application of such data to long-range forecasts, 
but slow progress and waning enthusiasm on the part of colleagues led Bigelow 
to leave the Weather Bureau in 1910 and continue his studies in Argentina. His 
successor, H. H. Kimball, organized continuous investigations with recording 
pyrheliometers at Lincoln, Nebraska, in 1911, and Madison, Wisconsin, the 
following year. Of particular interest to meteorologists were periods of greatly 
reduced intensity in direct solar radiation at times after volcanic eruptions,
19 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1900-1901. p. 12.
20 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1904-1905. p. xix.
21 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1905-1906. pp. xvi-xvii.
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22
as was the case in the Katmai volcano in Alaska during June, 1912.
Equally important as solar activity was another neglected field.
Though meteorology featured the measurement of precipitation and the gauging 
of streams, little had been done previously about calculating the enormous loss 
of water from evaporation. The Weather Bureau soon contributed to an inter­
bureau project on evaporation at Salton Sea, California. The United States
Reclamation Service and United States Geological Survey also participated in
23
these experiments on evaporation. Although an appropriation of $25,000 pro­
vided for the initiation of this operation in 1908, no recordings were made 
until the following year.
Professor Bigelow supervised installation of a tower in the center
of Salton Sea, with evaporation pans located at the surface and at various levels
to the top of the tower. The Salton Sea project continued until 1910, providing
estimates that evaporation at the four-foot level amounted to 193 inches per
24.
year while the loss was fifty-five to seventy inches at the surface. Professor
Bigelow also conducted evaporation observations at Reno, Nevada, and at Indio
and Mecca, California. In spite of these efforts no definite policy of ex-
25
pansion evolved,and requests for evaporation stations were refused.
22 Weather Bureau. Annual Report. 1912-1913. p. 12, Similar periods of decreased 
radiation in 1885 and 1903 coincided with periods of low temperatures in
the United States and the northern hemisphere. Kimball, following the 1912 
eruption, advised Moore that 1913 would be a cool year, and his prediction 
was verified, especially in February and March.
23 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1906-1907. pp. xiv-xvii.
24. 6lst Congress, 3d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1912, p. 25 (December 7, 1910).
25 Eric R. Miller to Moore, February 24, 1911, and C.F. Marvin to H. C. 
Frankenfield, March 1, 1911, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
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Although no definite program had yet evolved, the means to measure 
evaporation became standardized. The equipment normally used for making evapora­
tion measurements consists of an evaporation pan, a micrometer hook gauge, a
26
stilling well, and a water-storage tank, where necessary. The iron pan is of 
cylindrical design - ten inches deep and forty-eight inches in diameter (inside 
dimensions). It is placed on a wooden frame at a level of only a few inches 
above the ground.
The cylindrical stilling well provides an undisturbed water surface 
around the hook gauge, and, in addition, provides a support for the gauge. The 
well consists of a brass cylinder eight inches high and three and one-half inches 
in outside diameter, mounted rigidly over a hole in a triangular base,
A micrometer hook gauge is used to indicate changes in the level of 
water in the evaporation pan. The gauge consists of a hook in the end of a stem 
that is graduated to tenths of inches over a range of several inches. The gauge 
is placed on the top rim of the stilling well with the hook centered in the well. 
The relative height of the hook in the well is indicated by reading the scales 
of the gauge. Evaporation is calculated by comparison of the current level 
of water in the well, as compared to the reading of the previous day, with 
allowance made for precipitation caught in a rain gauge at the same location.
Where it is necessary to transport water some distance, a tank or 
other covered receptacle is located nearby in order to refill the evaporation 
pan.
An anemometer for measuring wind movement over the pan is mounted on 
the wooden pan support. Because the anemometer is mounted on a specially
26 Weather Bureau, "Instructions," tenth edition, pp. 31-38.
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designed support on the northwest projecting corner of the pan platform, the
shadow of the cups falls on the pan only during late afternoon, thereby not
affecting evaporation. The anemometer is provided with an odometer on which the
total wind movement is read daily at the time of the evaporation observation
to the nearest whole mile. Wind movement, sunshine or cloudiness, and humidity
all affect the amount of daily evaporation.
As part of Bureau general policy of another nature, personnel obtained
observations as contributors to various scientific expeditions, Evelyn B.
Baldwin, Weather Bureau observer, ranked second in command on the Wellman Polar
27
Expedition of 1898-1899. Baldwin took daily observations of dry bulb and wet
bulb temperatures, wind, clouds, and fog. He kept a daily journal, and preserved
trace sheets of barograph and thermograph records taken during the expedition.
Professor Bigelow journeyed to Spain and Algeria in 1905 for observation of an
eclipse.While en route, Weather Bureau men practiced balloon ascensions
over the ocean. They reported excellent cooperation on the part of the Spanish
authorities. Bigelow bad completed a detailed account of a total solar eclipse
in South Carolina several years previous to the overseas expedition.^
The lack of upper air data prevented anything but imperfect results
in this attempt to measure the effects of the moon’s shadow on the atmosphere
of the earth. Weather Bureau observers in 1910 also recorded special descriptive
30
data on Halley’s comet. Interest in mountain observations continued with
27 Evelyn B. Baldwin, "Meteorological Notes and Observations of the Second Well­
man Expedition," two volumes, MS, material in the National Archives*
28 Moore to Wilson, June 8, 1905, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
29 F. H. Bigelow, "Eclipse Meteorology and Allied Problems," Bulletin I (Wash­
ington, D.C., 1902). The eclipse occurred May 28, 1900, and the ex­
pedition was made to Newberry, South Carolina.
30 Records of these observations are on file in, Weather Bureau Correspondence, 
at the National Archives.
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Weather Bureau personnel usually present on various of these scientific ex­
peditions.^
As demonstrated by nearly all the above phases of research, the quality 
of results depended upon the basic ingredient of meteorology, the weather 
observation. One of the major difficulties throughout Weather Bureau history 
has been the lack of adequate equipment to measure several elements with the 
desired accuracy. A case in point involved the beginning and ending times of 
light precipitation which were not always recorded with much accuracy, especially 
during the night, when offices were closed. There was a trace recorder, which 
the Weather Bureau had used for several years in some places to help solve this 
problem. Consisting of a sheet of paper containing lines in copying ink, the 
chart was exposed to the air. Blurred lines indicated that there had been rain­
fall. Prior to 1901, this crude instrument did not record the actual time of 
precipitation.^2 Oliver L. Fassig, section director at Baltimore, used an 
extra anemometer register to turn the paper, which showed time as well as 
occurrence of light precipitation. Fassig urged adoption of this mechanism 
for cooperative observers, but some officials indicated the desire to wait in­
stead for self-registering rain gauges. Actually the cooperative observers 
gained neither.
The accuracy in measuring meteorological phenomena involved three ma­
jor difficulties, exposure of instruments, human errors, and instrument errors.33
31 Weather Bureau. Monthly Weather Beview. vol. 38, part 2 (Washington, D. C., 
October, 1910), p. 1422, Alexander McAdie accompanied the Campbell-Abbot 
party to Mount Whitney in 1910.
32 Weather Bureau, "Milwaukee Convention," pp. 213-214.
33 Weather Bureau, Peoria Convention, pp. 31-37.
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The mercurial barometer, best instrument of the day, maintained accuracy to
almost one one-thousandth inch. Precipitation gauges proved satisfactory, but
exposure became the major problem here, as it was also in regard to standard
thermometers. Rooftop temperatures usually read abnomally high during winter,
and total precipitation catch was less than ground-level recordings.Normally
rain gauges stood 100 feet above the ground at city offices. Wind anemometers
needed further testing in order to correct for inaccuracies, especially at the
higher speeds, although Marvin did produce an improved wind recorder within a
few years. The hair hygrometer, used already for years, but little improved,
reacted too slowly for accurate humidity data. Sling psychrometer readings were
by far the best means of obtaining wet bulb and dew point temperatures and
the resultant percentage of relative humidity. These readings, however, were
extremely difficult to obtain in below-freezing temperatures. Likewise sunshine
recorders of that time were very crude. Even the standard maximum thermometer
had to be checked periodically against retreating or falling after the warmest
part of the day, instead of remaining fixed at the highest temperature. Marvin
sought to remedy this by suspending the maximum thermometer, bulb end higher,
and then dropping it to the vertical position for reading.
The Weather Bureau also lacked a continuous, recording pyrheliometer,
35
or instrument to measure solar radiation, and adequate recordings of snow.' 
Efforts at accurate measurement of snowfall continued to show that small gauges 
were unreliable because of wind eddies. The standpipe device was twenty to 
fifty percent in error, while platforms were not suitable. Only the snow bin
34 Alfred J. Henry, "Rainfall of the United States, Annual, Seasonal,"
Weather Bureau, Bulletin D (Washington, D.C., 1897), p. 8.
35 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1909-1910. p. 21.
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showed much promise. Still another demand at the time called for stronger light 
in the storm-darning lanterns, which could be obtained by substituting acetylene 
gas for the oil or weak electricity used.
In contrast to the inadequacies of several instruments, one valuable 
recording device came into general use, in this case during the middle nineties. 
This was the triple-register apparatus, which is still in use today in modified 
form at most weather stations. Operated by six-volt batteries, the triple­
register merely provided a way to convert various data into a continuous record. 
Electrical connections led from the tipping-bucket rain gauge, the sunshine 
recorder, the anemometer, and the wind vane. These wires connect with the 
triple-register which records the data on charts driven by a clock. The drum 
containing the chart completes four revolutions per day and provides the data 
of wind direction, wind speed, sunshine, and precipitation. Although the 
triple-register did not record temperature or relative humidity, it was, never­
theless, a major advancement in the measurement of weather elements. One favor­
able feature often cited was the accessibility of several types of data on only 
one chart.
For the benefit of all phases of instrumentation, Marvin continued
37to invent, or modify for practical use, most Weather Bureau instruments*
He designed a theodolite in 1896 for use in measuring velocity and direction 
of clouds, and perfected the kite meteorograph for measuring upper-air wind 
velocity, temperature, barometric pressure, and relative humidity. An improved 
kite reel was devised through the use of piano wire. Professor Marvin invented
36 Weather Bureau, »'Milwaukee Convention," p. 154-.
37 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1897-1898. p. 13.
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an electrical-resistance thermometer for measuring intensity of solar radiation 
in absolute units of heat, and in 1907, perfected a form of inverted astatic 
pendulum for recording earthquakes* Marvin also designed a lightning rod for 
the White House.^
Chief Moore, quite anxious to place recording instruments at all first- 
order stations, increased the number of fully-equipped stations from sixty 
percent in 1902, to include practically all of these locations in 1910. In 
addition to issuing better equipment to the regular stations, extensive attempts 
were successful in bringing long-needed uniformity of instrumentation to the 
network of cooperative observers. A large majority of the cooperative stations 
soon received at least the standard observation shelter.39 Necessity for a more 
concentrated system of inspection for cooperative stations had been expressed 
early in Moore’s administration.^
Along with the emphasis on improvement of instruments, a problem per­
sisted over the status of meteorological training. Since Weather Bureau per­
sonnel learned the science of meteorology through practical experience, as there 
were as yet no organized courses available leading to a degree in meteorology, 
deep concern arose as to the need of providing specific meteorological work 
to college men, who would be expected to maintain a steady flow of replacements 
in the professional ranks
38 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1909-1910. p. 20.
39 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1909-1910. p, 19, In 1910, maximum and minimum 
thermometers, non-recording rain gauges, and standard instrument shelters 
were used at approximately 3,000 cooperative stations.
4.0 Weather Bureau, ’’Omaha Convention," p. 151, An official reported finding one 
voluntary observer’s thermometer on the west side of the house with only a 
black umbrella protecting it.
41 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1905-1906. p. xv, Surveys revealed the lack of 
courses in meteorology when in 1906, only fifty-nine of 311 colleges and 
universities offered any courses in meteorology.
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In an attempt to remedy this situation, Weather Bureau meteorologists
offered courses at fourteen universities and technical schools, in addition to
giving numerous individual lectures.^" Professor Abbe presented one such course
at George Washington university, which was available without cost to Weather
Bureau personnel.^ Meteorology and physical geography, described in an official
Weather Bureau publication, also provided materials for a high school course
44
aimed at stimulating interest in weather science. Professor Abbe fostered 
the widespread use of foreign meteorologists’ contributions to the science, and 
translated several special studies into English. Also of special historical 
significance is his chronological list of inportant meteorological events of 
the period 1644-1909.45
Weather Bureau relationships with meteorologists of other nations dis­
play a model of what can be achieved in the exchange of scientific data, regard­
less of political differences among these same countries. Among activities in 
research directed toward world cooperation were the international cloud ob­
servations, with the Weather Bureau starting its share of the program on May 6, 
1896. Lasting for one year, this project provided data with which meteorologists
42 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1907-1908. p. xxvi, Participating schools 
included the universities of Washington, California (Berkeley), Vermont, 
Missouri, Wisconsin} and Syracuse, Bradley, lale, Norwich, Cornell, Ohio 
State, Cincinnati, Johns Hopkins, St. Lawrence universities} and the Raleigh, 
North Carolina Agriculture and Mechanical School.
43 Abbe to Secretary James Wilson, September 9, 1905, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence, and Weather Bureau, "Milwaukee Convention," Bulletin 31 
(Washington, D.C., 1902), pp. 85-92, Abbe served as adviser to Harvard
and Cornell for graduate meteorological studies, and also delivered lectures 
at Johns Hopkins. Doctor Fassig had given course work at Johns Hopkins for 
some time, prior to his Weather Bureau service.
44 Weather Bureau, "A Course in Meteorology and Physical Geography," Bulletin 39 
(Washington, D.G., 1911), New York state featured use of visual aids to 
popularize meteorology.
45 Cleveland Abbe, "A Chronological Outline...of Meteorology in the United States 
...," Monthly Weather Review, vol. 37 (1909), pp. 87-89, 146-149, 178-180.
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could review the rival theories of general and conventional circulation on the
formation of storms. Tyo small theodolites were used to check the velocity
46
and direction of clouds. These cloud studies of 1896-1897 reflected dis­
agreement with Professor William Ferrel’s earlier contention that tropical 
air moved at higher levels before returning cooled. They revealed that tropical 
air moved generally at the lower levels, and that cyclones and anticyclones 
are caused by collision of air currents with different temperatures. These 
upper-air studies proved further that new air does flow into the cyclone, and 
that these low-pressure phenomena are not always accompanied by precipitation. 
Another investigation was undertaken in 1912, when the Weather Bureau began 
special cloud observations at 1:00 p.m. at Mount Weather, Virginia.
A further, and perhaps even more noteworthy development in inter­
national cooperation occurred in 1907 through the official exchange of weather 
information with Czarist Russia.+ Meteorologists had acknowledged for years 
the importance of gaining daily reports from Siberia and Alaska in order to 
increase timeliness of forecasts for the United States, by tracing origins of 
several areas of high pressure later having effects on this country. Under 
the new plan the Russian Meteorological Service cabled daily observations to 
the United States from its stations at Vardo, Astrakan, Tashkend, Nertchinslc, 
and Yakutsk.^ By this time cabled reports also reached the Weather Bureau from 
Shanghai, China, and Nemuro, Japan.
All these foreign reports, together with American data from stations
/£ Weather Bureau. Annual Report. 1898-1899. vol. 2, Professor Bigelow compiled 
a summary of this international cloud research for the Weather Bureau.
47 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1906-1907. p. xii.
48 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1911-1912. p. 13«
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in Alaska, Manila, and Honolulu, enabled the Weather Bureau to compile, in
manuscript form only, a daily weather map of the Northern Hemisphere, starting 
49
in 1911* The Signal Service and later the Weather Bureau had issued maps of
the Northern Hemisphere for the 1875-1895 period based solely on observations
that were already one year oM. The 1911 program provided maps with data slightly
50
over twenty-four hours after observation. The Deutsche Seewarte at Hamburg, 
Germany, and the Danish Meteorological Office at Copenhagen also issued a joint 
daily map for the Northern Hemisphere.
The exchanges of data were accompanied by various inspection tours. 
Weather services of Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and Mexico sent their person­
nel to the United States to scrutinize operations of the Weather Bureau. Two
Mexican students studied at the Central Office in order to learn ways of building
51
up their own system.
Chief Moore proposed two additional undertakings in the realm of 
international cooperation, both of which failed at the time to gain the necessary 
support of Congress. He remained unable to get backing for both seismological 
observations and for the United States share in plans for a cooperative waather- 
waming service for the North Atlantic, The proposal for a weather service on 
the North Atlantic, an unsuccessful predecessor of the post World War II coop­
erative weather-ship patrol, grew to maturity because of the significant strides
49 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1910-1911. p, 17* Daily exchange of ob­
servational data had already been established with most of Western Europe 
and Canada,
50 Milham, Meteorology, pp. 361-362,
51 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1906-1907. p. xvii and 1908-1909. p. 28.
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made in the perfection of wireless telegraphy during the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Chief Moore attended the summer 1912, International Radio- 
Telegraph Conference at London, where members agreed to give weather data 
priority, second only to distress signals, in transmission schedules.^2 Mete­
orologists divided the Atlantic into two east-west zones separated by the 
thirty-fifth meridian. Vessels reporting while in the west zone would radio 
their reports to the United States, while those located east of the dividing 
line were to relay observations to European stations. Storms could be located 
and their positions made known to all radio-equipped ships at sea from 01»  high-
powered sending station on the Atlantic coast. Moore planned to give instruments
53
to ship owners and hire ship employees as special observers. He asked for an 
increase in appropriations of $150,000 to cover the new program, but it was 
refused by Secretary James Wilson, even before estimates arrived at Congress. 
Though unsuccessful later in persuading Congressmen, Moore reminded members of 
the House Committee on Agriculture that this measure would carry someday, if not 
then.
Another proposed venture of cooperative nature failed to materialize 
at t.Ma time. The German government, through its embassy in Washington, D.C., 
suggested in 1912 that the United States, Russia, and Germany cooperate in an 
aerological study of the Arctic region.54" Secretary of State Philander C.
52 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1911-1912. p. 13.
53 62d Congress, 3d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1914-, pp. 11-12 (December 9, 1912).
54. German Embassy to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, July 19, 1912, 
Weather Bureau Correspondence.
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Knox referred the proposal to Chief Marvin. The 1-leather Bureau, however, re-
55
fused to take part, yet indicated the desire to obtain the data.
In general, the international exchange of meteorological knowledge 
and the fostering of research stood at an extremely high level of attainment 
on the eve of World War I. For similar benefits to the United States only 
the period since 1945 has witnessed a status equal to this earlier model of 
cooperation.
55 Wilson to Knox, July 27, 1912, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
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CHAPTER VIII
Criticisms and Dismissal of Moore
Despite the fact that the Weather Bureau accomplished widespread prog­
ress in the extension of public services, and sponsored useful research studies 
at a rate unparalleled in weather service history, Willis Moore encountered 
growing opposition to his administration. These protests did not form instan­
taneously upon his elevation to the position of chief. Moreover, he did not have 
the restraining effects of a superior blocking every move in policy and detail, 
as had been the ease under Chief Mark Harrington. Public reaction in general, 
and the majority of the press in particular, grew more sympathetic and helpful 
toward the Weather Bureau, even to the point of increasing the use of forecast 
and observational materials, and printing abridged synoptic maps for the benefit 
of readers. This did not mean that newspaper men attempted in all cases to get 
weather terminology straight, or that they stopped giving space to the non­
professional forecaster. Editors persisted in misusing the terms tornado and 
cyclone. They acclaimed the untrained weather prophets when they did forecast 
correctly, and failed to explain the symbols used on weather rnaps.^ -
Since the beginning of the weather service in 1870, numerous cartoons, 
poems, and other jokes have been directed toward the men who forecast the 
weather. As previously mentioned, to the present time the Weather Bureau employee 
is identified so closely with weather phenomena that he is blamed for not only 
incorrect forecasts, but unfavorable weather as well. Weather Bureau activities 
could not escape the close scrutiny of Finley Peter Dunne, who discussed the 
situation through his famous Mr. Dooley. Dooley and his friend Hennessy reviewed
1 Harvey Maitland Watts, "The Weather Against the Newspapers." Popular Science 
Monthly, vol. 58 (New York, 1901), pp. 381-392.
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the merits of Clancy’s ailing leg as a valuable weather forecast guide. They sug­
gested that the Weather Bureau take observations of Clancy’s leg before issuing 
its bulletins. They agreed: "Ye always thrust a weather prophet in good weather, 
an’ that's because ye don't raymimber what he prophysied." There are two kinds of 
weather, human and Weather Bureau weather, with no man knowing what causes human 
weather. Weather Bureau weather is good parlor weather because it is on the map, 
while the other type is in the air. Dooley realized the difficulties of fore­
casting: "I niver wud prophesy till the day afther.”^
Another incident best describes the type of non-official forecasting, 
which constantly irritated Weather Bureau forecasters. Oliver P. Wiggins, former 
scout and protege of Kit Carson, now ninety years old and on his deathbed, gave an 
aspiring young reporter a weekly forecast based on the condition of his left leg, 
wounded sixty years earlier. To the surprise of the reporter, his editor, and the 
Weather Bureau, Wiggins' efforts surpassed the official weekly forecasts to the 
point where local Weather Bureau officials requested the newspaper to stop print­
ing these prognostications alongside those of official nature.3 Such lampooning, 
of course, had only limited adverse effect on the Weather Bureau. Chief Moore 
could counterbalance the more vicious criticisms by an annual compilation of 
favorable comments from the press. However, Weather Bureau forecasting, based on 
scientific observational reports, could not throw off altogether the use of signs 
or local indications. This would be rank folly.4-
In 1903, sifter eight years in office, Chief Moore still held the support
2 F. P. Dunne and Robert Howard Russell, "Mr. Dooley: On the Weather Bureau," 
Harper's Weekly, vol. 4-5 (New York, July 27, 1901^ p. 74-6.
3 Gene Fowler, A Solo in Tom-Toms (New York, 1946), pp. 300-304. The newspaper 
involved was the Denver Republican.
4 "The Spectator," The Outlook, vol. 78, (November 19, 1904,) p. 713.
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of the influential House Committee on Agriculture, and forestalled an effort to 
consolidate the Department of Agriculture Division of Statistics with the Weather 
Bureau. As part of the appropriation act for fiscal year 1903, this committee had 
requested a study from the Secretary of Agriculture as to the advisability of such 
a measure. The entire issue revolved around the question of whether duplicate 
services could be eliminated in compiling weekly climate and crop bulletins.
These reports actually were only incidental to other Weather Bureau meteorological 
duties.-* Costs were only $8,000 out of the annual Weather Bureau appropriation of 
$1,24-8,760. Weather Bureau data in the reports as an example, required an average 
of only seven and one-half man hours per week for the entire State of Georgia.
The Division of Statistics began the crop estimates in 1899, but confined its ef­
forts to the wholly statistical portions of these joint, weekly bulletins. The 
committee was convinced, and nothing further came of the suggestion.
Another incident occurred, however, within two years, which began seven 
years of intermittent strife between Moore and his growing number of critics, 
consisting of Congressmen, former Weather Bureau officials, and a noisy minority 
of the nation*s press. Purchase of land for the new research center at Mount 
Weather, Virginia, produced no immediate unfavorable comment, but events at this 
location, following its official opening in 1904, led to an unceasing storm of 
protest.
The basic reason for later difficulties originated from the rapid ex­
penditures of appropriations at Mount Weather and the manner in which the expan­
sion was undertaken. To provide added funds for this enterprise, Chief Moore made 
use of the vaguely-worded appropriation laws which purposely allowed the Bureau 
much freedom of action. A case in point was the portion of the annual appropriations
5 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Document 238, p. 10 (January 5, 1903).
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allocated to new weather stations. Throughout the years it had been generally 
understood that the Weather Bureau decided where to place new stations after a 
total sum of funds had been allocated by Congress for this category of expendi­
tures.
In the past officials of the Weather Bureau had usually indicated the 
total number of new stations to be erected for a given appropriation, A marked 
deviation from this policy occurred during the establishment of the new research 
center at Mount Weather. Moore decided to employ a more liberal interpretation of 
the appropriation laws, which provided for the construction of six new buildings 
without specifying locations. Beginning with fiscal year 1903, Moore had one 
building constructed each year at Mount Weather from the total of six new 
buildings allowed annually. While there was no public announcement of this plan, 
Moore did advise several Congressmen in a general way that he intended to expand 
the operations at Mount Weather.^ Within three years an administration building, 
a building used to conduct kite and balloon observations, and a cottage were 
erected.
By the summer of 1905 there arose some complaints about the sudden 
appearance of this government installation. Several factors gave support to those 
critics who were anxious to expose any case of unsavory nature within the federal 
government. In the first place the location of Mount Weather, sixty-four miles 
west of Washington, D.C,, caused detractors of the Weather Bureau to label this 
site as a "mountain resort" instead of a research center. Moore added credence to 
this criticism by spending a good portion of the summer months at this location. 
The administration building provided accommodations for Moore to receive and pass
6 59th Congress, 2d Session, House Report 814-7, p. 5 (March 1, 1907), The letter 
to members of the House Committee on Agriculture was written on December 18, 
1903.
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on his official work here at the elevation of 1,725 feet instead of in the sultry 
atmosphere of Washington, D.C. Moore furnished the center well, linens and glass 
included. Employees paid one dollar a day into a mess fund in order to support a
g
cook, waiter, and other help. Moore was also accused of maintaining "high- 
spirited" horses, liveried coachmen, government carriages, and gala parties at 
Mount Weather.
Amid the rumors of wrong doing in early 1906, Chairman James W. Wads­
worth of the House Committee on Agriculture called upon Moore to summarize the 
work at Mount Weather in answer to public charges of reckless expenditures. Moore 
immediately denied all public accusations involving any mismanagement of the in­
stallation at Mount Weather. About the stories of lavish entertainment Moore 
declared*
There have never been but four people not workers in that 
institution who ever spent a night in it. One was Mr. Bell, 
the inventor of the telephone, whom I took over there be­
cause I wanted to consult him. Another was the man editor of 
the Philadelphia Press, who was quite a meteorologist. But I 
should not hesitate to take anybody over and keep him over­
night..,, I go when I can, not as much as I ought.9
Chief Moore reminded Chairman Wadsworth and other members of the
committee that they had been informed in 1903 of the intentions to enlarge the
the station at Mount Weather through construction over a period of several years.
7 59th Congress, 2d Session, House Report 814-7, p. 64 (March, 1, 1907).
8 59th Congress, 1st Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal year 1907, p. 29 
(January 12, 1906).
9 59th Congress, 1st Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1907, pp. 24“35 (January 12, 1906).
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Representative John Lamb of Virginia acknowledged his own recollection of Moore’s 
intentions.The only criticism of Moore’s policy about Mount Weather was ex­
pressed by Chairman Wadsworth who questioned the procedure used to hire laborers 
for the construction of a stone fence around the research center. Moore employed 
day laborers, but Wadsworth believed that the task would have been done best by 
contract.
While the House Committee on Agriculture failed to criticize Moore about 
Mount Weather, a Congressional investigation was undertaken to review the matter 
during the following session. Visits were made to Mount Weather by members of the 
House Committee on Expenditures in the Department of Agriculture. On March 1,
1907, two reports were issued in summarizing the findings which covered the history 
of the project at Mount Weather.
On the one hand the majority opinion of the committee expressed the 
belief that Chief Moore and the Department of Agriculture had not been guilty of 
the misuse of appropriations through the construction of one new building each 
year. The law did not place restriction as to the location of buildings. Moore’s 
letter of 1903 expressing the intention to expand the research center was accepted 
as valid proof that the policy was not of secret nature. At the same time the 
Department of the Treasury had accepted all financial accounts and vouchers, 
another example showing the validity of Bureau action.H
The minority opinion of the same committee presented a variety of dis­
agreements with the foregoing. By far the most significant testimony showed that 
up to January 10, 1907, the Weather Bureau had spent $161,093.26 at Mount Weather.
10 59th Congress, 1st Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ...
Appropriations for fiscal 1907, p. 25 (January 12, 1906).
11 59th Congress, 2d Session, House Report 8147, pp. 4-“7 (March 1, 1907).
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Of this total figure only 176,251.23 came from building funds while the additional 
#84-,842.03 was used from general expenses. Members of this minority view de­
plored the heavy use of funds from general operations for only one location.
Moore had already completed initial expenditures on the new institution before 
advising Congressmen.-^ Following the testimony of several men, who in 1903 had 
been members of the House Committee on Agriculture, those of the minority opinion 
failed to arrive at the conclusion that the Committee on Agriculture had been 
advised accurately as to Moore’s full plans for Mount Weather.
Congressmen were not the only government officials in disagreement over 
the question. A representative from the office of the Comptroller General con­
sidered Moore’s use of building funds during 1903-1907 as illegal while other 
auditors saw nothing unusual about the incident. The argument continued in 
similar fashion. The minority opinion of the Congressional report certainly 
represents the truest picture of the case. Moore’s actions were not illegal as to 
the construction of buildings, yet Congressmen either through lack of interest or 
because of Moore's failure to elaborate on his motives in detail, were unaware of 
the large expenditures at Mount Weather until after the investigation.
The long-range results of the probe into Bureau policy on Mount Weather 
varied considerably. In the first place, Moore was exonerated of any criminal 
action or case of misadministration. Appropriations for the Weather Bureau were 
not reduced, and further investigation was dropped. An expenditure for a new 
administration building at Mount Weather was granted without difficulty for fiscal 
1909 after fire destroyed the first structure.^ -3 In contrast the investigation 
did apparently result in more careful scrutiny of Weather Bureau expenditures by
12 59th Congress, 2d Session, House Report 814-7, pp. 51-64- (March 1, 1907).
13 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1908-1909. p. 9.
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other responsible officials. Despite Moore's pleas, the Comptroller soon elim­
inated his use of government carriages except for official business. Moore de­
cided to buy his own horse and carriage, but applied unsuccessfully for an increase 
in salary in order to make up the difference.H In refusing this request senators 
explained that the Bureau of Animal Industry appropriation, twice that of the 
Weather Bureau, included only 1-4,500 for its chief while Moore received #5,000 at 
the time.
Another revelation unfolded by the Congressional probe was the common 
practice of freely using appropriations without regard to predetermined allotments 
for individual projects. Moore frankly stated that, when he became short on one 
fund, he legally used from another in order to carry through the current year. 
Actually it is unfair to blame Moore for this practice, as it was made possible by 
liberal wording of the appropriations laws. A large portion of salaries was pro­
vided for at the time by lump sum allocations. This enabled Moore to pay low 
wages and use the balance elsewhere. The category of general expenses was even 
less rigorously checked by Congress. A case in point was the expenditure of 
#15,381.80 in 1900-1901 for research in wireless telegraphy. No legal authoriza­
tion was provided for this non-meteorological function until 1902p-5 Despite the 
common knowledge of these practices by 1907, little was done immediately to force 
a drastic change in policy.
Though Moore emerged successfully from the episode involving Mount 
Weather, forces within the Bureau rose up to expose reflections of discontent and 
resentment against Moore's administration. It is certain that several existing 
policies created dissension among some employees. While this is true to a large
14- 59th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1908, p. 7 
(February 5, 1907).
15 59th Congress, 2d Session, House Report 8L47, pp. 8-11 (March 1, 1907)._______
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extent of many large organizations, there was more than the normal amount of 
Justifiable criticism directed against Moore. Indeed, some veteran employees from 
the days of the Signal Service control wondered if military regulations were not 
yet enforced in the civilian Weather Bureau. Raises in salaries went only to a 
selected few, and harsh reprimands appeared abundantly. Perhaps most objection­
able was the practice of transferring employees to distant locations, sometimes 
with less than a week's notice. This policy resulted in a lack of security for 
many employees. On the other hand, it enabled Moore to maintain firm control over 
cases of infractions, and promoted hardy competition for the coveted titles of 
forecaster and section director.
Victims of Moore's stern rule complained to other government officials, 
particularly to Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson. Authorities of the Civil 
Service Commission advised Secretary Wilson in 1906 that they would gladly investi­
gate the personnel policies of Chief Moore.16
A specific case soon arose to indicate again the prevalence of such 
criticism. Elisha C. Vose, section director at Parkersburg, West Virginia, lost 
his rank and was made an observer at the Concord, New Hampshire station. Chief 
Moore charged Vose with: "Negligence in preparing the annual climate and crop 
summary, as shown by numerous errors in the publication and failure to cheerfully 
and properly carry out instructions."^
Vose complained bitterly to Secretary Wilson, who then recalled Moore 
from a western trip to discuss the Vose case. Chief Moore was obviously irritated 
by the whole affair, as he informed Secretary Wilson that the action cost him $500
16 Civil Service Commission to Wilson, October 25, 1906, Secretary of 
Agriculture Correspondence.
17 Weather Bureau, Personnel. January 2, 1906.
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in canceled speeches.1® After investigation, once again Moore's action stood 
firm. Within three years, however, Vose regained his previous salary and re­
mained at his new assignment for over twenty-five years.
For two years after the Vose case Moore was to enjoy comparative 
freedom from agitation. The next serious outbreak was partially caused by the 
inherent limitations of weather forecasting, and in part by Moore’s lack of 
caution in granting predictions to the press. Moore issued a forecast of "clear 
and colder" for the inaugural in 1909 of President William Howard Taft. Unfor­
tunately a snow storm descended upon Washington, D.C., for the festivities. Imme­
diately the missed forecast became the basis of a large-scale attack on Moore.
One former Weather Bureau meteorologist presented a synoptic picture of what 
actually happened to cause the sudden change in weather conditions. With the aid 
of hindsight he pointed out that Moore certainly should have foreseen the arrival 
of this storm.^
Another attack, much more inclusive in scope, appeared at the same time 
in Everybody's Magazine.20 In addition to citing the incorrect forecast for the 
recent inauguration, the Weather Bureau was labeled a trust. Meteorological 
operations were described as costly and not progressing, because meteorology was a 
crude science featuring mere guesswork as to the direction of storm movements. As 
in earlier charges, it was repeated that Mount Weather served Moore as an agree­
able summer resort. Testimonials against poor accuracy in forecasting and lack of 
stringent verification policy found their place in this assault in which the
18 Moore to Wilson, January 19, 21, 1907, Secretary of Agriculture 
C orrespondence.
19 Elias B. Bonn, "The Inaugural Day Storm." Evervbodv's Magazine, vol. 20 
(New York, May, 1909), pp. 713-714.
20 Emerson Hough, "Does the Weather Bureau Make Good?" Evervbodv’s Magazine, 
vol. 20 (New York, May, 1909), pp. 609-621.
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writer felt that the only creditable results of Bureau activity came from the 
river-flood, fruit-frost, and services in the cotton region.
The article undoubtedly added to the list of Moore’s detractors. It was 
a vague attack, however, and like many of the efforts during the latter portion of 
the muckracking era, did not reflect entirely sound findings. Making an imperfect 
forecast was no reason for a complaint of this magnitude. A stream of protests 
came from key personnel of the Bureau, who rushed to Moore’s defense. One official 
believed that a former Bureau employee furnished the material for the story.
Moore, however, was certain that the information came from one of the owners of 
the periodical.21 Confident as usual, Moore cleverly turned the episode into a 
rallying point for collection of favorable testimonials from users of Weather 
Bureau data.22 Cleveland Abbe, despite recent differences, supported his superior 
and advised the editors of Outlook» "Mistakes will occur and forecasts sometimes 
will go wrong and no amount of destructive criticism will remedy the matter."2^
The episode must be considered as another link in the growing crescendo 
of forces aligning against Willis Moore. Another controversy started the follow­
ing year which brought Moore far greater trouble. James Berry, once chief of the 
climatological and later chief of the distribution division, resigned from the
21 Allen Buell to Moore, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence, December 6, 
1910$ Moore to Buell, December 10, 1910.
22 Weather Bureau, "Does the Weather Bureau Make Good» Answer by Maritime... 
Commercial...Users," pamphlet in Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence;
Moore to Emerson Hough, January 30, 1911, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence, Moore also initiated correspondence with Hough in which he 
remained quite cordial and reported that the article actually won many 
fl*iends for the Weather Bureau.
23 Abbe to editors of Outlook, May A, 1909; Outlook to Abbe, May 5, 1909 
Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence, Outlook editors would not print 
the defense, but assured Abbe that they would not attack Moore.
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Weather Bureau in 1910 after apparently heated controversy with his superiors.2^- 
Berry subsequently provided the press with numerous criticisms of the Moore 
regime. Berry revealed cases particularly of the type which reflected Moore’s use 
of funds for projects not yet sanctioned by Congress. Actually the alleged of­
fenses were usually minor, but the publicity resulting from Berry's revelations 
reacted unfavorably toward Moore. The former Bureau official frankly acknowledged 
his mission against Moore as the result of being one of several employees driven 
from the Weather Bureau at an age of maximum usefulness.2  ^ Of the individual 
charges, Berry claimed that Moore employed Reverend T. L. Odenbach, S. J., of 
Cleveland, Ohio, for seismologieal work, yet there was nothing in the appropria- 
tions acts regarding such research.*" The Department of the Treasury later refused 
to allow funds for seismology, apparently prompted by Berry's action.^ Mean­
while, Moore attempted to pass off the charges as meaningless. He told members 
of the House Committee on Agriculture: "I have a friend who takes up everything I 
say and issues circulars to the effect that I make misstatements to this commit­
tee."28
24 Weather Bureau, Personnel. July, 1910.
25 James Berry to Secretary Wilson, March 18, 1912, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence.
26 Berry to the Attorney-General, July 11, and July 14, 1911, Justice Depart­
ment, "Summary of Charges in the Case of Willis Moore," MS, in National 
Archives, Berry later charged that the government paid a stiff price for the 
property of a senator to be used for a Weather Bureau building at Devils 
Lake, North Dakota.
27 62d Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1913, p. 21 
(December 11, 1911)*
28 62d Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1913, p, 21 
(December 11, 1911).
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Berry continued the relentless assault against Moore, and turned to 
Congress for aid in bringing about the repudiation of his former chief. As the 
crescendo of the anti-Moore campaign rose, Representative Theron Akin of New York, 
in 1912, took up Berry’s request by demanding an investigation of Weather Bureau 
operations.29 Akin maintained that members of the Committee on Expenditures in the 
Department of Agriculture failed to keep their earlier promise to probe activities 
of the Weather Bureau. Representative Ralph Moss of Indiana, chairman of the 
committee in question, denied Akin's assertion.Moss, accompanied by two other 
members of the committee, visited the research center at Mount Weather and found 
nothing wrong at that station. A clerk of the committee studied one year of book­
keeping, purchasing, and general records of the Weather Bureau without finding any­
thing questionable. Although in receipt of written charges from Berry, committee 
members decided they were not worthy of a Congressional investigation. As an 
exrtra measure, Moss canvassed newspapers in the country using map material from the 
Weather Bureau without finding significant complaint.
Akin's demands met a cool reception from his colleagues. Despite Repre­
sentative Nicholas Longworth's suggestion that he should investigate the abominable 
weather instead of the Weather Bureau, Akin remained unimpressed, and indicated he 
would find more specific charges. Akin's most vicious attack, aimed at both Moore 
and Secretary Wilson, was delivered later in the House only to be expunged from the 
Congressional Record by the vote of seventy-nine to forty.31
29 Congressional Record. 62d Congress, 2d Session, vol. AS, part 8, p. 7659 
iHouse, June A, 1912;.
30 Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 2d Session, vol. AS, part S, pp. 7801-7802 
(House, June 7, 1912).
31 Congressional Record. 62d Congress, 2d Session, vol. AS, part 11, p. 1102A 
(House, August 15, 1912).
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Though little public attention was given to the debate in the House,
Moore attempted retaliation by legal action against Berry, the source of Akin’s 
information, Moore told Attorney-General George W. Tviekersham that Berry had 
assaulted the Weather Bureau ever since his release, and urged hasty action in a 
case of criminal libel against Berry,32 The case, however, never materialized.
Although the above criticisms during the summer of 1912 failed to 
seriously endanger Moore’s position, various events led Moore to undertake a plan 
whereby he apparently hoped to increase his authority over operations of the 
Weather Bureau by becoming Secretary of Agriculture. There were several reasons 
for this turn to political action. First, Moore and Secretary Wilson had obviously 
fallen out of accord over the Vose case in 1907, and apparently over the constant 
flow of later criticisms directed at Moore. Even more recently, Wilson had ob­
jected to proposed increases in appropriations for the Weather Bureau. In 1912 
Moore requested increases of #4-00,000 to $500,000 for fiscal 1914-, Wilson, how­
ever, rejected the proposal before it reached Congress.33 Included in the in­
creases was an item of $150,000 for American share of the proposed warning service 
for the North Atlantic. Moore had advocated this new service in talks with 
European meteorologists. Naturally he was extremely disheartened when Secretary 
Wilson refused to submit this project to Congress.
Moore apparently saw the way to retaliate with the help of the coming 
elections. Undoubtedly surmising that the split in the ranks of the Republicans 
would swing the election to Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic nominee, Moore foresaw
32 Moore to George W. Wiekersham, September 25, 1912, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence, Moore accused Berry of using the frank of a Congressman to 
circulate the attacks.
33 62d Congress, 3d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1914., pp. 9-13 
(December 9, 1912).
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the vacancy in Wilson’s Cabinet and aspired for the position as Secretary of 
Agriculture. It appears that Moore suddenly realized a way to climb the political 
ladder, using the Bureau as a stepping-stone. Although most likely a subordinate 
motive, Moore believed that in this job he could obtain all he desired in the way 
of appropriations for the Weather Bureau. Moore had gained considerable power at 
the head of the leather Bureau, and was unaccumstomed to refusals of his requests 
for additional appropriations. If he gained the new position, Moore felt he 
would also be able to lend discredit to Berry's persistent criticisms and block any 
attempts by Berry to secure a secretary unfavorable to Moore.
With this goal in mind, Moore proceeded to formulate a thorough plan of 
action. One factor proved to be extremely advantageous. Moore controlled the 
system of weather stations scattered throughout the nation. A select number of 
trusted employees at these stations were of tremendous aid in his political cam­
paign. Through the help of subordinates, Moore attempted to line up support of 
civic, religious, educational, and political groups. C. T. Burns, an inspector 
with the Weather Bureau, concluded a six-week trip at government expense to secure 
the support of typographical and labor unions, while new stations were opened for 
campaign purposes, for example, at Champaign, Illinois, and Trenton, New Jersey.
Many of his employees supported him freely while others did so by order 
or through fear, as Moore showed little respect for those employees who were 
reluctant to back him. Moore labeled two prominent Bureau officials who failed to 
support him as "scabs" or "rat" workers.34 To secure the aid of his own employees 
Moore indicated that if he were chosen as Secretary of Agriculture, salary raises 
would be granted to Weather Bureau employees, and the Bureau would gain general 
increases in annual appropriations. Several employees received awards through
34- Moore to H. J. Cox, December 30, 1912, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
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pay raises in January, 1913. Advising that the least misstep might destroy all 
their plans, Moore warned his followers against possible leaks of information to 
the press.36 Requests for political favors were numerous and pointed. One such 
request instructed an employee in Jacksonville, Florida, tos "Get your friend 
Governor Jennings, to get W. J. Bryan to talk against Charles W. Dabney, quiet 
candidate."-^
Effort was directed to influence Joseph P. Tumulty, close adviser to 
President-elect Woodrow Wilson. Tumulty reluctantly met once with Moore.38 
Naturally with the use of such widespread preparations, the gist of the plan fell 
into the hands of Moore's chief opponents. In November, 1912, James Berry an­
nounced that Moore sought a portfolio and always was a Democrat.39 Berry attempted 
to label Moore a Democrat merely because he was chosen as chief by Grover Cleve­
land, a Democrat. Berry encountered difficulty yet in arousing much interest in 
the activities being conducted by Moore. This was partially because only rumors 
had become available instead of concrete evidence.
In the meantime, another source of embarrassment faced Moore. Members 
of the House of Representatives reduced Moore's salary for fiscal 1914-, only to 
have it restored through the persistent efforts of the Senate,^ By February 1913 
Representative Akin called for a complete investigation of the Weather Bureau, and
36 Moore to Cox, November 23, 1912, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
37 Moore to A. J. Mitchell, December 5, 1912, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence,
38 New York Times. April 20, 1913, II, p. 3.
39 Berry to President W. H. Taft, November 11, 1912, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence.
4-0 62d Congress, 3d Session, Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1914, 
p. 8 (1913).
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asked employees to give evidence as to certain alleged irregular conditions.41 
He said that Moore promised pay increases for Weather Bureau personnel, if he 
became Secretary of Agriculture. Akin furnished a list of those .already promoted 
for their help so far. Akin demanded the facts so that: "Moore could be relegated 
to the political scrap heap by the toe-end of Woodrow Wilson’s copper-toed boot."42 
These new charges by Akin proved to be fatal to Moore’s plan. Formerly 
a printer, Moore had remained a labor union booster, and President Wilson received 
many petitions from these unions asking him to select Moore. Wilson believed that 
Moore should keep out of politics.
In March, 1913, Moore resigned his position, effective July 31, 1913, 
after a conference with President Wilson. Detailed charges were not released at 
this time, but Moore's candidacy for the secretaryship was mentioned.^ The reason 
for delay in publication of more specific charges was the disappearance from the 
Central Office of practically all correspondence regarding the matter, reportedly 
burned in February. 44 Rumor still persists that these files were being removed by 
wheelbarrow through the back door of the Central Office while investigators 
entered the front door. Further search uncovered copies of many of these letters, 
which had not all been destroyed by field employees. A. S. Pollock, stationed at 
Trenton, New Jersey, during the election campaign of 1912, surrendered much of the 
correspondence which was sent to him.
On April 14, Representative H. Robert Fowler of Illinois, requested an
41 Congressional Record. 63d Congress, 1st Session, vol. 50, part 4, p. 3624 
(House, February 21, 1913).
42 New York Times. February 22, 1913, p. 7.
43 New York Times. March 23, 1913, HI, p. 1.
44 Department of Agriculture, Press release of April 16, 1913, p. 1.
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investigation of travel expenses in the Weather Bureau for the period November
IK
1912-February 1913. The seriousness of the accusations had grown to such an 
extent that President Wilson decided not to wait for the resignation date. He 
removed Moore from office on April 16, 1913»^ Officially the reasons were 
summarized* ’‘Acceptance of resignation withdrawn, removed for irregularities and 
misuse of orders in conduct of business of Bureau.”^  Wilson also ordered 
Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston to suspend C. T. Burns, another Weather 
Bureau employee.4^
Following the dismissal of Moore, the Department of Justice conducted a 
thorough investigation of all charges to determine whether Moore should be prose­
cuted. A decision not to prosecute was reached in November, 1914-» Investigators 
substantiated most of the accusations brought against Moore, but advised Attorney- 
General T. W. Gregory against prosecution, because of probable chagrin from public 
disclosure and the difficulty of bringing so many small acts before a jury.49 The 
feeling persisted that Moore was already sufficiently punished. President Wilson
7 3 New York Times. April 17. 1913. p p . 1-2? Congressional Record. 63d Congress, 
1st Session, vol. 50, part 1, p. 178 (House, April 14, 1913), Fowler also 
asserted that following the reduction of Moore’s salary on point of order in 
the House in February, Moore and former Senator William E. Mason of Illinois 
visited Fowler, at which time Moore became aggressive.
4.6 Woodrow Wilson to Willis Moore, April 16, 1913, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence.
47 Weather Bureau, Personnel. April, 1913.
4.8 Woodrow Wilson to Houston, April 16, 1913, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence.
4.9 Department of Justice, "Summary of Charges in the case of Willis Moorepre­
pared by A. Bruce Bielaski, For example, investigators claimed that the 
Bureau listed prior expenses for the Trenton, New Jersey station at $4,500, 
yet the office was not in operation for meteorological purposes until April, 
1913.
50 Gregory to Woodrow Wilson, November 23, 1914, Department of Justice, Case of 
Willi3 Moore,_________________________ ________
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agreed: "The President tells me to tell you he acquiesces in your conclusions.
The last official entry in the Moore episode followed in 1921, when an 
attempt by Senator Joseph France of Maryland failed to get the case reopened. 
Attorney-General H. H. Daugherty reminded those interested of hoy; Moore had 
appealed to President Wilson against a trial. There actually was no prosecution, 
and it would be too costly to reopen the case.52
Little sorrow came from several quarters following the Moore dismissal. 
An Oregon attorney, who was also a former general forecast official, advised 
Secretary Houston that he resigned ten years earlier because he could not bear 
Moore’s treatment.55 He listed three additional top-echelon officials he felt 
should be relegated to proper grades and stations. A member of the Fresno, 
California, Fruit Growers Association congratulated Houston, adding that Moore had: 
"Persistently hoodwinked Congress."5'+
Additional adverse consequences resulted for the Weather Bureau from the 
controversy, with action directed toward numerous other Weather Bureau officials, 
who were accused of aiding Moore’s political designs. Three were dismissed.55 
Several others suffered brief suspensions, while pay reductions went to six
51 J. P. Tumulty to Gregory, November 28, 1914, Department of Justice, Case of 
Willis Moore.
52 France to Daugherty, April 4, 1921, and Daugherty to 0. E. Weller, April 28, 
1921, Department of Justice, Case of Willis Moore,
53 B. S, Pague to Houston, May 8, 1913, Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence.
54 J. B. Bolton to Houston, April 17, 1913, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence.
55 Weather Bureau, Personnel. July, 1913, Chief Clerk D. J. Carroll, Professor 
H. L. Heiskell, and Section Director R. E. Pollock were all removed from 
office: "On account of unfitness for the public service as shown by their 
callous disregard of their official duties."
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district forecasters, nine section directors, and sixteen lesser officials, mostly 
to the salary levels they received prior to promotion by Moore during the political 
campaign.56 A more serious result of the Moore case was the added difficulty 
created for obtaining increased appropriations for the Weather Bureau throughout 
a number of years following 1913, leading to virtual curtailment of research 
activity.
Meanwhile, the search continued for a new chief of the Weather Bureau. 
President Wilson and Secretary Houston enlisted the aid of the National Acadeny of 
Sciences, whose subcommittee considered twenty-six candidates before narrowing the 
field to four.Secretary of Agriculture Houston then consulted Cleveland Abbe, 
Sr., for his opinions, finding that Abbe preferred C. F. Marvin for his friendli­
ness with his men as well as his expert scientific background.58 Secretary 
Houston in turn advised President Wilson to select Marvin.59 Wilson complied and 
the New York Times accurately summarized the feeling among meteorologists when it 
hailed the selection as proof that politics had not replaced science in this in­
stance. ¿Yen though it remained to be seen whether he possessed the necessary
56 Weather Bureau, Personnel, June, 1913, All six: district forecasters had re­
ceived #600 pay raises in January,* New York Times, lay 17, p. 2; June 8, II, 
p. 2; June 10, p. 7j August 1, p. 3; and August 29, p. 5.
57 New York Times. July 30, 1913, p. 6. Members of the subcommittee were Presi­
dent C* E. Van Hise, University of Wisconsin; Dr* Ira Remsen and R. W# H® 
Welch, both of Johns Hopkins University; Professor E. C. Pickering of Harvard; 
Professor E. L. Nichols, Cornell; and Professor W. W. Campbell of the Lick
Observatory. Professors A. G. McAdie and C. F. Marvin of the leather Bureau;
Professor E. B. Rosa of the Bureau of Standards; and Dr. L. J. Briggs were the 
top candidates.
58 Abbe to Houston, May 23, 1913; T. C. Mendenhall to Houston, May 5, 1913, 
Secretary of Agriculture Correspondence, Mendenhall of the University of 
Wisconsin also recommended Marvin.
59 Houston to Woodrow Wilson, July 22, 1913, Secretary of Agriculture 
Correspondence, Few actively aspired for the position.
SO New York Times, July 30, 1913, p., 6.
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executive ability, Marvin had established himself as a capable scientist, writer, 
and i n v e n t o r . I t  was generally considered that changes would be slowly and 
carefully undertaken by Marvin in contrast to Moore. At the same time, the 
country did owe Moore a great debt for developing the Weather Bureau in the 
numerous ways described. He, like everyone else, committed errors, especially one 
that was clearly inexcusable»
61 Weather Bureau, Personnel. July, 1913, At the same time of Marvin’s selection, 
C. C. Clark was transferred from the Department of Agriculture office to the 
important position of Chief Clerk and Executive Assistant of the Weather 
Bureau*
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CHAPTER DC
The Modernization of General Services, 1913-191*1
The elevation of C. F. Marvin to the top position in the Weather 
Bureau in 1913 marked the beginning of a new era in the supervision and control 
of operations. Marvin remained until his retirement in 1931*, finishing the 
longest tenure to date of any chief.-*- Innovations, introduced by Marvin and 
later Chiefs, established the period of 1913-191*1 as one of gradual improvement 
in general services. Another phase of operations, the service to aviation, grew 
even more rapidly during the same time. Aid to aviation will be discussed fully 
in the next chapter.
In the administration of Bureau affairs Marvin manifested qualities 
of fairness and frankness which made him well liked by the vast majority of his 
employees. Generally speaking, Weather Bureau personnel enjoyed a period of 
stability and security unknown prior to 1913 under any administration. Marvin 
and his successors abandoned the practice of transferring employees with perhaps 
only twenty-four hours notice. Despite evidences of bureaucratic conservatism 
during the Marvin leadership, employees gained such pre-tfew Deal benefits as 
the Saturday half-holiday and salary raises.
In January, 1931*, Willis R. Gregg became Chief of the Bureau. Marvin, 
however, remained as a professor until his retirement on August 23, 193i*, after 
fifty years with the weather service* Marvin represented the older group of 
early government meteorologists, while Gregg had started with the Bureau in 1902
I Willis L. Moore served eighteen' years, 1895-1913» while F. W. Reichelderfer 
has been chief for the eighteen years since December, 1938*
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as an observer» He completed seven years of kite work at Mount Weather,
Virginia, before becoming assistant chief of the new aerological section in 19ll** 
Gregg served during the 1917-1931* period as chief of the aerological division*^ 
Gregg was chief of the Bureau until his sudden death on September ll*> 1938, at 
the age of fifty-eight»
The next head of the weather service was chosen from outside the ranks
of the Bureau, Francis W. Reichelderfer, appointed chief in December, 1938, was a
commander in the Navy at the time. He had obtained the bachelor of arts degree
at Northwestern University in 1917, after which he entered the Navy, and aided
in the reorganization of meteorology in that department» He had worked at the
forecast division of the Weather Bureau during 1922-1925 to obtain weather data
for the Navy. Chief Reichelderfer aided greatly in providing pioneer service
3
to military aviation throughout the 1919-1938 era. He remains as chief today*
Improvements are generally made possible by increased appropriations»
This was certainly the case with the Bureau. From the fiscal 1913 expenditures
of $1,638,878*92 the total appropriations advanced to $2,105,11*1«76 during
fiscal 1921. By 1932, the peak year prior to depression cuts, the total was
$1*,1*97*720. The fiscal year 191*2 appropriations totaled $7,838,1*50.^ Most of
the increases during the period of 1930-1939 went for aid to aviation instead of
d
general services, which gained very little during these ten years» The number
5 Weather Bureau, "Topics' and Personnel, August, 1938.
3 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, February, 1939*
1* 77th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on Depart­
ment of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 191*3, p. 222 (January 8, 191*2). 
5 76th Congress, 1st Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ..* 
Appropriations for fiscal 191*0, pp. 21*5-21*6 (February 11, 1939)*
201
of full-time personnel likewise increased notably by the late thirties to almost 
double the figure of pre-eWorld War I. When Reichelderfer became chief there 
were approximately l,i>00 regular employees.®
One of the early tasks of the Marvin administration was to supply 
meteorologists and weather advice to the military forces, beginning in 
1917 with American entry into World War I* Twenty-five percent of the Bureau 
personnel entered military service, while others left for better jobs in in­
dustry.? Another result of the war was the introduction of daylight saving 
time* necessitating additional observations at many weather stations. Despite 
these difficulties, Bureau officials trained meteorologists of the Signal Corps 
in classes held throughout the country and provided daily weather bulletins 
covering conditions in this country to all American military units in Europe.® 
These war time contributions were only temporary. Other areas of 
special type of service, however, also underwent a decided expansion through­
out the 1913-191*1 period. For example, the hurricane-warning service, one of 
the hardest worked Weather Bureau groups in the 195U-195S seasons, matured by 
1936 from adolescence to adulthood. In 1913 residents of the endangered coastal 
areas enjoyed hurricane-warning facilities for only approximately fifteen hours 
per day. It is likely that even less attention would have been directed toward 
these tropical storms, if it had not been for the opening of the Panama Canal 
and the dangers of World War I*
i> 7£th Congress, 3d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1939, p. (February 2, 1938), indicates full-time 
personnel by ten-year periods as follows: 18 71, 233; I88O, i*8£; 1890, ¿6£;
, 1900, 51*6; 1910, 792; 1920, 922; 1930, 1,023; and 1938, 1,1*91*.
7 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1917-1918. p. 9.
8 Willis R. Gregg, "Aerological Investigations of the Weather Bureau During the 
War," Monthly Weather Review, vol. 1*7 (Washington, D.C., April, 1919), pp. 205-
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In 1911;, the Heather Bureau received only 8t00 a.m. daily reports from 
Caribbean area observers, mostly native observers who were paid a small wage for 
the service* No separate hurricane service existed, but the general forecasters 
at Washington, D.C. also issued hurricane warnings* Anticipating the opening 
of the Panama Canal, the Weather Bureau planned to obtain two daily observations 
and to send two or three additional commissioned employees to the area,9 x  
separate hurricane service was proposed but not adopted at this early date.
Actually the only immediate major improvements came with the addition 
by 1917 of reporting stations on Swan Island, Eritish Honduras, Nicaragua, Cuba, 
the Canal Zone, and the Virgin Islands. H. B. Hersey, principal forecaster at 
Milwaukee, was assigned temporarily to the area, but the original plan to center 
the service in the Canal Zone was dropped in favor of San Juan, Puerto Rico, 
which became a district forecast center in 1919* However, it did not originate 
hurricane forecasts,1 *^ Additional commissioned employees were sent only to San 
Juan, while special observers elsewhere continued to send their single daily 
reports to San Juan*
Another effort was undertaken to arouse the interest of shippers in 
providing regular observations. The Weather Bureau paid ten percent of tele­
graph costs plus fifty cents per observation. Little success resulted in the 
way of direct radio observations from ships until the thirties. An early ex­
ample of the still inadequate arrangement was a destructive storm September 
1919, which followed an abnormal course«11 The storm hit Key West, Florida, then
9 63d Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture, Appropriations for fiscal 1915, pp. 12-15 
(December 9, 1913)«
10 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1916-1917, p« 10,
11 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1919-1920, p. 10*
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12veered west to strike Corpus Chris ti, Texas* Weather Bureau warnings caused
removal of ships from the water and little information was available until the
widely-scattered land stations were affected. This observational phase of
hurricane service was never solved until the advent of airplane flights into the
eye of the storm and radar tracking techniques, both of the post-World War H
era* A pilot-balloon study of the hurricane land areas was started as a result
of this 1919 storm, with two daily observations for the July-Noveraber period of
13high storm frequency* There was one consolation. The Bureau did become
extremely helpful in advising steamers of the general danger zones, even if it
Hicould not sufficiently warn land areas.
In spite of the meager service already in existence, the hurricane 
advisory system suffered a severe curtailment in the name of Coolidge economy, 
when the seasonal service was reduced by six weeks*15 Another cutback was forced 
upon the Bureau in 1928 when the Swan Island station, previously operated by the 
Tropical Radio Telegraph Company, was closed.^ The United States Navy later 
cooperated with the Weather Bureau to open a station on Swan Island in 1938.^  
Further improvement was interrupted by the Great Depression, with the 
next significant advancement, consisting of two-way radio service from ship to
12 èôth Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on depart­
ment of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1921, p. 1|5 (December 9, 1919)*
13 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1919-1920, p. 17*
lb 67th Congress, Util Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1921;, p. 73 
(November 16, 1922)*
1$ Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1923-1921;, p. 1;* June to November are the 
most dangerous months•
16 70th Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1930, p. 89 
(November 19, 1928), The Weather Bureau requested, without success, #3,$00 a 
year to operate the office plus $11,2$0 to replace basic field equipment*
17 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1937-1938, p* 8,
20k
shore, introduced in the post-1935 era. In addition to two daily ship obser­
vations, the radio service featured special observations. Bequests for data 
were issued to ships of every national registry while commercial radio stations 
then relayed the reports to the Weather Bureau in Washington, D* C. Stations 
of the Radio Marine Corporation of America gathered these coded reports at 
Tampa and Palm Beach, Florida, and Port Arthur and Galveston, Texas. ° Other ex­
amples of cooperative radio stations were the South Puerto Rico Sugar Company 
and Kin American Airways which maintained radio contact with thirty-five stations 
in the Caribbean and turned over all weather information to the Weather Bureau 
at Miami. Once again the undertaking proved less beneficial than might be 
assumed at first glance because ships quite naturally left the danger zones, 
leaving forecasters a guessing game as to the movements of storms. It was also
true that forecasting only from knowledge of past storm tracks of hurricanes
19was early recognized by the Weather Bureau as of little value.
The outstanding weaknesses of the existing warning system were ex­
pertly analyzed in 1933-193k by the Presidential Science Advisory Board.^O 
Chief complaints were that the service was still operated only approximately 
twelve to fifteen hours a day* There were only two basic observations, at 8:00 
a.m. and 8:00 p.m., and just two warnings issued each day. All forecasts origi­
nated at Washington, D.C., far too distant from the critical areas. A record of 
twenty-one storms in 1933 brought further clamor for reorganization and caused 
a Bureau committee to list the steps necessary to inaugurate the recommendations
IB Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, May, 1933; Weather Bureau, Annual 
Report, 1932-1933, p. 3~. ------
19 Ivan R. Tannehill, Hurricanesi Their Nature and History (Princeton, 1938), 
p. 55» Dr. Tannehill had completed twenty years of experience with Weather 
Bureau hurricane-warning work at the time of publication.
20 Report of the Science Advisory Board, July 1933-September 193k (Washington, 
D.C., 193k ),' PP» k7-kB.
I!
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of the Science Advisory Board* It was estimated that ¡¡>96,1*00 would be required 
to reorganize the hurricane service in order to provide two additional forecast 
centers, four daily observations and warnings, and a separate teletype network 
to insure twenty-four hour operation* Chief Gregg considered the hurricane 
program of the Weather Bureau in 193U as "sadly sketchy*"^
The wheels of progress sometimes turn slowlyj another hurricane season 
passed before a complete reorganization could be effected. Congress provided 
$80,000, and the new system went into operation in time to cope with eight storms 
in 1935« As recommended, a minimum of four daily observations and warnings were 
initiated with supplementary ammouncements whenever necessary. Coordination of 
communications followed in the form of a special teletype circuit installed to 
connect fifteen coastal cities* Forecast warning centers were established at 
Jacksonville, New Orleans, and San Juan to supplement the center at Washington,
D .C.^  It was at this time residents of the Jacksonville district became familiar 
with the radio alerts of W. J. Bennett, the late Grady Norton - eventual head of 
Weather Bureau hurricane service, and his future successor, Gordon E. Dunn*^
One of the storms in 1935 was the Labor Day hurricane, resulting in the 
deaths by drowning of more than 500 persons on the Florida Keys. Most of the 
fatalities befell World War I veterans who lived in temporary barracks, while 
laboring for a Florida relief project* It is a difficult task to formulate 
an accurate account from the voluminous amount of conflicting testimony, but 
several facts are apparent*
15l Gregg to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, February 19, 193k f 
Weather Bureau Correspondence*
22 Gregg to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, December ill, 1937,
Weather Bureau Correspondence.
23 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 193^-1935, pp* 9-10* Fixed areas of 
responsibility were assigned*
2k Weather Bureau, "Roster" Topics and Personnel, September 1, 1935*
I
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In the first place, at 3*30 a.m., Labor Day, September 2, 1935» the
Weather Bureau issued an advisory indicating the possibility of high tides and
25
gales on the Florida Keys, Camp officials ordered an evacuation train, but 
it did not arrive until the water was already across the tracks. Meanwhile, a 
large number of permanent residents, who owned cars, made no effort to leave, 
even though there had been previous losses of life from hurricanes in the region. 
The Army Engineer Corps, significantly enough, moved its men and valuable equip­
ment away from the threatened area on the basis of Weather Bureau advisories.
Pan American Airways did likewise.2? There is no doubt that public apathy in 
interpreting or paying attention to warning is the major cause of hurricane 
fatalities, in this and most other instances.
Nevertheless, Representative J. Mark Wilcox of Florida suggested in 
1936 that the Weather Bureau place a series of new stations along the Keys.2® 
Obviously this would do nothing to solve the real problem of blind spots at sea 
causing lack of observation data, and the plan was rejected by Chief Gregg.2^
25 71*th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on World War Veterans* Legislation, 
Hearings on H.R. 91*86 to give Benefits, March 26-May 6, 1936, p. 182, 181* 
(March 26—May 6, 1936). At 9*30 a.m. the position of the storm was placed at 
200 miles west of Havana, and at 1*30 p*m. hurricane warnings were issued
for Key West with gales for the Keys. By 1**30 p.m. the Weather Bureau 
warnings stated that the storm, located seventy-five miles away, was moving 
northwestward toward the Keys. The calm center of the storm did not hit 
ill-fated Matecumble until after 9*00 p.ra., but winds of the forward edge 
brought the fatal high tide across the Keys at 8*25 p.m.
26 7l*th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on World War Veterans Legislation, 
Hearings on H.E. 91*86 to give Benefits, p. 201*. The same Florida East Coast 
Railroad counted 121* dead laborers from a storm in 1906, while other violent 
hurricanes occurred nearby in 1919 and 1929.
27 7l*th Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings for Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1937, p. Ui5 
(January 13, 1936).
28 Congressional Record, 7l*th Congress, 2d Session, vol. 80, part 3, pp. 2701*- 
2705 (House,February 19, 1936).
29 Congressional Record, 7l*th Congress, 2d Session, vol. 80, part 3, p. 2886 
(House, March lo, 1936).
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The Weather Bureau did gain an increase of $128,000 for hurricane work at this 
session of Congress. An experiment designed to obtain upper-air data during the 
passage of hurricanes was then undertaken in cooperation -with Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. The lack of coastal storms in 1936 meant postponement 
of the attempts for one year, several stations in the South and one at Havana, 
Cuba, were equipped in 1937 with forty-inch balloons and meteorographs in order 
to take sounding balloon observations to preferred heights of 30,000 to 100,000 
feet.3® Among other new projects, Weather Bureau personnel inspected fourteen 
weather stations on the Bahamas and received some daily reports from them during 
the 1937 season. Meanwhile researchers at Florida University attempted in 1936 
to locate the center of hurricanes by radio static crashes sent out by the storing 
Professor Joseph Weil reported accuracy within ten miles of Weather Bureau 
tracking reports. Another improvement in service accompanied the increase in 
personnel to five men each at hurricane centers and additional teletype 
facilities in the Jacksonville and Brownsville areas
Further embarrassment was caused in September, 1938, however, by the 
tragic New England hurricane, a phenomenon better known to that sector in 1931i- 
1955* New England, because fewer storms had threatened its location, was not 
highly organized for hurricane work. Chief Reichelderfer declared that four 
daily general weather maps and the accompanying forecasts, instead of the current 
two per day, might have aided in giving better warning of that storm.^^pour daily
30 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1936-1937, p. 11, and Weather Bureau, Topics 
and Personnel, August, 1936* Instruments were tagged and the finders, 
collected $3*00 each for returning them to the Weather Bureau.
31 New York Times, August 10, 1936, p. 21.
32 75th Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on ... Appropriations for fiscal 1938, pp. 133, 1U7 (March 12, 1937).
33 76th Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1940, p. 251 
(February 11, 1939)*
I
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forecasts were started in 1939» Similar to Hurricane Carol of 195U, the 1938
sto m  doubled its forward movement overnight, costing the Weather Bureau several
precious hours of warning.^ Newspapers and radios were also jammed with news
of the Sudetenland crisis in Europe during the hurricare’s approach, which had
been tracked for one week. In all fairness to the Weather Bureau, it must be
said that warnings of full gale were announced over four hours before the hurri­
ed
cane struck long Island. Then, as now, people worry over the term hurricane, 
but remain little concerned about gales, which can prove in reality only 
slightly less devastating.^ ^he usual number of individual complaints were 
directed to the Weather Bureau Central Office*
Regardless of the complaints, the hurricane service of the Weather 
Bureau was as complete as possible in 19U1 when consideration is given to the 
fact that this branch of meteorology was without the later benefits of hurri­
cane-hunting by airplanes and radar-tracking equipment.
Another aspect of special aid, the river and flood service, extended 
its work at a slow pace until the later twenties. It then suffered cutbacks, in 
spite of planned improvements at the start of the depression, but later gained 
New Deal funds for sweeping reorganization and modernization. Few Americans 
actually realize the extent of the flood menace to this country. During the 
192l|-1937 period damaging floods occurred in all but fifteen of the 168 months.^” 
The annual average loss of life was ninety, while the annual property damage was
35 76th Congress, 1st Session, House,Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1950, p. 266» 
(1939).
35 76th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Subcoimiittee of .Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1950, p. 158 
(1939).
36 Weather Bureau Correspondence, file on 1938 New England hurricane.
37 Department of Agriculture, Climate and Han, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1951» 
(Washington, D.C., 19ill), p. 566.
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estimated at $102,182,000*
Bureau river forecasters since the mid-nineties predicted the future 
changes of river levels for periods of one to several days, depending upon the 
situation. They also reported the daily readings of river stages and their 
changes during the previous twenty-four hours.3® These river forecasts were 
accompanied by tables giving temperature, wind, and precipitation data for the 
majority of first-order stations in the country. The weather map, drawn at 
larger stations, was also a part of this same publication, available daily except 
Sundays and holidays. Data originated from daily observations taken at 7:00 
a.m. Inquiries literally deluged river offices during flood-stage situations, 
one office answering 8,6ll telephone calls in a twenty-hour period.^ Just as 
elaborate rules governed general weather forecasting, river forecasting also was 
regulated by standard empirical rules based on situations similar to previous 
occurrences.^
At the start of World War I much remained to be done in river work, 
especially west of the Mississippi. Steps to alleviate this deficiency were 
taken in 191it with the inauguration of river and flood protection for Oklahoma.
To increase the accuracy of reports, an engineer was employed at St. Louis to
jb Weather Bureau, "River Forecasts for Saturday, January 9, 1932," issued at the 
St. Louis, Missouri, office: "The ILLINOIS will change but little, probably 
rise slightly at Peoria and below tonight and Sunday. The MISSOURI from 
Lexington to its mouth will fall decidedly during the next several days. Fall 
next 2k hours at Waverly about 2.0 feet, at Boonville about 1.8 feet, at 
Hermann about 1.6 feet, at St. Charles about 1.2 foot. The MISSISSIPPI from 
Louisiana to Cape Girardeau will fall decidedly during the next several days.
"At St. Louis there will be a fall of about 1.0 foot in the next 2i* hours 
and about 1.6 feet in the second 2k hours."
39 Weather Bureau, "River Forecasts for Saturday, January 9, 1932," St. Louis 
office*
1*0 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1935-1936, p. 6.
1*1 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, l91'3-1915, p. 11: Annual Report, 191i*-19l5, 
p. 17. ~
t
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inspect river gauges*^2 Personnel of the United States Geological Survey also 
inspected river gauges at various times for the Weather Bureau^ At this time the 
vertical staff river gauge was preferred over the sloping concrete gauge which 
was best used in the largest streams. The chain and weight type, the simplest 
of all, required frequent checking»
In 1917, two new flood districts were opened in California, besides
further additions made in central Alabama, Missouri, and North Dakota.^ Some
cutbacks followed in 1918, a year blessed with few floods, but featured by re-
k'icord ice jams on the Ohio River below Cincinnati* Two years later further cur­
tailment set in with shortening of the gauge-reporting season in order to give 
salary raises to the observers.^
Several technical changes also followed. The procedure used for re­
porting river levels in cold weather required modification. The observer 
calculated the average thickness of the ice and the distance from the bottom of 
the ice to the river*s surface near the gauge. He then reported only two or 
three readings each week until the ice had broken.^ Hood-stage readings at
1*2 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 19H*-19l5, p* 17*
1*3 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, August, 1919*
1*1* Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1916-1917, p* l6j During fiscal year 1917 
total expenditures for river and flood service accounted for $171,600 out 
of the total Weather Bureau budget of close to $1,700,000, 6i*th Congress,
2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on Department of Agri­
culture Appropriations for fiscal 1918, p. 79 (December 6, 1916)*
1*5 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1917-191?, p. l£*
1*6 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1919-1927), p* 12j: Then the trained engineer
resigned from the Weather Bureau to accept a military position* 66th Congress 
3d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, Hearings on 
Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1922, p. 90 (December 20, 
1920).
1*7 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, November, 1919. The river-stage cipher 
code in use was still the 1ti99 printed form; The river and flood observers, 
all non-commissioned employees, received twenty-five cents per observation, 
Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, February, 1922*
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several points were changed to different levels in 1922«
The year 1922 featured a record-breaking ice storm in New England, the
collapse of a snow-packed theater roof, resulting in the death of ninety-seven
patrons at Washington, D. C*, and an unprecedentedly large number and wide 
. Ii9
distribution of floods* Obviously the Weather Bureau was justified in calling 
for increased funds for new river stations. In fact, thousands of such gauging 
locations were in demand west of Missouri*-’0 New river locks in the Ohio Valley 
also necessitated additional gauging stations in that region.^ -*- However, the 
stagnation of government expansion tinder Coolidge could not be disturbed*^2 
In l$2k the Weather Bureau utilized 500 river stations and a similar number of 
rainfall reports were submitted daily for its river and flood program* Unusually 
devastating floods again struck the Mississippi basin in 1927, causing wide» 
spread outcries for improved service and increased facilities*^ In contrast, 
people from areas covered by adequate service praised the Bureau* Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover sent his congratulations to veteran Forecaster Isaac M* 
Cline of New O r l e a n s H o o v e r  credited Cline and his assistant, Willard McDonald,
lib Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, February, 1922, These included Cincin­
nati} Florence, Indianaj and Arkansas City, Arkansas* 
h9 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1921-1922, pp* 8-9, 15-16} H.C* Frankenfield, 
»Spring Floods of 1922, ^  Monthly Weather Review Supplement No* 22* (Washington, 
D*C., 1922); A portion of the April, "022, flood service drew just praise*
The Davenport, Iowa, Times and the Moline, Illinois, Plow Company each sub­
mitted official commendation for the Weather Bureau*s Mississippi River fore­
casts, 67th Congress, lith Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations 
Committee, Hearings on department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 
192U, p* 75 (November 16, 1922)*
50 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1922-1923, p. 9.
51 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 19^3-192U, pp* U-5*
52 Dr. W. J. Humphreys and" William Jackson, »Origin and Growth of the Weather
Service and Cincinnati's Part Therein,« Scientific Monthlv. vol. 18 (New York. 
192U), p. 382. -----------------
¡53 H. C. Frankenfield, "Floods of 1927 in the Mississippi Basin«, Monthly Weather 
Review Supplement No* 29 (Washington, D.C., 1929)* — — — .
$k Frankenfield, "Floods,«lionthly Weather Review, Supplement No. 29 (Washington, 
D*C., 1927) p* 36*
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with providing the data in 1927 for the stretch from Cairo to the Gulf -which 
gave ample time for engineers to save New Orleans from inundation.River reports 
from Brownsville, Texas, aided greatly in a construction company's battle to 
keep a new Rio Grande River bridge from collapsing while flood stages prevailed»
The 1927 floods caused a redefinition of the Bureau's river work. 
Station personnel were urged to advise contractors to install gauges while con­
structing river bridges»^ Reference was directed to the gradual lengthening of 
river-gauge chains, a phenomenon requiring corrected readings.The use of 
copper rivets as bench-mark identifications was ordered at all river-gauge 
stations*-’® Speculation arose as to the likelihood of future floods in the 
Mississippi Valley comparable to the 1927 disaster» H. C. Frankenfield, chief 
of the river and flood division, informed a House committee that a similar 
flood was easily conceivable even with less rainfall, if the spacing of pre­
cipitation xtore right and if the ground were unable to absorb much of the 
moisture»^
Despite the earlier disasters, enthusiasm for the extension and im­
provement of the river work suffered a severe relapse during the 1929—1932 
portion of the depression»^ Total expenditures for river and flood work in
$5 New York Times, August 30, 1927,' P* 22/ New York Times, October ll/, 1928, 
sec. II, p. l8': New York Times, July li|., 1929, sec. II, p. 12»
56 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, January, 1927*
57 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, April, 1928»
58 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel], February, 1930»
59 70th Congress, 1st Session, House Committee on Flood Control, Hood Control 
in the Mississippi Valley, Report 1072, pp. 307-308, 312 (1928)j Dr» Frank­
enfield died July 29, 1929, as a result of injuries incurred when struck by 
a car. Frankenfield first joined the weather service in 1882» He was suc­
ceeded as Chief of the river flood division by Montrose W. Hayes, who held 
the position until his death in 1936* Before 1929 Hayes had been stationed 
at St. Louis for fifteen years. Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, July, 
1929.
60 71st Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee,
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1931, p. 98 
(November 20. 1 9 2 9 ^ . ________________________________
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fiscal 1929 were $>205,927, or an increase of only $3U*327 in eleven years#
Concurrent extended periods of drought lessened *che danger of floods, >jhile
causing other forms of hardship* The fifteen months ending in the summer of
1931 probably constituted the longest drought in United States history#^ This
proved to be just the beginning, as droughts of 193U-1936 were also extremely
damaging to crops* Actually drastic cuts did not affect the river program until
fiscal 1933* when eighty-four river and rainfall-reporting stations were dis- 
62continued* Less than one year of New Deal spending, however, alleviated one 
of the flood service’s most pressing concerns, the replacement of defective 
river gauges* Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, funds became available 
September 1, 1933» to permit purchase of new gauges for 15>0 river stations in 
thirty-three states»'^ A large number of automatic gauges vie re placed in service 
at the time. Within four years, 1*00 deficient gauges were replaced. At this 
time the Weather Bureau obtained readings from 100 A m y  Engineer stations. The 
Weather Bureau and United States Geological Survey operated jointly sixty river 
gauges, with the Weather Bureau paying the observers -while the Geological Survey 
repaired the equipment.
Replacement of the outmoded equipment preceded the Science Advisory 
Report on river and flood service. Therefore, Weather Bureau administrative 
leaders believed that only modest increases would be necessary to extend services 
to the point of the status recommended.^ Despite this optimistic judgment, other
r
31 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1930-1931, p. 5.
62 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1932-193?» pp. 3, 5.
63 73d Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee on Committee of Appropriations, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1935» p. H 6 
(January 18, 193li)s Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 193U-1935» p. 3.
61* Calvert to Secretary Wallace, February 19, Ì93h»p. 26, Weather Bureau 
Correspondence, Memorandum report.
I
serious problems still existed* Hydrologists had realized for some years that 
it was absolutely essential to know when, where, and how much rainfall occurred 
in order to project its effects on rivers with greater accuracy. If a fore­
caster knew that eighty percent of an eighteen-hour storm occurred within two 
hours, he would better realize the potential results in light of previous rain­
fall, soil conditions in the area, and the current river level. Hourly rainfall 
amounts, generally lacking at the time, proved to be the data necessary for this 
proposed system. It was also imperative to obtain the assistance of hydrological
engineers, a policy carried out under Chief Gregg for the Missouri and upper
6?Mississippi basins.
Essentially, river forecasting was accomplished in one of two ways. 
Gauge readings and discharge rates comprised the old method, while forecasting 
from rain already fallen or rain expected to fall was considered a superior 
means to employ for areas east of the Appalachians#^ Rainfall over the basin, 
retardation, infiltration, and temperature, which in turn affect the surface 
run-off leading to the flood flow, all play a role in river forecasting. The 
ultimate aim of the river program was to base forecasts on the unit hydrograph, 
a scheme developed by L. K. Sherman in 1933* In this method, for any storm the 
relation between rainfall and runoff, including the duration of rain, and its 
areal distribution are determined, and the results are compared to the appro­
priate hydrograph. The entire system is best suited for regions of 2,000 to 
3,000 square miles
¿5> Gregg, Annual Reportr ~1935~1936, p. 6.
66 'Weather Bureau Plans for Better Flood Forecasting," Science News Letter,
vol, 31 (Washington, D.C., February 6, 1937), pp. 85-B6, "
67 Ray K. Linsley, Jr., "Hydrologic Services of the Weather Bureau," Weather 
Bureau Training Paper, No. 2, 19U6-19U7 (Washington, D.C., 19U9), pp. Ii9-5U.
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For larger river systems the Bureau uses stream-flow routing, through 
knowledge of the rate of river flow one can plot the crest at one station 
against the crest at a downstream station. The difficulty herein lies with the 
fact that floods often occur before the crest is reached. A levee that held 
one year may, moreover, be the first to break during an ensuing flood. From the 
start of this period, personnel of the United States Geological Survey checked 
the rate of river-water movement through use of flow meters and notified the 
Weather Bureau of their findings. Practical limits prevented the permanent 
installation of meters for flow measurements, making the Weather Bureau staff 
gauge or float-actuated recording gauge indispensable for the regular stage 
readings.^®
Chief Gregg stressed in 1936 the need of increased funds to raise the 
status of the river services "My survey shows Weather Bureau service in­
adequate to the needs of the public...100 river and flood stations dropped... 
research facilities at the Weather Bureau are woeful!'^ Montrose Hayes was in 
the process of reorganizing the river and flood service by division into eight 
districts when he died November 16, 1936.^ Plans for a better river and flood 
service had been presented to the American Society of Civil Engineers just one 
month prior to his death. The five-point program consisted of (1) need of more 
rainfall stations in headwater regions. (2) recording rain gauges (3) improved 
snow surveys (1*) better communication facilities connecting headwater areas to
58 Linsley, "Hydrologic", Weather Bureau Training Paper, p. 51*.
69 7l*th Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1937, p. 126 
(January 13, 1936).
70 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, November, 1936*
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river-district centers (5) division of the country into eight river districts 
and the use of amateur radio operators, especially when regular communications 
have been disrupted.
Floods of unparalleled intensity in the East during March, 1936, once
again demonstrated the necessity for improved services. The eastern floods
displayed the need for a vast system of recording rain gauges. Such a network
was soon established in Pennsylvania when the state, Weather Bureau, and
United States Geological Survey opened 130 rain gauges near the Allegheny,
71Monongahela, and Susquehana rivers.'
Before further modernization could be completed, disaster struck again, 
this time on the Ohio and Mississippi in 1 9 3 7 These floods caused 137 deaths. 
The crests during this flood advanced at the rate of forty miles per day. The 
waters were above flood stage for seventeen days at Cincinnati, twenty-two days 
at Louisville, thirty-nine days at Evansville, and forty-eight days each at 
Paducah, and Cairo. Once again the importance of rainfall statistics was 
vividly revealed, as rain and runoff were the primary factors for the Ohio River 
forecasting, especially between Cincinnati and Pittsburgh.
A variety of reaction toward flood forecasting resulted from the 1937 
performance. One clergyman recommended the discharge, for alleged poor fore­
casting, of the senior meteorologist at Cincinnati.™ Gregg paid little attention 
because W. C. Devereaux was considered one of the best in the flood service.
71 Willis R. Gregg, "Weather Bureaii's Contributions to Hydrology,« Civil 
Engineering, vol. 8. no. 3 (Easton, Pennsylvania, May, 1938), pp. 323-323.
72 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1936-1937» p. 16.
73 Bennett Swenson, "Ohio and' Mississippi Floods of January-February 1937,« 
Monthly Weather Review Supplement, No. 37 (Washington, D.C. 1938)} Snowfall 
was not a factor in this“ pa'rticular-?lod3’, Gregg, ’Weather Bureau*s 
Contribution«, Civil Engineering, vol. 8, pp. 323-325»
7li Neil E. Annable to Chief Gregg, February 8, 1937, Weather Bureau Correspon­
dence.
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T*wo press accounts featured Weather Bureau service as evidently inadequate during 
the f l o o d . L a c k  of both modern equipment and trained personnel were cited as 
contributing factors. The mayor of Louisville, however, congratulated the Weather 
Bureau for its advices issued during the flood. Another charge was directed at 
over centralization of authority, a long-standing reality of Bureau g eneral op- 
©rations# One engineer claimed that local offices "were restricted in their 
warning activities* specifically that the late McLin S* Collum of the Evansville 
office reported: "I can not send out alarmist reports." Weather Bureau offi­
cials denied that any reports, sound in nature, were restricted. Actually, local 
officials do not lack authority, but sometimes fail to take the initiative in 
releasing amended, or supplementary, river forecasts, or any type of forecast. 
Often t imes the Weather Bureau is not at fault. As one employee summarized
complaints: "Even those who are not entirely crazy sometimes blame the Weather
77
Bureau for causing the floods as well as other severe weather conditions."'
This must not be interpreted to mean that top-echelon officials were 
satisfied with the river and flood service in 1937*78 In response to inquiry 
from Secretary Wallace as to the progress made in the Weather Bureau during the 
last five years, Chief Gregg considered the river and flood service better, but 
with much left undone. The floods of 1937 occurred too late to alter budget
An Associated, tress story blamed delayed forecasts for a portion of the en­
suing damage, Louisville Courier Journal, April 10, 1937, Weather Bureau 
Correspondence, Story and comment by Weather Bureau officials; Mayor of 
Louisville to Chief Gregg, March 17, 1937» Weather Bureau Correspondence.
76 Memoranda of C. C. Clark and W. J. Moxon in regard to claims of E. E. Brownell 
in the Philadelphia Evening Ledger, February 11, 1937, Weather Bureau Corres­
pondence.
77 W. C. Devereaux to Chief Reichelderfer, May 9, 19U0, Weather Bureau Corres­
pondence.
78 Wallace to Gregg, December 8, 1937, and Gregg to Wallace, December Hi, 1937, 
Weather Bureau Correspondence.
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estimates for the next fiscal year* The flood service had benefit ed from the 
reorganization of the Kansas City and Davenport districts* Chief Gregg requested 
a modest increase to be used for additional rainfall data in the headwater 
areas. y In 1936 Gregg launched a program calling for major increases 
Following the death of Montrose Kayes in 1936, Merrill Bernard, an experienced 
engineer, was appointed chief of the river and flood division. Additional rain 
gauges were purchased for the northeastern portion of the country. Works 
Progress Administration funds provided tabulation of valuable evaporation data 
for the new volumetric type forecasting. Further attention was also directed to 
mountain snowfall studies in the West, where twenty new snowfall stations were 
opened, five at levels exceeding 8,000 feet. Army Engineer storm and flood 
studies were also of extreme value as research tools. Beginning in the early 
thirties, Weather Buerau personnel released annual water-supply forecasts, based 
upon snow surveys, for the arid and semi-arid regions. Runoff statistics for 
the April-Ju]y period were forecast on April 1*
For further decentralizations, the river service was reorganized 
in 1938 into nine hydrological regions, five of -which immediately obtained 
regional offices to coordinate administrative activities.®^ To facilitate 
theoretical advancement, funds from the Army Engineers contributed to the estab­
lishment in December, 1937, of the hydrometeorological research section at the
79 75th Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1938, pp.
133> 11*7 (March 12, 1937)* Gregg had requested $8,700.
80 75th Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Cpmmittee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1939, p. 220j 
Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, February, 1937o
81 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1937-1938, p. 11j Weather Bureau, Topics and 
Personnel, October, 1937j Linsley, «Hydrologic Services", Weather Bureau 
Training Paper, No. 2, 191*6-191*7, p. 58.
82 Gregg, "Weather Bureau1s Contributions," Civil Engineering, vol. 8, pp. 323-
325. '
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Weather Bureau Central Office where employees became engaged in determining 
maximum rainfall rates and other statistical data of interest to river and flood 
forecasting.^
Expansion at the rate of several dozen rain gauges per year, however, 
was hardly adequate to satisfy the hydrologists’ aim of warning for flash floods, 
especially in the headwater regions. Flood damages, estimated at $17*535*000 
during fiscal year 19l|0, aided in fostering a cooperative Weather Bureau-Corps 
of Engineers project, which provided for both recording and non-recording rain 
gauges in the Ohio River v a l l e y , Meanwhile, several new river stations and 
thirty additional evaporation stations were opened in the West. In fiscal 
19ijl transferred funds from the War Department enabled the Weather Bureau to 
considerably increase the number of gauges in the network,®'’ Expenditures for 
the vast expansion of 1939-19l|l also came from the cooperative efforts of the 
Department of Agriculture Flood Control Committee, originating with the Flood
OS
Control Act of June 22, 1936*° Under this program the Department of Agriculture 
transferred some $375,000 to the Weather Bureau, while In the three years the 
War Department Contributed $100,000. Regional field administration of the 
program was financed from these cooperative f u n d s A n o t h e r  aid was data on 
precipitation frequency from the joint Weather Bureau-United States Geological
B3 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, August, 1938.
8I| Weather Bureau, Annual Report, I959-19l|C, pp. 9-10, The 19l|0 project provided
950 recording and' 325 non-recording gauges.
85 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 19li0-19lil. p* lli3, The network was increased 
by 625 recording rain gauges.
86 Weather Bureau, Topics ana Personnel, September, 1939»
87 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, January, 19Ul> Regional offices ad­
ministered the program from Albany; Montgomery] Cincinnati; lavra City;
Kansas City; Fort Worth; Albuquerque; Salt Lake City; Portland, Oregon; and 
Los Angeles. The transferred funds also provided for twelve additional 
Weather Bureau employees at the regional offices and suboffices for field in­
spectors.
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Survey publication of hourly precipitation data at first and second-order 
Weather Bureau stations. Records were compiled from tipping-bucket rain gauges, 
which were first installed around 1590* Works Progress Administration funds 
enabled this project to be started in 191*0 at Pittsburgh.
Not all areas were immediately protected. Three consecutive flash 
floods in Nebraska prompted Representative Karl Stefan to bring the matter before 
Bureau, officials, who testified that they needed to triple river and flood ex-
QO
penditures* At any rate, river and flood service in 191*1 had progressed
significantly toward implementation of the improved techniques in this phase of
meteorology. In response to the Nebraska problem, the Bureau began a model
project for headwater forecasts at Elkhorn, Nebraska, where observers submitted
39special telephone reports whenever they measured one inch of rainfall. The 
long-range goal then, as indeed, it remains today, was to arrive whether by 
collecting data from rain gauges or attempting to determine rainfall intensity 
by radar, at a potential index which would indicate just how much rainfall will 
cause a flood. Naturally snowfall had also been a most important fhctor, 
particularly in the Missouri River floods*
Duplication has often been avoided in river and flood services, but 
few will assert that the Army Engineers and Weather Bureau forecasters do not 
actually perform similar forecast duties during time of floods* The military 
personnel are anxious to protect the levees while Weather Bureau representatives 
must report existing stages and foretell future changes. It is hard to visualize 
complete lack of duplication whenever military and civilian agencies labor on
BB 77th Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Commerce Appropriations for fiscal 1 9 k 2 . pp. 283- 
286 (February 13, 191*1)*
89 Linsley, «Hydrologic Services," Weather Bureau Training Paper, No. 2, 19lj.6- 
191*7, p. 57*
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similar meteorological or hydrological enterprises, -whether in the realm of 
aviation forecasts or flood service*
While river-warnings gained considerable attention, the special 
services to agriculture remained quite similar to those of the pre-World War I 
era.^° Special reports for cotton, corn, and wheat growers, cattle raisers, and 
fruit-frost warnings were all consolidated administratively under the new divi­
sion of agriculture meteorology in 1916. J. Warren Smith, a veteran clima­
tologist, was placed in charge of this division. Agricultural services and the 
other climatological duties of the Bureau were combined in 1932 into a climate 
and crop division under J. B. Kincer* An inventory of the type of activities 
performed shortly after World War I reveals the following special services.
Corn and wheat service was provided for eleven grain states, all districts 
organized on a state—wide basis, with rainfall and temperature reports relayed 
to Chicago, from which daily bulletins were issued.
Service in the cotton regions was similarly organized around stations 
in eleven states, all reporting to the New Orleans office. Sugar and rice 
growers especially in Texas and Louisiana, also benefite d from weather advices. 
The weather station at Portland, Oregon, collected reports to aid sheep raisers, 
while cattle regions were serviced through centers at Amarillo, Texas, and 
Roswell, New Mexico. Connecticut and Wisconsin tobacco growers enjoyed special 
forecasts, with western Kentucky slated to receive similar aid. Alfalfa areas 
of Utah benefit-e.d from help which went beyond general weather forecasts.
Service to fruit regions was available only in isolated areas, as local 
fruit growers were still experimenting cn ways to protect their crops against
90 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 191$-1916, p. li*j Weather Bureau, Topics and 
Personnel  ^ July 1932* ----- - --
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sudden freezes* Experts from the Bureau of Entomology also aided with these
studies in North Carolina, Oregon, Colorado, and Ohio, while Weather Bureau
91funds were used in 191? for such research. Burning of oil was found to be the
best means of protection, but these experiments were soon curtailed because of
American participation in World War I. After the war, several other suggestions
gained consideration, one calling for a smoke barrage over the orchard similar
to smoke cover for troops. However, majority opinion continued to favor heating
92
the surface layer of air with cheap fuel. In the winter of 1921-1922, forty- 
four percent of the fruit acreage in California was heated in this manner.
Fruit growers within a few years were firmly convinced of the wisdom of orchard 
heating.93 one of the foremost examples of the validity of mass-heating effects 
was provided during the freezes of January, 1927, in California. Damages were 
small in the heated areas where costs of the oil burned by growers amounted to 
only four percent of the annual crop value.
By 1922 extensive fruit-frost warnings were provided for the Pacific 
Coast, but little special aid was offered to Florida because of inadequate funds* 
Less extensive fruit-frost information was also provided in parts of Arizona,
9h
New Mexico, New Jersey, New England, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, and Kansas. 
Fruit growers took the observations for the Weather Bureau, which in turn issued 
minimum-temperature forecasts for detailed local areas. From the beginning the
9T Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1915-1916, p. 17. The Weather Bureau appro­
priation was $10,COO.
92 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1922-1923, p. 22.
93 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1 9 2 8 -1 9 2 9 J p. h ; Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 
1936-1937« p* 13« This winter the 5T/900,000 gallons of oil cost
000£ 000•
9h 67th Congress, Uth Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 192lu pp. 
82-81; (November 16, 1922).
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growers were prepared to match federal expenditures. Only eight Bureau em­
ployees were originally assigned to this phase of meteorology and communications 
work was in the main provided by the growers* Fruit-frost work on the Pacific
Coast began November 1 in southern California, moving slowly northward to Fresno, 
and San Jose. The next change carried the workers to the pear districts of 
Medford, Oregon, then into the Yakima and Spokane valley of Washington* Bureau 
thermometers were installed in the orchards while telephone and telegraph con­
tact was maintained with San Francisco. Dangerous temperatures were determined
by formulas based on previous temperature surveys. Techniques of fruit-frost
96forecasting proved to be highly respected by foreign meteorologists*
Late in the twenties, associations of fruit growers continued to pre­
sent numerous petitions to Congress for increased Weather Bureau assistance, 
both for strengthening operations in areas already possessing limited service, 
or in the case of Florida, for a new fruit-frost p r o g r a m . B y  1932 portions of 
Alabama, Florida, and Texas had gained limited service»^® Once again a catas­
trophe, this time the unannounced Florida freeze of December, 193k, enabled the
55 Despite the elimination of this' Weather Bureau service from the estimates 
by the Budget Bureau, Congress appropriated $12,000 for its continuation 
during fiscal 1922, 67th Congress, kth Session, Senate Subcommittee of 
Appropriations Committee, Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropria­
tions for fiscal 192k, p. 19 (December 28, 1922).
96 Several European weather services borrowed the film which described this pub­
lic service, 73d Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations 
Committee, Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 
1935, P* 120 (January 18, 193k)«
97 71st Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1931, p. 100 
(November 20, 1929)*
98 72d Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department on Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 193k, p. 128 
(November 23, 1932)*
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Weather Bureau to expand its Florida fruit-frost service.99 The expansion of 
the Florida service bore gratifying results late in January, 19h0, when a two- 
day warning enabled pickers to collect and store much of the fruit crop.100 
While in 19lU the fruit-frost service was hardly satisfactory, by 1937, the level 
of attainment was reasonably high. The combination of federal, state, and 
private funds stimulated an interest in agricultural meteorology which had been 
dormant for some years.
In addition to the more conventional services already mentioned,
Weather Bureau funds were also utilized temporarily for special forecasts to aid 
in orchard-spraying and harvesting of crops. Harvest forecasts of forty to sixty- 
hours, confined primarily to New York state, were initiated in 1923 in coop­
eration with the Farm Bureau, but after periodic criticism from Congress, 
charging extravagance, this service was discontinued at the conclusion of the 
1933 season. The special orchard-spraying service also proved to be only 
temporary*101
Innovations of the special services variety were not restricted to
agricultural meteorology. What started as aid to Army truck convoys during
55 ?kth Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1936, p.
Ik 3 6  (February 5, 1933). Disastrous freezes had also occurred in ilorida 
in 1886, l89it, 1893, 1899, and 1917. In the 193^ 1 freeze minimum temperatures 
reached ten degrees Fahrenheit at Jacksonville and two degrees below" zero at 
Tallahassee; In addition to the $13,000 federal grant, the state of Florida 
appropriated $10,000 for the program. Citrus growers in California paid 
approximately $lU,000 to $13,000 annually toward the service in their state. 
House Subcommittee on Committee of Appropriations, Hearings on Department of 
Agriculture Appropriations for Fiscal 1938, pp. 132-133.
100 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1939-19U0, p. 10, and Weather Bureau, Topics
and Personnel, March, l91|0. — — —
101 69th Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings for Department of Agriculture for fiscal 1927," p. 126 (December 17. 
1923).
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World War I was turned into a highway program during the automobile boom of the 
post war era* During the winter of 1918-1919* fifteen first-order stations in 
eleven states provided highway-forecast service* Forecasters obtained knowledge 
of read conditions through the addition of one word to the daily observation 
telegrams from regular stations* and the supplementary reports of highway con- 
ditions from cooperative observers» Although whatever the Weather Bureau 
undertook in the way of forecasting road conditions had to be done without 
specific appropriations,"^ its personnel continued to provide highway forecasts 
until 1926, when it was decided to allow state highway commissioners to under- 
take these duties.
The fire-weather service, however, another new venture undertaken
during World War I, withstood the test of time to become a useful aid in the
preservation of national timber resources. What began as merely daily wind
forecasts in 191ii, developed into a highly organized system of cooperation be-
10<
tween the Weather Bureau and the United States Forest Service» Started without
a specific appropriation, the project was interrupted later in the war, then
resumed on a rather fragmentary basis until 1926 when Congress allowed $15,000 
10Ó
for this work. In the meantime, state funds were provided in several instances
ÏÔS Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1918-1919, p. 12. Within one year sixty-two 
stations in thirty states provided this service.
103 66th Congress, 3d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1922, pp. 
103-105 (December 20, 1920). Led by Congressmen J. F. Byrnes and Sydney 
Anderson, who contended that motor clubs provided this type of service, 
committee members refused to grant a $20,000 request in 1920 for highway 
weather forecasts, See also Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 3d Session, 
vol. 60, part 2, pp. 1903-1905 (House, January 22, 1921).
10U Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, February, 1926.
105 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1913-1911;, p. 10; 6I|th Congress, 1st Session, 
Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropria­
tions for fiscal 1917* p. 85 (January 8, 1916).
106 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1925-1926, pp. 3-lu
i'
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to facilitate the early years of the experiment.10? Weather Bureau participation 
prior to 1926, other than the wind forecasts, had involved the part-time services 
of only two employees*
Representatives of private lumbering interests, the Forest Service, 
and the Weather Bureau conferred at Portland, Oregon, in 1926 to formulate a 
new and detailed plan of operations. The essential features of this resultant 
service consist primarily of the Weather Bureau's advices to Forest Service 
personnel of unusually dry atmospheric conditions, inducing the possibility of 
dry thunder-storms, which are highly conducive to the starting of fires. Forest 
rangers are provided with standard observation equipment and report three times 
daily the temperature, humidity, wind, and precipitation data, as well as forest 
fuel-moisture content, to the nearest Weather Bureau station. The latter 
measurement is obtained by observing the weight of specially prepared birch 
sticks, which have been oven-cooked to a uniform weight of 100 grams. Forecasters 
then consider the existing relative humidity, wind velocity, number of days 
since the last precipitation, and fuel-moisture content before determining which 
advice to issue from a prepared numerical fire-danger scale of nine intensities*
Upon receipt of each forecast, which covers the next forty-eight hours, 
Forest Service personnel decide on the number of lookouts required, and whether 
to close certain key roads, or to require the cessation of lumbering activities, 
all depending upon the scale of fire danger indicated. When the Forest Service 
later began dropping fire fighters by airplane at the scene of fire, these units 
were also alerted by the special daily forecasts*
Even with this degree of assistance, it soon became apparent in the 
vast western forests that forecasters were also necessary at the fire scene,
LÒ7 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1923-192U. pp. 6-7*
227
sometimes situated hundreds of miles from the nearest fire-weather station. 
Consequently, trucks were converted into mobile forecast stations. An experi­
enced Weather Bureau forecaster and radio operator went to all major fires. With 
the advantage of nearby observations, together with his radio contact with 
Weather Bureau stations, the forecaster is in a position to advise the fire 
fighters as to possible shifts in wind direction or velocity, factors which 
might drastically alter the entire plan of attack. Normally a new forecast from 
the mobile unit is issued every five hours. Contact was maintained with such 
stations as Missoula, Boise, Seattle, Portland, Mt. Shasta, San Francisco, and 
Los Angeles.
Because the major fire season is from July through September, the 
shifting of extra personnel is easily facilitated. For example, a fruit-frost 
service employee in Florida might spend the fire-weather season at Missoula, 
Montana. During the off-season, fire-weather personnel are busy inspecting the
more than 700 forest observation stations, many trips being completed by horse-
. . 108 back.
Although requested each year from Congress, funds were not orovided 
for the extension of the fire-weather service to the Appalachians until the early 
thirties, after fires during the severe drought periods caused serious losses in 
that region. By 1935 most national forest areas were covered.
While fire-weather service in the East is based on the same general 
principles as in the West, there are some exceptions. Mobile units are not so 
necessary because of the closer proximity to weather stations. The moisture
10B Weather Bureau, Annual Report,r 193it-1935, p. 2.
109 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 193U-1935» p. 11; Weather Bureau, Annual Re- 
port, 1936-1937, p. 7, Four new mobile units were installed in the Westj~See 
also Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, June, 1936.
sticks differ from those used in the West*“^  Brush, -which in southern California 
gives protection against mud slides, involves a different type of fire-weather 
service*
One useful feature of the post-World War II era had been given little 
attention during the previous half century* Weather Bureau forecasters continued 
until 1950 the precedent of the Signal Corps weather service of the l880fs by 
not issuing public tornado warnings* There were two major reasons for this 
policy* In the first place officials feared the public reaction to tornado 
warnings* This was reasonable, for a considerable part of the populace refuses 
even in 1956 to understand the real significance of such announcements, which 
are only to of conditions favorable for the formation of these violent 
phenomena, and do not specify exactly what time an individual stozm might strike* 
Forecasters had previously hesitated to predict such conditions, lacking data 
about the formation of tornadoes* Better means of understanding upper-air con­
dition, of heights op to perhaps U5,000 feet, were needed before greater 
accuracy could be achieved in foreseeing the possible formation of tornadoes* 
Radioso jade observations and air-mass analysis of the late thirties preceded the
forecasts of severe storms in 1950, while radar has also proved to be a useful
112tool in tracking storm areas in general*
Nmerous examples are available for any modern period to illustrate
U S  The Appalachian Mountains are serviced from Asheville and New England from 
Boston while the Chicago station issues forecasts for the regions bounded 
by Lake Superior, the Mississippi, and Ohio Rivers, and the State of Ohio*
111 Daily News, July 16, 1956, p. 8, in which a reader complains of the 
useless panic caused by tornado warnings. This negative attitude remains 
prevalent except in the cases where warnings have actually allowed many 
people to escape tornadoes*
112 The Air Force Weather Service instigated tornado warnings for its command 
in 19U8 and was soon followed by public Weather Bureau releases. Weather 
Bureau, Topics and Personnel, November-December, 1950*
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the severity of this type of weather catastrophe, especially when moderately to 
heavily populated areas are involved. A classic case was the famous series of 
tri-state tornadoes on March 18, 1925, causing 957 deaths.11^
Another phase of storm warning, that responsible for the Great Lakes 
area, for all coastal shipping, and for pleasure craft, was maintained with a 
high degree of success. Here, as in all aspects of forecast distribution,, 
public service was greatly improved by the introduction of the radio. The 
modernization of storm signals was accomplished by the gradual conversion to 
electric lamps and the use of three lights for each display station.^* Another 
major improvement along similar lines during this period involved the support 
from the new Coast Guard Service, whose personnel manned display stations and 
in turn planned their critical stand-by operations from Weather Bureau advices.11'
The foregoing description of operations is based mainly on the im­
portant special reports and advices given by the Weather Bureau. The vast 
majority of Americans, however, remained acquainted only with the brief, general 
forecasts. These were to be found in the newspapers, on cards displayed in 
public buildings, or could be heard at frequent intervals on the radio. The
S 3  Mew York Times, March 19, 1925* p* 1* Approximately 350 people were killed 
at West Frankfort, 100 each at Murphysboro and DeSoto, all in Illinois, 
while another 100 died at Princeton, Indiana. Of the 500 inhabitants at 
Parrish, Illinois, only three escaped injury.
Hit The three-lantern system was completed on the Great Lakes in 1916, along 
the Atlantic Coast two years later, and on the Pacific Coast in 1919.
Weather Bureau, Annual Reports, 1916-1917, p. 12; 1918-1919, P. 21; Traffic 
signal lamps were found to provide the best type of warning lamp. Weather 
Bureau, Topics and Personnel, April 1929; A number of display stations still 
used oil lanterns in 193&. Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1937-1938, p. 7* 
115 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1916-1917, p. 10. Coast Guard employees 
maintained fifty display stations in 1935* Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 
193U-1935, p. li; The Weather Bureau display stations numbered approximately 
300 throughout the period. Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 19i|0-19l|l, p.
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two daily forecasts were still restricted in language because of the rigid
1 ^
verification procedure retained until the late thirties.
The Weather Bureau under Chief Reichelderfer finally adopted in 1939 
the use of four, instead of two daily forecasts for the general public, a reform 
which had been urged by the Science Advisory Board and actively sought by Chief 
Gregg,11? Popularly called the breakfast forecast, the new early morning fore­
cast was the most useful innovation of the system. Instead of the 10:30 a.m* 
10:30 p»m. forecasts, the public now received revised predictions at 1;:00 a.m, 
and p.m. and 10:00 a.m, and p.nu, Central Standard Time, Greater local control 
of forecasting was attempted through the reduction in size of forecast districts 
and doubling the number of district forecast centers.118 In 1932 there were 
five forecast centers. For example, the Chicago district issued forecasts for 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Missouri, Nebraska, and Kansas. After the Kansas City, Missouri, center 
was established, Missouri, Kansas and Nebraska were detached from the Chicago 
district. Further decentralization provided individual states with zone forecasts 
in an effort to explain varying local conditions of temperature and precipitation, 
To improve official long-range forecasts, Weather Bureau scientists 
embarked on research In 193? leading to the popular five-day forecast, first
Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, January 19U0, Official verification 
of state forecasts was discontinued on January 1, 19h0, in order to allow 
easier terrainology.
117 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1939-19ljO> p. 7*
H 8  Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, February, 1932.
119 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, September, 1930. States were divided 
into quarters for forecast terminology; A revision of this system took place 
in 1933, Topics and Personnel, July, 19333 Use of specific local forecasts 
was encouraged for city offices, Topics and Personnel, February, 1939.
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issued to the public in 191*0, which replaced the former weekly forecasts.-^0 
Based mainly upon -upper-air pressure data correlated with past weather patterns, 
the system was similar to that of the German meteorologist Dr. Franz Bauer.
The forecasts were issued twice weekly for Saturday and Wednesday publications. 
There is no doubt that the more analytical approach and specific data presented 
in the five-day forecast was an improvement over the previous very general fore­
casts. However, all of the computations involved in preparing the five-day, 
even the daily forecasts, are in vain when, for example, the sudden deepening 
or filling of an area of low pressure alters the movements of the air masses.
While the public gained from the increased number of forecasts, the 
availability of detailed past weather records for public use was restricted by 
the amount of material involved. These climatological services to the nation 
during the 1913-191*1 period were deficient.121 There was a noticeable lack of 
scientific and analytical -use made of the voluminous amount of weather data 
available from the approximately 5>000 cooperative observers and the more de­
tailed records of the first-order stations. Far too little effort was made to 
stimulate the correlation of past weather data with such national problems as
land utilization, water supply, building construction, aircraft design, climatic
n Opchange, or the effects of climate upon people. Expressed in another way, the
12£> Hew York Tidies, May 25, 191*0, p. 8. Several Americans had studied under 
Dr. Bauer. An example forecasts "Great Lakes-eonsiderable shower and 
thunderstorm activity, particularly over southern portions} temperatures 
above normal," New York Times, August 17, 191*0, p. 17. Expected amounts of 
precipitation and temperature figures were soon added to these forecasts.
121 Advisory Committee on Weather Services for the United States Department of 
Commerce, Weather Is The Nation’s Business (Washington, D.C., December 1, 
1933)> pp.l*, ¿1*. ""This committee of meteorological experts found that the 
climatological service was excellent as late as 1920, but suffered slow de- 
teriorization since that time,
122 The Weather Bureau creation of the position of state climatologist in 1953- 
1956 could help solve this lack ox coordination between the meteorologist 
and other scientists who may benefit from more detailed use of weather data.
Weather Bureau had accumulated a wealth of weather records whieh had been given 
only limited use* The few exceptions consisted of climatological averages in
revised editions of Bulletin W, monthly and annual state bulletins, weekly crop
123bulletins, and supplements to the Monthly Weather Review* All of these ex­
amples are brief summaries as compared to the detailed types of frequency data 
necessary for public use*
Prior to World War H ,  only one of the necessary steps was taken to­
ward remedying these shortcomings* This was the partial modernization of data 
12iiprocessing* It was generally understood in the twenties that the only way to 
put the mass of past records into useful form was by the punehed-card technique* 
Most meteorological services in Europe were already making at least limited use 
of this streamlined method*Hence, the Science Advisory Board in 1931», re- 
commended a card-punching unit for the Central Office* The same year appro­
priations from the Civil Works Administration enabled the Weather Bureau to
undertake the machine processing of fifty years of marine-weather data, fire- 
weather service records for 1926-193U, and thirty-five-year normal climatological 
f i g u r e s . T w o  years later funds from the Works Progress Administration promoted
1^3 W. F. Jacobs, "Climatological Service of the Weather Bureau, Lectures to 
Professional Interns," Weather Bureau Training Paper No* 2, 19l»6-19i»7, 
(Washington, D.C., 19l»9), p. 29. ”
121» Charles F. Sarle, "Climatological Services of the Weather Bureau," MS, a re­
port to the Secretary of Commerce, June 17, 19l»6, in Weather Bureau Library. 
12$ The Czechoslovakian service issued hand punches to weather stations in 
1927 while Great Britain, France, Holland, and Germany also made various 
uses of punched data cards immediately after World War I*
126 Science Advisory Report, (Washington, D.C., 1931»), pp. 1»7-58j Chief Gregg 
to Secretary of Agriculture Wallace, February 19, 1931», P* 37, Secretary of 
Agriculture Correspondence*
127 73d Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1935, p* 118 
(January 18, 193k)*
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the card-punching program of surface data, radiosonde, and pilot-balloon ob­
servation records, all from approximately lj.00 airway stations,12® This notable 
beginning, was the extent of machine processing before World War II.12^
A rapid increase in the number of daily individual telephone calls 
betokened the ever growing demand for detailed climatological studies. The 
American public was not content with published forecasts, or even with fore­
casts via radio. Individual weather stations in normal weather answered each 
day an average of more than 100 telephone calls for information concerning fairs, 
picnics, cruises, baseball ganes, weather insurance, street flushing, snow re- 
moval, and so on. A major contribution to improved public service came with 
the installation in 1939-191*0 of automatic telephones for weather forecasts, 
although eventhen telephone lines to ¿feather Bureau offices were usually busy. 1^1 
Cities enjoying this rapid means of obtaining the forecast were Washington, D.C., 
New York, Newark, Baltimore, Detroit, and Chicago. The New York unit serviced 
an average of 30,000 calls daily with maximum loads of 79,000 per day. Weather 
Bureau officials were also plagued by less legitimate calls from sponsors of 
weather lotteries and from advertisers, hopeful of using weather data in numerous 
ways to boost sales. Written requests for weather data and demands for
^ J a c o b s ,  »Climatological Service,» Training Paper No. 2, p. la.
129 Since World War II, Weather Bureau”station personnel Have been provided with 
hand or key punches to process current data, which then is collected at the 
National Weather Records Processing Center in Asheville, North Carolina. An 
example of the savings involved is demonstrated by the comparison of costs of 
a detailed study compiled manually in 1925, costing $1*00,000 to the machine 
technique employed later for the same research project at one-half the cost. 
Jacombs, "Climatological Service," Training Paper No. 2, p. 1*6.
130 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1919-1^0, p.'7? T9ST-1922. o. 9s 19
p. 5l New York Times, sec. IÜC, p. 2, March 23, V & U l----- -------- -
L31 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1939-191*0, p. 7.
L32 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, January, 19l6j October, 1922.
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weather records as testimony in court also continued to increase at a rapid 
rate#*^3
The radio caused the older methods of disseminating forecast and 
weather observational information to be abandoned* Late in 1917 a decision was 
reached to abandon gradually the use of the kiosk stations in cities.1^  Starting 
in 1920 several stations also discontinued the display of weather and temperature 
f l a g s « p h e  next extra service to be cut was the maintenance of the glass 
weather maps in public locations, which were supplanted by copies of the raanu- 
script daily weather maps* 3 The use of wirephoto weather maps by press services, 
starting late in 193U, also helped to provide service to more locations in less 
time. The daily weather maps continued to be issued at approximately one-half 
of all first-order stations, with the exception of World War I years, when the 
printing budget was drastically reduced. Station maps were standardized in 1935 
through the introduction of international symbols and isograms.
Scientific development not only improved the distribution of weather 
informationj it also played a major role in the advancement of meteorology prior 
to World War II. The general daily forecasts of 1933 did not vary basically 
from those of 1871. The movements and relationships among areas of high and low
155 New York Times, January 2lt, 1932» sec. V, p. 9? Weather Bureau, Annual 
Report, l5Ht-19l5, p. 18.
13U WeailierTBureau, Topics and Personnel, November, 1917.
135 Weather Bureau, Topic's and personnel, December, 1920; April 1928; March, 1930
136 Weather Bureau, topics and Personnel, April, 193h> December, 193U; Weather 
Bureau, Annual Report, l93U~1935, p. 9; Station maps have since World War 
H  been replaced by facsimile transmission of weather maps to stations.
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barometric pressure formed the primary source of Weather Bureau prognostications* 
New forecasters continued to be selected from the ranks by choosing the winners 
of contests in making daily practice forecasts^*
Meanwhile, the techniques of weather forecasting were rudely challenged 
by a growing belief that new factors must be studied, particularly in order to 
correlate meteorology with the important new field of forecasting service to 
aviation* Forecasters traditionally relied on observational data obtained at 
the surface of the earth to provide the clues for weather prediction* Numerous 
meteorologists, both in Europe and the United States, believed after World War 
I that the key to advancement in forecasting rested with a more thorough study 
of the already available upper-air data* Analysis of the upper air might reveal 
characteristics, that is, temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, and wind 
data, of various masses of hot and cold air which would indicate the subsequent 
occurrence of certain surface pheonmena at points in the path of movement of 
these air masses* For example, if observations indicated the presence of warm, 
moist air to the height of 10,000 feet, there was a stronger possibility of re­
ceiving more precipitation at the surface level than under conditions indieating 
that the upper air was less moist and that the moisture available extended to a 
lower altitude* Meteorologists also found that changes in barometric pressure 
discovered at levels up to perhaps 18,000 feet sometimes aided in forecasting 
surface conditions. The factors, however, were not available from surface ob­
servations*
137 A. J* Henry, et al, Weather Forecasting in the United States (Washington, 
D.C*, 1916)* This became a manual for new employees and for all forecast 
personnel* Forecast rules were included for each of the districts* Another 
forecast guide was available in, Edward Bowie and E. Hanson Weightman,
"Types of Storms in the United States and their Average Movements," Monthly 
Weather Review Supplement, No. 1 (Washington, D.C., 191U)*
138 Weather Bureau,"Topics ana Personnel, May, 1927} January, 1928.
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To obtain the necessary information, meteorologists directed their
attention to the study known broadly as air-mass analysis. One of the leading
proponents of the new approach was Jakob Bjerknes, a Norwegian meteorologist*
Shortly after World War I, Bjerknes stressed the conflict between the masses of
hot and cold air. To forecast the effects on the weather he studied observations
of the upper air and arrived at his conclusions through the use of mathematical 
139equations* Bjerknes visited the Weather Bureau Central Office in 192U, while 
lecturing in this country*
To the layman the most noticeable result of the ultimate introduction 
of air-mass analysis was the publicity given to new terms describing the air*
The leading or forward edges of different masses of air became known as the 
cold front, warm front, stationary front, or the occlusion, the latter occurring 
when the cold air has outrun the warn air and the two have merged. Usually the 
warm front precedes the advance of colder air. Besides the frontal terminology, 
meteorologists gave strict attention to the origin of the various air masses, 
classified as maritime, tropical, or polar* In the final analysis the new 
technique of analyzing the upper air did not replace, but rather supplemented 
the previous methods of forecasting based on surface conditions. Surface data 
remained of as much importance to the meteorologist as before.
The Weather Bureau, however, did not for many years embrace the air- 
mass methods, even though for a short period it employed expert assistance in its 
use.^° Scandinavian meteorological services by the late twenties used air-mass 
studies in their daily forecasts, and C, G. A, Rossby of the Swedish Meteoro­
logical Service was employed for eighteen months, beginning in 1926, as research
159 New York Times, July *■>, l9^U, p, 7? August 9, 192U, p, U, Weather Bureau, 
Topics and 'Personnel, December, 1921*, 
lUO Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, July, 1926.
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associate to assist the Bureau forecasters. Weather Bureau officials, however, 
were reluctant to accept the method and were also preoccupied with the expanding 
airway service and later with the Great Depression. They were not yet including 
air-mass techniques in forecasting late in 1933 when the Science Advisory Board 
submitted recommendations which included the promotion of air-mass analysis.^' 
Adoption of the air-mass analysis program, indeed, proved to be a 
painfully slow process Special funds were not available, forcing the use in 
the creation of a new air-mass section in 1935 of some money originally intended 
for salary increases. The Weather Bureau during 1935-1938 appointed approxi­
mately a dozen young university men with air-mass training. Prior to this time 
the Weather Bureau had -trained its own personnel. Several field employees were 
also called to Washington, D.C., to partake in the new air-mass -training.
Training of Weather Bureau forecasters was at first augmented by visiting lectures 
presented at Washington, D.C.3^  Dr. Sverre Fetter seen, a district forecaster in 
Norway, delivered a series of lectures before selected Weather Bureau, Army, and 
Navy meteorologists. He applied to maps his methods of calculations for the 
displacements and developments of pressure formations and fronts. Fronts did
. 1 till
not appear on a large number of weather maps until 1936.
The Civil Aemnauties Act of 1938» a direct result of the Weather 
Bureau*s long-standing aid to aeronautical interests, provided the means for 
more rapid introduction of air-mass analysis by permitting the employees to train
ltq New York Times, December 1, l9l3> P* 21$; For the full report see Report of 
•¿he Science Advisory Board (Washington D.C., September 20, 193U), pp. 1*7*58. 
21*2 Willis R. Gregg to Secretary of Agriculture Wallace, March 7, 1938» p. U, 
Weather Bureau Correspondence, Memorandum; Weather Bureau, Topics and Per­
sonnel, June, 1935*
1U3 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, December, 1935» p. 213.
liih Gregg to Wallace, March 7» 1938, p. h, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
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at government expense at meteorological institutions:
8) The Weather Bureau shall:..,detail annually, within the 
limits of available appropriations made by Congress, 
members of the Weather Bureau personnel for training at 
Government expense, either at civilian institutions or 
otherwise, in advanced methods of meteorological science:
Provided, that no such member shall lose his individual 
status or seniority rating in the Bureau merely by reason 
of his absence due to such training»"^
Perhaps the greatest practical application of air-mass analysis has 
ccme with noteworthy improvement in forecasting precipitation. Weather Bureau 
meteorologists began to consider the role of cold fronts, pressure, and flow 
patterns of air, among other things, in the analysis of vertical and horizontal 
cross sections of the upper air.^^ Plow patterns of moist and dry tongues of 
air, as shown by the isentropie charts, explain a number of precipitation cases 
not covered by frontal concepts. Kinematical computations on the movement of 
pressure systems and fronts, later called frontogenesis and cyclogenesis, also 
play an important role. Such elaments as specific humidity and potential temp­
eratures became key factors in this mathematical forecasting. This enabled the 
Bureau to issue more accurate daily precipitation forecasts for the Army 
Engineers, Another example is the daily precipitation forecasts provided for 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, The detailed study of the upper air also led 
to the five-day forecast, as previously described.
The Weather Bureau quietly embraced the theory that weekly, then 
five-day, forecasts could be worthwhile, but continued throughout the 1913~19l»l
1 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, August, 1938, 52 Statutes at Large 
1011», Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Five men were selected forr&ie-T? ^ st- 
terra under this measure, and they studied at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, California Institute of Technology, and New York University, 
li»6 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1937-1938, pp, h-$', Jerome Naraias, Air MAss 
Analysis (fourth edition, Hilton, Massachusetts, 1938), p, 9,
period to deny the validity of a number of schemes for long-range fwe casting, 
which ranged from specific, predetermined weather cycles and forecasting frcm 
solar radiation data to tree-ring predictions, astrology, and even the ground 
hog's traditional behavior*^^ The official Weather Bureau position, however, 
was to caution its personnel against open criticism of such claims,^ although 
it maintained its earlier stand against attempts at rainmaking. Cornell 
University experimenters in 1923 had used dust and sand in an attempt to seed 
clouds and produce rain at Dayton, Ohio* Rain followed but there was no proof
that it would not have occurred without these attempts. The Weather Bureau 
denied the possibility of such attempts proving effective and was editorially 
ridiculed for not attempting to learn from such r e s e a r c h e r s T h e  Bureau 
similarly rejected bombarding the skies with cannon as comparable to "booing 
a blizzard or saluting a hail storm.»
The Weather Bureau was applied to for information on such alleged 
phenomena as the permanency of warmer winter« and of the droughts of the early 
thirties. ^  Assistant Chief C. C. dark asserted that there was no evidence 
for permanently warmer winters. Indeed, one of the coldest winters on record 
followed in 1935-1936. The next year Congressmen were reassuringly and correctly
i W  C. F. ¿arle, "Reports on Critical Studies of Methods of Long-Range Weather 
Forecasting,» Monthly Weather Review Supplement. No. 39 (Washington, D.C.,
1U8 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, October, 1931*$ Weather Bureau Annual 
Bggjfo 1922-192J T p T T ^ d  Y92l*-i9%, pp. 8-10, the latter declaiming t5£ 
validity of predictions based on the solar constant« 
ill? New York Times, March 22, 1923, p• 10$ March 23, 1923, p. 18$ W « J#
Hmphreys, Raimaking and Other Weather Vagaries (Baltimore« 1926). no. 80«*82« — — —  r"
150 73d Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1935, pp. 
112-111* (January 18, 1931*)$ 7l*th Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee 
of Appropriations Committee, Hearings on...for fiscal 1936, p. 138 (February 
5, 1935)*
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informed that much more rain would probably fall during the next few years*
The Weather Bureau did not escape several scathing verbal and printed 
attacks in connection with these and other services* Fortunately the instigators 
of such misinformed onslaughts were but a vocal minority* In 1916 Congressman 
William S. Howard of Georgia issued a resolution for the abolition of the Weather 
Bureau* He preferred the prognostications of a clairvoyant constituent» who 
employed a sourwood stick in a form of ritual before the forecast was issued* 
Several recent incorrect Bureau forecasts had instigated Howard to launch this 
attack*'^ Howard’s motion, however, was lost by a vote of fifty-one to one, 
and he was sharply criticised by his colleagues* More serious were two smear 
campaigns shortly after World War I employing highly uncomplimentary handbills* 
Circulars were found in 1919 at Grand Rapids, Michigan, with the following 
attack:
Weather Bureau a humbug and grafting outfit* To hell with it*
If you are honest and work for a living, you don’t want to 
pay for what man don’t have anything to do with* The weather 
is God’s business only*^52
Marvin suggested that this campaign might be connected with the "Red”
1^3
progaganda of the era l A similar campaign took place in 1922 at Sioux City, 
Iowa*1^  In 1921, a former Bureau employee, Elias B* Dunn, asked newspapermen to 
demand better forecasts from the Weather Bureau, but his request although pub­
lished was ignored by the public, and the principal members of the Bureau
151 Congressional Record,' Congress, 1st Session, vol* 53» part 6, pp* 6157- 
6l60 (House, April ih, 1916)*
152 C. F. Schneider, Grand Rapids Weather Bureau Office, to Marvin, December 30, 
1919, Weather Bureau Correspondence*
153 Marvin to Inspector Ashley, January 5» 1920, Weather Bureau Correspondence* 
15U G. K. Greening, Sioux City Weather Bureau office to Marvin, November 20,
1922, Weather Bureau Correspondence*
aase
2k 1
regarded the attack as motivated by Dunn’s chagrin at having failed in 1913 to
155
be appointed Chief*
Forecasts, special warnings, and climatological data represented the
major portion of Bureau activity, although contributions to research during
1913-19111 also involved several additional areas. Research activities, however,
continued to comprise an extremely small portion of Bureau operations prior to
the creation in 1936 of the meteorological research division* Two new fields of
endeavor were seismology and volcanology* Automatic seismological recorders
156were maintained in Washington, D. C*; Northfield, Vermont; and Chicago* All
other Weather Bureau stations submitted non-instrument descriptions of tremors
felt in the area. Weather Bureau responsibility in seismology, which had begun
in 191ii, was transferred in January, 1925, except for cards collected from
cooperative observers, to the Coast and Geodetic Survey. Similarly shortlived
were Weather Bureau efforts to measure and analyze volcanic phenomena. This
project was undertaken in Hawaii in 1918 and was turned over in 192k to the
157United States Geological Survey* In contrast, the recordings of solar radia­
tion and evaporation data have continued to be functions of Bureau activity to 
the present. The major contributions in the field of solar radiation, however, 
have come from the Smithsonian Institution and its secretary, C. G. Abbot, which 
have supplied such data to the Weather Bureau. Only three Weather Bureau 
pyrheliometric stations, Madison, Wisconsin! Lincoln, Nebraska; and Santa Fe,
New Mexico, were maintained in the 1920’s* Research was halted for a time in the 
next decade but was partially resumed again, although with the major emphasis
155 Marvin’ to <5. IP. firooks, July 7, 1921, Weather Bureau Correspondence*
156 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1918-1919, p. 2ks Weather Bureau, Topics 
and Personnel, January, 1935*
157 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, June, 192h*
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delayed until after World War H . 1**® Weather Bureau personnel could see no way to 
correlate daily solar changes, which are difficult to measure, with everyday 
forecast problems*
Evaporation experiments, also started before 1913* resulted in an 
attempt to create a representative network of recording stations throughout the 
nation. The eight stations entering regular reports in 1916, had grown to thirty- 
eight stations three years later, and this network was increased by 1922 to at 
least one location in each of forty-seven states Efforts to improve the 
methods of measurement, however, proved futile, and in 1937 the network of pri­
mary gauges remained exceedingly small.160 Only seventy-five of the total 150 
stations were equipped with the standard, class A evaporation pan. Forest and 
stream-flow experiments of the Forest Service at Wagon Wheel Gap, Colorado, were 
aided during the 1910—1926 period by the presence of Weather Bureau personnel for 
special reports
Other prominent examples of research are the Bureau*3 participation in 
several Arctic and Antarctic expeditions. Two Weather Bureau scientists ac­
companied the Byrd expeditions to Antarctic regions in 1928-1930, 1933-1935, and 
. 162
again in 1939-191*1. Radiosonde observations were completed during the last
15b' Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel, March, 191*9 i Weather Bureau, Annual 
Repprt, 192l*-192'$, p. 8Z ------
1$9 Weather Bureau, innual Report, 1921-1922, p. 28*
160 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, l936-l93f, p. 8*
161 A.J. Henry, "First Report of the Wagon Wheel Gap Project," Monthly Weather 
Review Supplement No. 17 (Washington, D.C., 1922)j C.G* Bates and A.J. Henry, 
"Forest"and "stream iTow Experiments at Wagon Wheel Gap, Colorado," Monthly 
Weather Review Supplement Mo. 30 (Washington,D.C., 1928), p. 17.
162 G. Grimmager and W.C. Haines, Meteorological Results of the Byrd Antarctic 
Expeditions, 1928-1930, 1933-1935," Monthly Weather Review Supplement No. l£L 
(Washington, D.C., October, 1939)J Arnold Court',' "MeteorologicAL Data for ~  
Little American, III 1939-191*1," Monthly Weather Review Supplement No. 1*8 
(Washington, D.C., 19l*9), p. 111. University of1 kichig'an, "Reports UponThe
Greenland Expeditions of the University of Michigan," Scientific Studies 
vol. 6 (Ann Arbor, 19l*l)j New York Times, November 23, 1938, p. 21. ’''
trip. Weather Bureau equipment was used by the University of Michigan on its 
Greenland expedition of 1930-1931» while a Weather Bureau employee went with an 
earlier expedition to Greenland. Clifford J. MacGregor, Weather Bureau employee, 
organized an expedition to Alaska.
In world meteorology, the activities of the International Meteoro­
logical Organization were centered around obtaining better daily exchange of 
weather observations from land stations.^3 one of the tasks falling to the 
Weather Bureau was that of supplying the peace conference of 1919 at Paris with 
climatological data on Africa, especially concerning the former German colonies. 
After operating informally for fifty years, the I.M.O. in 1931 opened a permanent 
office in Holland, each member nation contributing less than $1,000 annually. 
Interrupted by World War I, the exchange of information was revived shortly after 
the end of the conflict, except that the valuable data from Russian Siberia was 
not available to the United States during the long period of diplomatic non- 
recognition. Chief Gregg traveled to Russia in 1935 in an attempt to arrange an 
exchange of weather data.^k World tensions leading to war in 1939 prevented a 
significant expansion of exchanges until after this conflict had ended.
During 1913-19U1 the Weather Bureau grew in size and responsibility 
along with a general expansion of government activity. All of this development 
and modernization, however, failed to prevent an occasional missed forecast, a 
hurricane that changed its course at the last moment, or a sudden, unannounced 
flood. The vast majority of these failures, however, were not due to Weather
Weather Bureau, Annual Report, £718-1919, p. 20j 75th, Congress, 1st Session, 
House Subcommittee of1 Appropriations Committee, Hearings on Department of 
Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1938, p. 133 (March 12, 1937).
16U New York Times, October 10, 1935, p. 1.
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Bureau inefficiency, but .to the limitations of the science of meteorology* For 
example, the accuracy of general forecasts was approximately eighty-five percent 
throughout the period.1^  Accuracy of the five-day forecasts of October 1, 19k0 
to June 30, 19i|l, was forty-eight percent for temperatures and sixteen percent for 
precipitation*^-^
165 Weather Bureau« Annual Report, 1919-1920, p* 11; 75th Congress, 1st Session, 
Senate Subcorrmittee o i Appropriations Committee, Hearings on Department of 
Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 1938, p* 38 (1937)*
166 77th Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on Department of Agriculture Appropriations for fiscal 19U3» P* 237 
(January 8, 19U2)*
CHAPTER X
Aviation Forecasts: A New Enterprise, 1913-1941
Aid to American aviation has involved more innovation, technological 
development, and opportunities for expansion of Weather Bureau facilities than 
any other field of weather service. Aviation, first almost solely military, 
culminated in the gigantic influx of commercial airlines prior to World War II. 
The close connection between aviation and meteorology did not begin with the 
successful demonstration that motor-driven machines could remain in the air for 
a considerable length of time. As already stated, early experimenters, includ­
ing Octave Chanute and the Wright brothers, continually examined weather theory 
and forecasting throughout their initial calculations preceding the actual 
flights.
At the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914» the relationship of meteor­
ology to aviation consisted primarily of an awareness by both meteorologists and 
aviators that weather service was imperative for the future of aviation. Pilots 
had always been able to obtain current weather forecasts, special bulletins or 
warnings, and opinions from forecasters as to the probabilities of good flying 
weather, mostly confined to data on surface conditions. The aviator was extreme­
ly thankful for information on surface wind speed and direction, which would 
assist him to choose a proper time to r i s e  into the air. On the other hand, 
practically no information was available on varying winds or other phenomena at 
the various layers of air above ground. With the creation of the National Ad­
visory Committee for Aeronautics in 1913» a planning group was provided to 
recommend government action for the support and development of aviation. Chief 
C* F. Marvin represented the Weather Bureau on this body as did his successors
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Willis Gregg and F. W. Reichelderfer.
Dr. Ford A. Carpenter of the Weather Bureau office at Los Angeles was 
not content to provide A m y  pilots with the data normally available. He also 
accompanied them on actual flights, and is credited with being the first Weather 
Bureau representative to complete an airplane flight.1 Carpenter provided 
special forecasts to A m y  fliers for the cross-country flights of Apri1-May,
1916. Included among these reports were those from Mount Wilson solar observa­
tory at the height of 6,000 feet from which data on wind, humidity, and clouds 
proved useful in determination of the height of fog. Close cooperation was 
maintained between meteorologists and the War Department school of aviation at 
San Diego. In 1914 Professor W. J. Humphreys, Weather Bureau physicist, gave a 
series of lectures to the airmen at San Diego. Robert D. Ward, professor of
climatology at Harvard, also presented lectures during World War I to fliers at
2
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory work on aeronautics was con­
ducted at Blue Hill Observatory the same time by A. L. Rotch.
Of uppermost concern during this early period of experimentation was 
the determination of exactly what weather phenomena were of leading importance 
to the flier. Meteorologists, as well as fliers, were, of course, in 1913 al­
ready aware of the importance of wind effects at all elevations from ground 
level to maximum flight altitudes, and especially of the critical effects of 
gusts, which still harass the landing of major aircraft. A danger area in these 
pioneer days of flying was that place of contact between the low-level easterlies 
and the prevailing westerlies. This was not considered a problem above the
1 C. L. Edholm, “Airmen and the Weather Bureau, Partners," Scientific American. 
vol. 116 (New York, April 4, 1917), p. 342.
2 "Meteorology and Aeronautical Engineering," Science, n.s., vol. 46 (New York,
July 27, 1917), pp. 84-85.
247
3
one-mile height. The danger to light aircraft was caused by the zone of tur­
bulent winds between these layers of air moving in opposite directions. Pilots 
from the beginning faced the effects of thunderstorms and line squalls. Here, 
wind gusts and lightning proved dangerous. Meteorologists often realized these 
hazards to a greater extent than did fliers.
Humidity, on which fog, clouds, rain, and snow depend , was «mother 
factor of the upper «dr which was of prime concern to the pilot. Its accurate 
measurement, however, continued to perplex the meteorologist until World War II 
and even after. Information on cloud heights, ceiling, and visibility, was «lLso 
essential before the takeoff if the aviator were to have reasonable assurance of a 
successful flight. Temperature itself, despite its relation to the other ele­
ments, was not considered the most essential factor. A British meteorologist
observed that differences in barometric pressure «ire most important as they
/
affect the lapse rate, the decrease of temperature with ascension. For example, 
at the same height of 23,000 feet, the temperature was -39 degrees Centigrade 
when the mean sea level barometric pressure was 29.00 inches, while with 30.30 
inches pressure the temperature was -27 degrees Centigrade. Pressure affects the 
altimeter reading which indicates the pilot's height above ground.
Long before regular aviation forecasts became an integral part of 
Weather Bureau activity, systematic efforts were inaugurated to measure weather 
elements of the upper air. Kite records, obtained from the research center at 
Mount Weather, Virginia, for the 1907-1912 period, comprised the only continuous
3 "How the Meteorologist Aids the Aviator," Scientific Araeric«m, n.s. vol. 121 
(New York, July 5, 1919), p. 22.
4 W. H. Dines, "Meteorology in Relation to Aeronautics," Scientific American 
Supplement, vol. 86 (New York, 1918), pp. 351-352, 366-368.
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record of aerological data in the Weather Bureau. The kite observations head­
quarters were transferred in 1914 to a farm near Fort Omaha, Nebraska, and later 
a Signal Corps gas plant at Fort Omaha was used for balloon inflation. Kite ob­
servations were moved during October, 1915, to Drexel, Nebraska, where a station 
was maintained for the next ten years, and the daily flight data were telegraphed 
to the forecast centers at Chicago and Washington, D.C.
Such was the status of upper-air activity in the Weather Bureau when 
in 1917 American entry into World War I and the rise of military aviation 
created the opportunity for an immediate enlargement of operations. The Army 
Appropriation Act for fiscal 1918 provided #100,000 for collection of additional 
upper-air data throughout the country. This act, which was originally backed by 
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and later by Army and Navy 
authorities, resulted within the next two years in the establishment of five kite 
stations, besides several stations for pilot-balloon observations.
The kite stations were at Ellendale, North Dakota; Broken Arrow, 
Oklahoma; Groesbeck, Texas; Leesburg, Georgia; and Royal Center, Indiana. How­
ever, Ellendale was the only new station reporting before the end of the war. 
After the war the Signal Corps, which provided meteorological service for the 
Army, transferred pilot-balloon equipment to the Weather Bureau for use at the 
five kite centers and by a unit at Washington, D.C. Ey the summer of 1919, 
Weather Bureau personnel had also organized pilot-balloon observations at already- 
existing Weather Bureau stations in Ithaca, New York; Lansing, Michigan; and 
Madison, Wisconsin.^* Observations of wind conditions were taken twice daily at
5 Weather Bureau, Bulletin of the Mount Weather Observatory, vol. & (Washington, 
D.C., 1914)» The other pre 1919 kite data were summarized, usually twice 
annually, in, Weather Bureau, Monthly Weather Review Supplements. 3. 5. 7. 8. 
10-15 (Washington, D.C., 1916-1919).
6 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1918-1919. p. 15.
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the latter stations, and results telegraphed to Washington, D.G. Weather Bureau 
leaders were well aware that the recent extension of upper-air activities was 
due to military support and not to increased Congressional generosity toward 
regular Bureau appropriations. An attempt in 1918 to reopen Mount Weather for 
kite observations on a limited scale, in order to get records for ten complete
g
years at this site, had to be dropped for lack of funds. Chief Marvin was also 
unsuccessful in 1919 in obtaining funds which would have enabled the Weather
9
Bureau to take over twenty pilot-balloon operations from the military forces. 
These operations were retained by the military. His request in 1920 for ap­
propriations for the establishment of five airport stations as aviation forecast 
center's, forty more pilot-balloon stations, two kite stations, an experiment in 
obtaining upper-air data through the use of airplanes, and a sounding-balloon 
program was also rejected.^ Marvin, who always found it difficult to obtain 
increased funds from Congress, impaired his own cause when he admitted, two years 
later, that requests for flying data came principally from military and air-mail 
pilots rather than from those connected with commercial interests.^1
The Weather Bureau, nevertheless, managed gradually to establish flight 
forecast centers at regular city stations in Chicago, Washington, D.C., and San 
Francisco. In 1920-1921 twice-daily pilot-balloon observations were added at
7 Marvin to General George 0. Squier, February 12, 1919, Weather Bureau Cor­
respondence.
8 Willis Gregg to C. F. Marvin, July 12, 1918, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
9 66th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on ... 
Appropriations for fiscal 1921, pp. 61-63 (December 9, 1919).
10 66th Congress, 3d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1922, pp. 100-101 (December 20, 1920).
11 67th Congress, 4th Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1924» p. 90 (November 16, 1922).
I
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San Francisco, California; Burlington, Vermont; and Denver, Colorado. Although 
the recommendation by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics of an ad­
ditional appropriation of $200,000 for new aeronautical observation stations was 
not accepted, the Weather Bureau was granted funds in the fiscal year 1924 for 
eight new stations. By July, 1923, four pilot-balloon stations had been es­
tablished on the Pacific Coast. During the period of 1919-1926 the Weather 
Bureau was always hoping for funds which would enable it to add new stations to 
its upper-air program, but by 1926 it was maintaining only twenty-one pilot- 
balloon stations in addition to six kite stations. The Army and Navy were also 
maintaining fifteen additional upper-air stations for the benefit of their own 
meteorological services.
The war-time stimulus to flying caused the Weather Bureau not only to 
expand its upper-air observations but also make greater use of its increased 
facilities by beginning on December 1, 1918, to issue daily aviation forecasts. 
These forecasts, initially intended for the benefit of the Signal Corps and A m y  
training posts, immediately became indispensable to the Post Office Department's 
air-mail service, an enterprise inaugurated in May of the same year. Weather 
Bureau officials fully intended from the first to extend these forecasts to 
fliers everywhere in the country, but due to inadequate funds were forced to 
restrict the service to air-mail routes and other military flights."^ Air-mail 
flights were already in operation between Chicago and New York, and Washington, 
D.C. and New York.
12 67th Congress, 4th Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1924, pp. 87-89 (November 16, 1922).
13 67th Congress, 4th Session, Senate Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1924, P* 17 (December 28, 1922).
14 Weather Bureau, Tonics and Personnel. December, 1918.
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The system of flying forecasts involved division of the air-mail routes
into thirteen zones. Forecasts were issued daily to the military authorities of
each zone. They were worded in very general terms. A favorable forecast might
read: "Good flying weather today} generally clear sky and good visibility,
moderate varying winds surface and a l o f t . B a d  weather would be announced in
such terms as: "Zone 1 and 2, Poor flying weather today} Local thundershowers
probable} moderate to fresh south and southwest surface winds, becoming west and
moderately strong above 3,000 f e e t . A  Weather Bureau employee, just returned
from France, pointed out in 1919 one of the limitations of these early forecasts.
He noted that the American forecasts did not mention the expected heights of
clouds, both upper and lower levels, information which was included in the
17
aviation forecasts of the French Meteorological Section. Another limitation
was the lack of flight forecasts for the night air-mail service, which were not
18
started until 1924«
Despite their shortcomings, these forecasts were eagerly sought. They 
played a particularly important role in the numerous military endurance flights 
of the period immediately after the war. Three United States Navy seaplanes 
left Rockaway, New Jersey, on the morning of May 8, 1919, on a transatlantic 
flight to Portugal via Halifax, Newfoundland, and the Azores. A Weather Bureau 
representative was previously sent to Newfoundland to aid the flight by radio 
messages to Washington, D.C. including both British weather reports and his own 
observations. E. H. Bowie's Washington, D.C. forecasts correctly warned the
15 66th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on...for 
fiscal 1921, p. 59 (December 9, 1919)»
16 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1919-1920, p. 9*
17 A. H. Thiessen to Marvin, February 18, 1919, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
18 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1924-1925, p. 7.
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the pilots of cloudiness near the Azores. Two of the planes crashed, but one,
the NC-4, reached Portugal. Weather Bureau aviation forecasts also received
plaudits for their assistance to the flight of the British dirigible R-34 which
flew from Long Island to England in July of the same year."^ But while the
British Air Ministry indicated its pleasure with these forecasts, the American
press ignored the role of the Weather Bureau. Other transatlantic flights of
British and German planes were also benefited by Weather Bureau forecasts.
Transcontinental as well as transatlantic flights were aided by
Weather Bureau forecasts. In 1919 such a flight by fifteen Army DeHavelands
20
was assisted by special forecasts, in addition to the normal daily reports.
The Weather Bureau was also consulted in regard to the cause of aircraft failure
21
during military flights. Chief Marvin was of the opinion that weather was not 
the cause of one mishap involving a Navy C-8 at Camp Holabird, near Baltimore. 
Experimental flights of the Navy flying boat NC-4 during September, 1919, were 
assisted by two forecasts daily from the Weather Bureau, which supplied similar
pp
assistance to a series of manned-balloon races during the same year, < Six 
Army and Navy balloons left the ground September 25, with the aid of forecasts 
giving surface and upper-air data. Less fortunate were two men in one flight of 
the national balloon races on October 1. Despite a Weather Bureau warning to 
delay, the races took place, and one crew was lost over Lake Huron. The 
Weather Bureau continued its practice of supplying special forecasts for «nmiqi 
balloon races and military plane flights, such as the Army's cross-country C-2 
flight in 1922, which received particular aid from Weather Bureau offices at 
Cleveland, St. Louis, San Antonio, El Paso, and Los Angeles.
19 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1918-1919f p. 11.
20 Marvin to Forecast Division, May 22, 1919, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
21 Gregg to Marvin, and reply, July 1, 1919, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
22 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1919-1920f p. 8.
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The expansion of upper-air observation stations and the issuance of 
an increasing number of special aviation forecasts were accompanied by continual 
efforts for the improvement of upper-air observations, essential for the accum­
ulation of the data which were necessary for better flying forecasts* From the 
beginning Weather Bureau balloon observations were highly successful for the times 
British meteorologists conceded that Bureau balloons attained greater heights 
than the smaller British balloons used in carrying the Dines meteorograph. The
best Weather Bureau rubber balloons were of the prewar variety, obtained from
23
St. Petersburg, Russia. When war-time conditions made it impossible to pur­
chase these, however, suitable American-made balloons were obtained, especially 
after the end of the war.^
Weather Bureau employees were urged, in the interest of a more nearly 
unbroken record of observation, to take another pilot-balloon observation im­
mediately if one balloon burst or if rain or ice prevented the completion of an 
observation. White—washed balloons or red and black balloons were employed to
obtain longer visual observation, and hence higher altitude data. Yellow bal­
loons were used for observations shortly before sunset.^ White balloons can be 
traced better in clear skies, while the black balloon shows up more distinctly 
when the sky is partially covered by clouds. Higher pilot-balloon runs were 
constantly attempted. The maximum time limit for each operation was eighty-
23 F. J. W. Whipple to Gregg, March 7, 1921, and Gregg to Whipple, March 19,
1921, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
24 Marvin to Dr. C. D. Walcott, Secretary of Smithsonian Institution, November 
30, 1917} Marvin to R. A. Millikan of Ryerson Physical Laboratory, October 3, 
1919, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
25 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. December, 1923.
26 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. July, 1924.
27 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. February, 1930.
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five minutes. It took this long to inflate the balloon, release it, trace its 
flight through use of the theodolite, and plot the data for reports to Washing­
ton, D.C. Wind speed and direction were both determined for the various levels 
of air. The rate of ascent was 600 feet per minute after the first two minutes. 
In a majority of cases, cloudiness, haae, or other obstructions prevented obser­
vation of the ascent of the balloons to desired heights, and sometimes they 
would burst at 20,000 to 25,000 feet. Care also had to be taken against the bal­
loons exploding while being inflated with hydrogen.
By the middle thirties the heights of pilot-balloon flights had been
increased to daytime averages in good weather of six to nine miles, while night
29
observations were possible up to approximately two miles. One source of pos­
sible error in observations was the occasional failure to consider the effect on 
the ascent rate of the extra weight of the candle and Japanese lantern attached 
to the balloon during night observation, which led to incorrect entries for 
various altitudes.^0 Pilot-balloon observations were taken at 6:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. Four daily observations were soon added at 
selected stations.
In order to obtain supplementary upper-air data in aid of aviation, 
especially rind information, the Weather Bureau again sponsored manned-balloon 
flights, this time in cooperation with the Army at Scott Field, Belleville, 
Illinois. A series of fifteen flights was begun in April, 1924* Dr. Clarence 
L. Meisinger, Weather Bureau scientist, conducted the experiments and arranged 
careful plans for securing forecast data including radio reports prior to his
28 Bowie to Gregg, May 4, 1925, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
29 74th Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1936, p. 1586 (February 5, 1935).
30 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. February, 1930.
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31observations. Most successful of the flights was the initial test of April 2,
in which the balloon carried its passengers 700 miles away into South Carolina.
On June 2, the aeronauts again ascended, this time in a larger balloon, and,
ironically enough, despite thunderstorm forecasts. The flight ended in tragedy
32when both Meisinger and his companion were killed, apparently by lightning.
Earlier the same year Willis Gregg had warned against balloon racing under
33hazardous conditions, such as during lightning.
A projected sounding-balloon program for upper-air measurement of 
temperature, relative humidity, and barometric pressure was submitted to Congress 
in late 1919, but failed to receive the necessary appropriations. The Weather 
Bureau had made such observations on a non-systematic basis prior to World War I; 
two pilot balloons would be sent up, each equipped with a meteorograph and with 
a parachute to insure safe landing of the recording instrument after the balloons 
burst.^ Each instrument cost approximately $100. Data from the flights would 
not be available at once, as in the kite and pilot-balloon observations, but 
could only be utilized after the instruments were recovered at least one or two 
days later. The sounding balloon collects data on a recording instrument while 
the pilot balloon carries no instrument and provides information only on wind 
direction and speed.
Simultaneously with the development of upper-air observations and 
aviation forecasts, the rapid improvement of the radio had by the twenties made 
it extremely useful to the entire Weather Bureau service. The radio was destined
31 Memorandum',' C. LeRoy Meisinger to Forecast Division, February 9, 1924; M. W. 
Hayes to Meisinger, April 2, 1924, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
32 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. May, 1924; Weather Bureau, Annual 
Report. 1923-1924. p. 14.
33 Gregg to Aviators, January 11, 1924, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
34 66th Congress, 2d Session, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on...Ap­
propriations for fiscal 1921, pp. 56-58 (December 9, 1919).
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to supersede earlier dependence on the telegraph and the telephone. By 1930» 
however, the teletype had replaced all three as the best means of communicating 
observational data and forecasts among Bureau stations. The Weather Bureau, it 
will be remembered, had turned over its wireless experiments to the Navy earlier 
in the century. Navy wireless stations then relayed Weather Bureau coded bulle­
tins to those ships at sea which were close enough to hear the reports. As of 
November 1, 1920, more comprehensive bulletins were transmitted each night from 
five naval radio stations, still mainly for shipping interests. The initiation 
on June 1, 1921, of extensive morning broadcasts from Radio Arlington, Virginia, 
brought the benefits of the radio dissemination of forecasts to aviators. These 
forecasts included reports from forty-two surface and nine aerological Weather
Bureau stations and were designed at first for six, later for fourteen, flying
35zones comprising the region east of the Mississippi River. These radio bul­
letins also featured pressure synopses, and wind and weather forecasts for the 
Gulf and Atlantic coastal areas.36 On August 20, 1920, the Post Office Depart- 
ment issued orders for the installation of radio stations at each field used for 
air-mail flights.-^ Seven were in operation later the same year and a total of 
seventeen fields were equipped at a later date. Radios were used for weather 
forecasts and stock market reports. On July 1, 1927, the Department of Commerce 
assumed control of this radio operation.
Both the Arlington and Great Lakes naval radio stations reverted in 
1922 to broadcasting the aviation data in code, and it proved more reliable than
35 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1920-1921. p. 12.
36 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. May, 1921.
37 Post Office Department, Report for Fiscal 1927 (Washington, D.C., 1927),
pp. 2 2 6 .
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38messages sent in words. The increase in the radio distribution of forecasts 
was indeed rapid. In mid-February 1923, the Navy station at Arlington began is­
suing three daily forecasts instead of one 10:30 a.m. report.Fliers could 
also utilize broadcasts from some of the many commercial radio stations which 
mushroomed into existence during the early twenties. Of some 4-00 radio stations 
in the nation in 1922, one-fourth, representing thirty-five states, issued 
Weather Bureau forecasts. In those days the radio people received the forecasts 
by telephone from the nearest weather station. The government broadcasting 
system, which had originally been assigned the lower wave-length of 4.85 meters, 
was in May, 1923, rejuvenated and assigned the regular wave-length.^ There were 
112 stations serving the Weather Bureau at this time, with all forecast districts 
except New Orleans boasting suitable stations.
Reception of these broadcasts often left much to be desired. Inter­
ference among stations caused numerous complaints. Weather Bureau officials were 
even blamed by irritated citizens for having failed to forecast periods of poor 
radio reception. The radio reports, at best, provided the pilot of the twenties 
with a more or less accurate idea of the weather situation at a greater or lesser 
time preceding his takeoff, its accuracy depending on how closely his takeoff 
followed one of the three daily forecasts. Aviators did not yet have the benefit 
of hourly weather reports or of a receiving-only radio set in the plane through 
which they could obtain reports while in flight. As late as 1932, not all air­
mail pilots were equipped with radio earphones.^1 The United States still lagged 
behind Europe in ground-to-plane communications, but, as we shall see, subse­
quently modernized its facilities.
38 Weather Bureau. Tonics and Personnel. June, 1922.
39 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1922-1923, p. 8.
40 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. August, 1923.
41 72d Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1933, p. 83 (December 15, 1931).
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The inadequacies of the Weather Bureau services to aviation prior to 
1926, which resulted partly from limited communication facilities due to the 
lack of separate appropriations, were fully recognized hy pilots, military metecr-i 
ologists, and Weather Bureau scientists. Repeated efforts to obtain the neces­
sary funds for improving the system had, as already noted, proved unsuccessful. 
Such improvements as had been achieved had sometimes necessitated as long as 
seven years from the first initiation of legislation to its final adoption.
Weather Bureau Chief Marvin, who was consulted on all legislative proposals, had
42
from the first favored a Bureau of Aeronautics within the Department of Commerce.
Chief Marvin summarized in his annual report for fiscal year 1925 the leading
obstacles to better aviation service which his organization confronted. He
deplored the fact that the only major allocation of funds for this work had come
during World War I and still provided only six kite stations and fifteen to
twenty pilot-balloon observation stations. Ninety percent of the trained and
dependable meteorologists of the nation were in or associated with the Weather
Bureau, and it would be much cheaper to have one government agency handle all
A3weather services. Marvin contended that the Weather Bureau should be in a 
reserve status similar to the Coast and Geodetic Survey, becoming part of the 
military forces during war. Former Chief Willis Moore, always an advocate of 
rapid expansion to handle the increased demand for services, felt that it was 
criminal for the federal government to fail to keep pace with the demand for 
•id to aviation.^-
42 Marvin to Secretary of Agriculture, February 8, 1922, Weather Bureau Corres­
pondence; see also 68th Congress, 2d Session, Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, Hearings on H. R. 10522, pp. 39-41 (December, 1924).
Marvin testified in favor of this proposal known as the Winslow bill.
43 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1924-1925. p. 4.
44 Willis L. Moore. «1 Am Thinking of Hurricanes,« American Mercury, vol. 12 
(New York, 1927), p. 85.
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Inadequate Weather Bureau aid to Army fliers contributed to the develop­
ment of a larger Signal Corps weather service. Lieutenant L. J. Maitland, con­
trol officer of the Army model airway during the experimental flights which 
covered 2,000 miles in 1923-1925, testified before Congress that Weather Bureau 
forecasts were too late to be of much help. Although Weather Bureau reports 
were radioed as rapidly as received, it was impossible to hear these broadcasts 
consistently at all Army s t a t i o n s T h i s  situation had resulted in the estab­
lishment of Signal Corps weather stations at Washington, D.C.j Dayton, Ohio; 
and San Antonio, Texas. Major Edward Blair, a Weather Bureau employee prior to 
World War I, and organizer of the Signal Corps weather service in France, charged 
that improvement in Weather Bureau airways forecasting would result not only 
from increased funds but from considerable local decentralization in Bureau or­
ganization and policy.
Marvin had estimated that an additional $75,000 per annum would be 
needed to provide adequate service for each 1,000 miles of airway. E. B. 
Calvert, chief of the forecast division, and chairman of an interdepartmental 
committee working on the problem, understood the basic shortcomings: (l) The 
existing observation times were not calculated to give adequate aid to aviation, 
because the majority of early morning flights left before such forecasts were 
available. (2) Additional upper-air stations were needed; each first-order 
station should take such observations. (3) Airway weather stations at each 250 
mile interval were essential, with substations seventy-five miles apart to pro­
vide for supplementary visual observations, the entire system to be connected by
45 70th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1929, pp. 226-228, 231 (1928).
4-6 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1924-1925. p. 4*
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telegraph or telephone. After inspection of Army, Navy, and state aviation 
fields, the committee also suggested a tentative plan calling for radio broad­
casts directly from the larger Weather Bureau offices to these f i e l d s . A r m y  
and Navy personnel, including future Weather Bureau Chief F. W. Reichelderfer, 
were currently stationed in the Weather Bureau Forecast Division at Washington, 
D.C., for the purpose of telephoning forecasts to their respective air fields. 
Military meteorologists, graduates of a recently-created school of meteorology 
at Camp Vail, New Jersey, were also stationed at these air fields.
A major impediment to earlier forecasts was the cost of readjusting 
telegraph circuits to carry the desired observations at 6:00 a.m., Eastern 
Standard Time. Western Union still began collection of weather data at 8:00 a.m., 
Eastern Standard Time, reserving its commercial lines for this use during the 
succeeding one and one-half hours. To further complicate matters, reports from 
the Canadian weather service were taken at the same time as this country's and 
relayed through telegraph in the same code. Canadian officials were not anxious 
to change times of observation because of the expense, and it was impractical
/g
for one to change and not the other.
Various unfortunate incidents inspired criticism of the Weather 
Bureau's failure to supply adequate protection to aviation. The crash in 1925 of 
the dirigible Shenandoah brought forth a naval inquiry opinion that better or 
more rapid airway weather service might have prevented the tragedy.^ Two 
Weather Bureau officials agreed with reports that warning of the thunder squalls 
was lacking. One Weather Bureau forecaster, indeed, was about to issue another
4-7 New York Times. September 19, 1925, p. 7, and June 29, 1925, p. 1.
48 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1924-1925. p. 6.
49 New York Times. October 15, 1925, p. 2.
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forecast, much too late to be of value to the flight, when informed of the 
50
crash. Another crash, involving a pilot of the night air-mail service, in­
volved not only forecasts too late to be of service, but also the circumstance 
that ground-to-air radio communications might have saved the man’s life.^ The 
airman was killed in a crash into a hill in Pennsylvania, while flying in fog. 
Effort was made to alert him of the fog, but his plane had left the ground at 
Hadley Field, New Jersey, before the message could be delivered.
Explanation if not justification of an increasing neglect of Weather 
Bureau forecasts goes back again to their frequent inadequacy and even inac­
curacy. Charles A. Lindbergh, who went through harrowing experiences as an 
air-mail pilot in the mid-twenties on the Chicago, Peoria, Springfield, and 
St. Louis route, subsequently expressed an exceedingly low opinion of domestic 
aviation forecasting prior to 1927. Lindbergh, noting that his group completed 
ninety-nine percent of all scheduled flights, asserted that one of the factors 
in this record was avoiding dependence on weather forecasts. His account con­
tains such expressions ass "Paying almost no attention to weather forecasts.. 
Chicago reports are so unreliable that I do not want to condition my mind with 
them. I would rather judge weather ahead as I fly."^ Lindbergh claimed, 
specifically, that the weather forecasts were inaccurate as to whether a field 
was closed or was open to landings. In those days, each pilot was his own dis­
patcher; if he thought he could make it, he flew, if not, he put the mail on the 
train. Many pilots on the dangerous New York to Cleveland air-mail route in
50 H. J. Cox to Marvin, September 4, 1925, Weather Bureau Correspondence,
51 New York Times. October 13, 1925, p. 25.
52 Charles A. Lindbergh, The Spirit of St. Louis (New York, 1953}, p. 4.
53 Lindbergh, The Spirit, p. 61.
54 Lindbergh, The Spirit, p. 172.
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consequence utilized all *their personal ingenuity to avoid complete dependence on
the official forecasts and to obtain spot checks of current weather data-— even
to telephoning farmers along the route to find out how far they could see through
55the rain or fog#
However, several Weather Bureau employees drew praise for their avia­
tion information, notably Henry T. Harrison of Cleveland, whose opinions as to
56
whether landing fields would be open or not were much in demand. Some pilots 
apparently failed to see the need for obtaining such useful weather forecasts as 
were available# Edward Bowie reported to Chief Marvin that one disastrous flight
tin
along the Pacific Goast was undertaken without contacting his office.? In
another case a pilot who ignored Weather Bureau forecasts of poor flying weather
58
crashed against the Tehachapi Mountains, oausing the death of all passengers.
Congress, after several years of incessant complaints from the nation’s
aviation interests in regard to the inadequacy of federal aid to this new and
important industry, finally, on May 20, 1926, passed the Air Commerce Act. A
portion of the new act made an important addition to the 1890 organic act of the
Weather Bureau, which states the responsibilities of the service, by specifically
requiring the Weather Bureau to provide necessary meteorological aid to aviation:
section 5 (e) ...Within the limits of appropriations which 
may be made for such purposes, it shall be the duty of the 
Chief of the Weather Bureau, under direction of the Secretary 
of Agriculture, (a) to furnish such weather reports, forecasts, 
warnings, and advices as may be required to promote the safety
55 Frank J. Taylor, High Horizons: Daredevil Flying Postman to Modem Magic 
Carpet - The United Air Lines Story (Hew York, 1951), pp. 5-6, 42, 43.
56 Taylor, High Horizons, p. 43*
57 Bowie to Marvin, July 14, 1926, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
58 71st Congress, 3d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...fiscal 1932, p. 663 (November 21, 1930).
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and efficiency of air navigation in the United States 
and above the high seas, particularly upon civil air­
ways designated by the Secretary of Commerce under 
authority of law as routes suitable for air commerce, 
and (b) for such purposes to observe, measure, and in­
vestigate atmospheric phenomena, and establish meteor­
ological offices and stations.59
Through a deficiency bill passed during July, 1926, the Weather Bureau
was granted $75,000 to inaugurate a process designed eventually to place ex-
60perienced meteorologists at all of the important aviation landing fields. 
Twenty-two pilot-balloon stations, at currently-existing city stations on the 
New York to San Francisco and eight other commercial routes, gained top priority 
for the first year. Chief Marvin requested $45,000 and eighteen new employees 
beyond the regular appropriations for fiscal 1928 in order to carry out the 
provisions of the Air Commerce Act for 6,000 new miles of airways.^
The Weather Bureau was on the threshold of unparalleled expansion.
A method of analyzing the increasing importance of the Weather Bureau's aero­
nautical functions is to compare appropriations figures before the passage of the 
Air Commerce Act with those for the subsequent period. Funds for aerology totalec 
$104,400 in fiscal 1926, and for 1927 were $175,000. The total Weather Bureau 
appropriation for fiscal year 1923 was $1,925,235. Congress granted in fiscal 
1932 over $1,700,000 for aerology alone out of the total Weather Bureau funds 
of $4,497,720.
59 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1927-1928. p. 3j (49 U.S.C. 603 US. Cl 171);
44 SiaMss. aL Lacea-568.
60 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. June, 1926.
61 69th Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...fiscal 1928, p. 570 (November 9, 1926).
62 72d Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1934, PP. 115-119 (November 23, 1932).
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Several significant changes in Bureau operations, all beneficial to 
aeronautics, resulted from passage of the M r  Commerce Act. In the first place, 
Weather Bureau airport stations were opened along all the major air lines, a 
vast improvement over the prior system of attempting to provide aviation data 
from downtown offices. Secondly, and even more progressive and far-reaching, was 
the inauguration of twenty-four-hour operation at the airway stations. Now the 
public no longer had to wait until 8:00 a.m. to reach a Weather Bureau office, or 
generally be without service after 11:00 p.m. A third result was the tremendous 
increase in Weather Bureau personnel and operations for coping with aviation 
problems. All these changes, however, materialized rather slowly. By November, 
1928, Weather Bureau personnel were located at only eighteen airport stations, 
five of which provided twenty-four-hour service and issued forecasts at five to 
six-hour intervals. ^ For example, twenty-four-hour service at Chicago Municipal 
Mrport was inaugurated April 1, 1927.
An example of the type of service added during the first two years of 
the program was the expansion along the San Diego-Seattle route. Aviation 
forecasts for this area were made at San Francisco, while airport stations were 
opened at Los Angeles, Oakland, Portland, and Seattle. Wherever airport stations 
were not yet established, first-order city offices continued to handle aviation 
requests; this was the situation at San Diego, Fresno, Red Bluff, and Reading, 
California; Medford and Roseburg, Oregon; and Tacoma, Washington. First-order 
offices, both city and airport, were manned only by full-time Weather Bureau 
employees. They were fully-equipped and took all basic observations. Second- 
order stations were partially manned by non-Bureau employees, usually with one
63 70th Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1930, pp. 96-97 (November 19, 1928).
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full-time Weather Bureau man in charge. These offices did not take all observa­
tions and were open on a reduced schedule. Second-order stations were established 
at twenty-two points along the San Diego-Seattle route to report surface condi- 
tions of temperature, pressure, wind, visibility, and cloud ceiling. By 1928 
similar organization of facilities was begun along airways connecting Cleveland 
and Louisville} Atlanta and New Orleans; Chicago and Lincoln, Nebraska; and 
Chicago and Kalamazoo. Fourteen airport stations were opened along these air­
mail lines.
The major source of aid to the Pacific Coast expansion of 1927 was the 
Guggenheim Fund for Meteorology.^ A committee of Willis Gregg, and C.G.A.
Rossby of the Weather Bureau; Edward Blair of the Air Force; and F. W, Reich— 
elderfer, then of the Navy; was formed to study such aviation problems as fog 
and haze. H. C. Willett of the Weather Bureau went to Bergen, Norway, to analyze 
these hazards in addition to the threat to flying caused by thunderstorms. In 
addition to financing research projects, the Guggenheim Fund was also used to 
plan and build the Los Angeles to San Francisco airline, whose weather service 
was taken over in 1929 by the Weather Bureau.^ The airport at San Francisco
was built after two years of cooperative planning by the city and Weather
_ 67Bureau.
There were no airport stations in 1926; eighteen in 1928; but airway 
stations of the type giving twenty-four-hour service in 1930 numbered fifty.
64 Aviation, vol. 25 (August 11, 1928), p. 484.
65 Weather Bureau, Tonics and Personnel. October, 1927.
66 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. July, 1929»
67 Willis Gregg, Aeronautical Meteorology (second edition, New York, 1930), 
p. 358.
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These stations were fully-equipped and each was maimed by four to seven trained 
68employees. Approximately 250 second-order stations in 1930 provided mostly
visual observations for the network.
The increase of interest in aviation, however, advanced at a greater
pace than the Weather Bureau appropriations. Even during one period of the
Depression, aviation mileage increased twenty-eight per cent whereas aviation
services were cut, sixteen first-order airway stations being dropped. The fiscal
1937 airway service appropriation was thirteen percent less than for fiscal
691932, yet miles flown totaled fifty percent higher. The actual cut-backs in 
the airway weather service, however, consisted in a large measure of relinquish­
ing hourly observation duties to Bureau of Air Commerce personnel stationed at
some airports and reduction of daily observations from the many supplementary
70off-airway stations.
During the 1938-1941 period, however, airway service grew rapidly to
71
nearly 100 first-order stations. by the same time 823 airway stations of all 
types reported regularly. Three additional airway forecast centers had been 
opened with three new forecast assistants sent to each. Besides the first-order 
airway stations, or those manned solely by Weather Bureau personnel, in 1939 
thirty additional airport offices or second-order stations were maintained, each 
by one Weather Bureau man and three non-commissioned observers. The staff was 
available forty hours per week, and one daily map was issued at these stations.
68 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1929-1930. p. 8.
69 75th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1938, p. 32 (1937).
70 72d Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on..,Appropriations for fiscal 1934» pp. 130-133 (November 23, 1932).
71 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1937-1938, p. 10.
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Another type of station belonged to a special category. Approximately 700 of
these stations, staffed by special observers or by Department of Commerce person- 
72nel, sent anywhere from hourly to six-hourly reports.
Administrative adjustments inaugurated to facilitate the aviation 
service included establishment in 1926 at the Central Office of an aerologieal
73division to replace the former research section of aerologieal investigations. 
Willis R. Gregg became Chief of the Weather Bureau in 1934» replacing the retir­
ing C. F. Marvin, and the important role of aerologieal division chief was 
entrusted to Delbert M. Little, a veteran of the airway service.^ Little had 
entered the Bureau in 1917 at the age of nineteen, and gained prominence from his 
early interest in aviation meteorology. Little had represented the Weather 
Bureau in the Guggenheim Fund model airway weather service on the West Coast and 
perfected the one-man pilot-balloon observation. Interchange of personnel be­
tween city and airport stations, except for New York City, was authorized to
75expedite the handling of emergency situations. Electric buzzers attached to 
clocks reminded airway service observers of the proper time to take hourly ob­
servations, which were then immediately transmitted via the teletype machine. 
Airport stations were soon officially called WBAS, Weather Bureau Airport Station,
to indicate the change from the exclusive use of city offices prior to the Air
76Commerce Act.
Modernization of the existing program proved necessary in order to 
coordinate the information from the vast new network of weather stations assigned 
to aviation services. Comraunications difficulties encountered during the pre-
72 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1Q38-1Q3Q, pp. 5-7.
73 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. June, 1926.
74 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. June, 1951, pp. 119-121.
75 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. July, 1928.
76 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. April, 1929.
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vious dependence upon telegraph and telephone facilities were relieved by the 
system of teletype circuits started in 1928 and extended within two years to 
cover 8,000 miles of airways. Several of the first places to receive teletype 
sets were airport stations at Hadley Field, New Jersey} Cleveland} Chicago} and 
Bellfonte, Pennsylvania. These teletype units were all connected to the Central 
Office at Washington, D.C., from which data were exchanged for all locations. 
Operated from the beginning by the Department of Commerce, the early teletype 
was of the tape variety. Mechanical failure was not an uncommon occurrence, 
whereupon personnel had to rely on telephone and telegraph messages to keep the 
frequent aviation reports available to the public. Marked improvements in com­
munications followed in 1932, when the page, or sheet-model, teletype replaced 
the tape model at thirty-six stations,^® and in 1937 when the speed of trans­
mission was increased from forty to sixty words per minute. Ely early 1937,
teletype facilities connected approximately forty percent of the total airway 
79miles. Of 32,000 miles of airways, 13,000 were served. Reports were entered 
by word code until inaugural of the more efficient number code in 1939, which 
describes the same conditions with one-third less total characters.
The teletype lessened the need for radio communications between air­
port stations, but the radio became the connecting link between the meteorologist 
on the ground and the pilot in the air. In 1930 broadcasts of weather data
77 71st Congress, 3d Session, House Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1932, p. 98 (November 21, 1930).
78 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. July, 1932.
79 75th Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1938, p. 5, 141 (March 12, 1937).
80originated from terminal airports along at least four airlines. Personnel
at airport control towers, operated since 1927 by the Bureau of Air Commerce
and since 1938 by the Civil Aeronautics Authority, gathered the weather reports
from the Weather Bureau and passed the information on to pilots through regular
radio broadcasts every thirty minutes. Airplanes equipped with two-way radio,
as many were by 1938, could call the airport at any time for special weather 
81
information. Dependable range of the airport radio reports to pilots was 100
g2
miles, with more distant reception in clear winter weather.
The advancement in communications facilities was accompanied by an 
improvement both in the quantity and quality of the information available to 
pilots. The Department of Commerce not only instigated regulatory practices 
aimed at increasing safety in aviation, as provided for in the Air Commerce Act, 
but also recommended increased airport facilities and additional weather data. 
Weather Bureau officials encouraged employees to provide special reports to 
pilots, even at the extra expense of telephone or telegraph messages.®-^ Data 
posted at airport stations included such useful information as moon phase, sun­
rise, sunset, and civil twilight times. The surface instead of sea level was 
used as the base for pilot reports. In 1929 the extremely important elements
g/
of ceiling and visibility were finally added to airway reports. Visibility, 
at first reported in words, was soon coded by numbers.®'*
80 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. March, 1930.
81 Federal Writers Project, "History of Aviation in Illinois," MS, 1938, pp. 
3-6, located at the Illinois Historical Society, Springfield, Illinois.
82 71st Congress, 3d Session, House Subcommittee on Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1932, p. 659 (November 21, 1930).
83 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. April, 1928.
84 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. January, 1929.
85 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. August, 1935.
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To decrease the flying hazards of bad weather* the Department of Com­
merce in 1930 banned the flights of passenger-carrying planes when ceilings of 
less than 500 feet prevailed. This placed increased responsibility and pres­
sure on weather observers, who supposedly entered only figures obtained through 
use of ceiling balloons and ceiling projectors* Pilots* always anxious to fly* 
were desirous of receiving the benefit of the doubt from the Weather Bureau in 
borderline cases of ceiling conditions. On the other hand, pilots sometimes 
blamed accidents on faulty reports of ceiling or visibility. Weather Bureau 
officials* to maintain their traditional legal position* always stressed the
point that they did not tell the pilots whether to fly or not— they merely re-
87ported the current weather along with forecasts.
During the early 1930's aviation services were increased. By 1930 some
stations were reporting dew-point readings, which, along with the temperatures,
could indicate possible fog formation or icing conditions. Hourly teletype
reports included not only general surface conditions, temperature, barometric
pressure, and wind, but also the condition of landing fields, as affected by
88
rain or snow, and thunderstorms or squall conditions. The trip forecast for 
flights on all civil airways, furnished to the pilot an hour before takeoff, 
was an innovation of 1931 providing closer attention to the needs of individual 
pilots; it was, however, dropped later in the depression.^ Upper-air maps, 
showing wind velocity and direction at various levels up to 13,000 feet, began 
in July, 1933, to be issued at airway stations. Such information was gathered
86 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. February, 1930,
87 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. May, 1929.
88 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1929-1930. p. 11.
89 72d Congress, 1st Session, House &ibcaramittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...Appropriations for fiscal 1933, pp. 85-86 (December 15, 1931).
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by teletype and supplemented the written aviation forecasts. The decision in 
1935 to issue aviation weather maps every six hours coincided with the avail­
ability of current reports from foreign meteorological services. Each new fore­
cast covered the next eight-hour period, while special intermediate reports
90
were made if conditions warranted.
A vast increase in the number of upper-air observations accompanied the 
expansion of data provided to pilots. In 1930 forty-five airport stations en­
tered on teletype the pilot-balloon data of wind direction and velocity at 
various heights. Within two years this number had doubled, but then remained 
almost stationary through the rest of the decade. The majority of these stations 
maintained a schedule of four observations per day, except for temporary depres­
sion reductions in 1933 to three each day. A rapid expansion of pilot-balloon 
observations with the establishment of over fifty new stations immediately pre­
ceded the attack on Pearl Harbor in 194-1»
Despite the improved analysis of wind data provided by the more tightly 
woven network of pilot-balloon stations throughout the nation, much more detailed 
records of temperature, relative humidity, and barometric pressure were desired 
in order to provide aviation forecasts which would include dependable descrip­
tions of conditions at the various levels of upper air. Such records from the 
several kite stations proved far from adequate. Kite observations were not only 
time-consuming and troublesome, but it was also frequently impossible to obtain 
data at all, especially from altitudes of 10,000 feet or higher.
For years meteorologists had debated the possibilities of using air­
planes to secure continuous records of the upper air. One writer in particular 
suggested in 1921 that airplanes could be used to record meteorological phenomena
90 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1934-1935. p. 9
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to the height of 25,000 feet. Weather Bureau Chief Marvin in 1920 tried unsuc­
cessfully to persuade Congress of the wisdom of attempting airplane observations^ 
but within two years told Congressmen that it would be extremely difficult to 
use airplanes because of the difficulty of keeping the recording instrument in
93proper place.
Weather Bureau officials, nevertheless, conducted several experimental 
flights in 1925. E. H. Bowie used an airplane at San Diego to obtain tempera­
ture recordings to a maximum level of 8,000 feet.^ The Weather Bureau and the 
Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy Department cooperated in the taking of daily 
8*00 a.m. airplane observations at Anacostia, D.C. A Marvin meteorograph was
attached to the top of the upper wing, to avoid motor heat, and flights were
95
completed to 3,000 meters. The meteorograph trace, showing data at the var­
ious altitudes, was then rushed to the Washington forecaster by 9*30 a.m. Army
96
Air Force personnel also cooperated in test observations at Bolling Field. 
Despite these individual tests, no systematic organization of airplane observa­
tions was undertaken for another six years. The delay was apparently caused by 
Marvin*s belief that the meteorograph did not record accurately when attached to
the airplane. In all fairness to Marvin, it should be noted that the planes of 
1931 were able to attain greater altitude than those of earlier years. In the
91 Geddes, Meteorology.... pp. 11-13.
92 6 6th Congress, 3d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1922, p. 101 (December 20, 1920).
93 67th Congress, 4-th Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1924» p. 90 (November 16, 1922).
94 Bowie to Gregg, May 4, 1925, Weather Bureau Correspondence. The average 
height was 4»000 to 6,000 feet.
95 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. May, 1925.
96 New York Times. April 21, 1925, p. 23.
interim, Weather Bureau personnel, if licensed by the Department of Commerce,
were given permission to participate in local flights for the purpose of taking 
97observations.
Finally, however, on July 1, 1931» aviation interests persuaded the
Bureau to take airplane observations, or apobs as they became known to meteor-
98ologists. They were inaugurated at Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, and Omaha.
The time of observations was fixed at 5 :00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, with local
pilots employed to make the flights, while Weather Bureau personnel took the
meteorographs on and off the planes for each flight. The initial flights at
Chicago gained altitudes of 14,000 feet the first day and 16,000 feet the next 
99day. The pilot's contract stipulated that he would receive no pay unless he
ascended to 13,500 feet, whereupon he was to get $25 plus a ten percent bonus for
each additional 1,000 feet of altitude. Ironically enough the temperature at
14,000 feet was below freezing while it was 100 degrees Fahrenheit at State and
Randolph in downtown Chicago. With inauguration of airplane observations the
kite stations were doomed. All except the Due West and Ellendale locations,
four stations in all, were immediately eliminated. In July, 1933, Ellendale, the
last kite station, was officially closed. Because of the depression, additional
airplane observation stations were not set up until May, 1934, when a total of
twenty-two locations, both Weather Bureau and military, was included in the net- 
100
work. The Weather Bureau then contracted for flights at Billings, Cheyenne, 
Fargo, Nashville, Oklahoma City, and Omaha, while daily flights were added by
97 Weather Bureau, Tonics and Personnel. June, 1928.
98 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. June, 1931.
99 New York Times. July 3, 1931, p. 21j July 6, 1931, p. 16.
100 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. May, 1934»
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military pilots at seven Army airfields, one National Guard station, and eight 
naval bases. Within three more years the Weather Bureau had increased the 
number of its own airplane observation stations to thirteen while military 
pilots continued to operate seventeen other installations.
In spite of these auspicious beginnings, numerous difficulties arose 
which caused military officials to grow cool toward the program. The early 
morning flights seriously interfered with the normal schedule for military pilots. 
Taking airplane weather observations involved considerable danger and over the 
1931-1938 period cost the lives of twelve pilots.^* Pilots under contract to 
the Weather Bureau were expected by 1938 to ascend to 16,500 feet or go without 
pay. At such heights a pilot might be overcome by lack of oxygen, without suf­
ficient warning in advance to enable him to descend; some pilots endeavored to
guard against this danger by taking along small pets whose heads would droop as
102a result of oxygen exhaustion before the human constitution would be affected.
In July, 1938, consequently, the Army discontinued airplane observations for the 
Weather Bureau. The A m y  monoplanes, indeed, were less suited to the purpose, 
because of turbulent wind effects on the meteorograph, than the Navy biplanes, 
eight of which continued weather observations for another year. All systematic 
Weather Bureau apobs were, however, discontinued prior to the outbreak of World 
War II, because of improved new techniques for securing the same data.
Systematic Weather Bureau apobs could be discontinued without injury 
to aviation forecasts, because modern technology had presented meteorologists
101 76th Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1940, p. 293 (February 11, 1939).
102 New York Times. July 24» 1938, p. 24.
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vdth a better device for measuring the temperature, pressure, and humidity of 
the upper air— the radio meteorograph. The radio meteorograph consists of an 
instrument similar to the meteorograph used on kites and airplanes, which is 
sustained in flight by a balloon comparable to a pilot balloon. In addition, 
however, the radio meteorograph is also equipped to send electric impulses back 
to a receiving set on the earth. The electrical impulses give the observer on 
the ground a continuous record of the weather elements recorded by the radio 
meteorograph. A parachute attached to the instrument enables the Bureau to 
recover some of the plastic instruments after the balloons burst. An arm within 
the instrument, rotated at constant speed by a clock in the British type instru­
ment and by a relaxation oscillator in the United States radio meteorograph, 
makes connection with a fixed contact and with variable contacts, which are 
moved by the parts of the meteorograph whose readings are desired. The trans­
mitter in the air and receiver on the ground are set accordingly, and the instru­
ment is calibrated in terms of the time interval between the fixed and variable 
contacts. Several years of preliminary experimentation preceded the actual 
beginning of routine use of the radio meteorograph as a replacement for airplane 
observations. Development of the meteorograph, as was the case with numerous 
other inventions, was not confined to any one country. In 1918 and 1921 scien­
tists in France and Germany had developed such instruments, though not without
the need of further refinement. In 1922 Major Edward Blair of this country
103
concluded a twenty-minute flight. French scientists obtained several success­
ful observations later in the decade, but a Russian designed the most successful 
instrument prior to the middle thirties. Finnish attempts were also conducted
103 New York Times. November 17, 1935, sec. X, p. 4.
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at the time. A. E. Bent and K. 0. Lange, Harvard scientists, developed in 1935
a radio meteorograph weighing three pounds and designed to record barometric
104.
pressure, temperature, and humidity. Test flights were completed in 1935
105
at Fairbanks, Alaska. Weather Bureau employees and scientists from Massachus­
etts Institute of Technology also tested sets during 1936 in the West Indies. 
Relative humidity was recorded in the early meteorographs by means of an element 
of hair, preferably blond, which, however, was not accurate. Temperature was 
traced through its effects upon a bimetallic coil. Since World War II, lithium 
chloride strips have provided a much improved means of humidity measurement. 
Temperature was later obtained through use of a capillary tube and electrolyte. 
Barometric pressure is recorded by expansion or contraction of a metal capsule, 
an aneroid type barometer.
One of the major problems at first was to determine a means of inter­
preting on the ground the radio signals transmitted by the instrument while in 
flight. The problem was to refine the instrument's operations so that it would 
give a continuous record of temperature and also contact breaks which would give 
humidity and occur at predetermined pressure levels. Harry Diamond of the 
National Bureau of Standards was assigned this task. Many other problems faced 
the early experimenters. Protection from cold was provided by enclosing the 
instrument, except for the temperature element, in some transparent material, 
which allowed the sun's heat to penetrate. Insulation, such as balsawood and 
chemical heating, was introduced for night observations. Direction-finding was
104 New York Times. November 17, 1935, sec. X, p. 4.
105 New York Times. March 31, 1935, sec. XI, p. 16.
106 Gharles B. Pear, Jr., "Balloons for Weather Forecasting," Science. Digest. 
vol. 3 (Chicago, January, 1938), p. 6.
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unsatisfactory at first. By 1937 signals, received on the ground, were put 
through relay circuits to operate a recorder, one type of which was designed by 
Dr. Lange. Of the upper—air difficulties, icing proved particularly hart to 
overcome. Temperature readings were sometimes too high, which forced a change 
in the calibration charts. The blame for such errors was ascribed to the sun's 
rays upon the instrument at the noon observation.10^
The radio meteorograph, however, despite all difficulties, proved from 
the beginning the answer to the problem of upper-level analysis in weather 
science. The pilot balloon provided wind data only, while airplane observations 
endangered many lives and at best produced data at altitudes of 16,000 to 20,000 
feet. The radio meteorograph, however, even in early experiments, rose to an 
average of 50,000 feet, usually without regard to weather. In these days, before 
the invention of jet aircraft, meteorologists seldom calculated that even higher 
altitudes would ever be attained. Radio meteorograph observations, which cost 
$25 to $30 each, proved somewhat cheaper than airplane observations. In Septem­
ber, 1937, radio meteorographs replaced airplane observations over Boston.108 
C. F. Brooks and his fellow workers at Blue Hill Observatory had completed test 
runs from 44,000 to 79,000 feet. While the Harvard instrument was tried at 
Boston, another radio meteorograph, this one developed by scientists at Califor­
nia Institute of Technology, was used at Burbank, starting in September, 1937.
A year later plans were completed for daily observations at Fargo, Nashville, 
Oakland, Oklahoma City, Omaha, and Sault Ste. Marie.10^
The six radio meteorograph stations of the Weather Bureau and one each 
manned by Navy and Army personnel finally late in 1938 began daily reports which
107 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. September, 1939, and June, 1941.
108 New York Times. July 18, 1937, sec. II, p. 4.
109 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. February, 1938.
ir
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were aided by the use of a new number code for these particular observations and 
for the few remaining airplane observations. In November, 1938, the term "radio 
meteorograph" was dropped and the "radiosonde" substituted."^ Meteorologists, 
when speaking among themselves, quickly shortened this to the raob. During 
fiscal year 194-0, the radiosonde completely replaced airplane observations."^^ 
From 1940 to 194-1 thirty-four radiosonde stations were taking the daily observa­
tions at noonj just prior to World War II this program was expanded, as a defense
measure, to observations twice daily at 12:30 p.ro. and 11:00 p.m., Eastern 
112
Standard Time.
Other changes in observational techniques, in addition to the introduc­
tion of the radiosonde, occurred just before American entry into World War II.
Ey 1940 one hundred-gram pilot balloons, uninflated weight, were provided at over 
forty stations. These larger balloons ascend at the rate of 1,000 feet per 
minute, instead of the 600 feet per minute rate of the 30 gram balloons, and, 
when ceilings do not interfere, provide data from higher altitudes. Ten-gram bal-t 
loons came to be utilized particularly for determination of ceiling height. Hel­
ium replaced the dangerous hydrogen for all balloon inflation, and, mainly because
of the fire hazard, electric light units were used instead of candles in night
113pilot-balloon flights. New mercury barometers, which made possible better 
surface reports, were also supplied to numerous stations.
Improvements in observations made possible better aviation forecasts. 
Nevertheless, the service remained the target for complaints about the inadequacy 
of such reports. Throughout the struggle for more money to keep abreast with
110 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. November, 1938.
111 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1939-1940. p. 7.
112 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1940-1941. p. 138.
113 Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. August, 1939.
114 Weather Bureau, Annual Report, 1938-1939. p. 5. Sixty-two stations received 
them.
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aviation, Weather Bureau and aviation spokesmen cited aircraft accidents to sup­
port their requests.^ Six major air crashes occurred during the October, 
1936-February, 1937, period, five of which were distinctly associated with 
weather. Chief Gregg inferred that faulty observations from offices without 
commissioned Weather Bureau employees contributed to such dangers. In 1937 
Colonel Edgar S. Gorell, president of the Air Transport Association, appearing 
before both House and Senate appropriation committees, urged additional funds for 
the Weather Bureau."^ Gorell believed that insufficient weather reports caused 
many accidents. Approximately thirty-two percent of all flying, he pointed out
upon questioning, was performed by scheduled airlines, the rest by other private
117
interests and by the military. Department of Commerce figures for the first
six months of 1937 were cited in 1938 by Chief Gregg to show that weather was
318
the cause of twenty-five percent of the accidents on scheduled airlines. Air­
craft personnel were blamed for an additional twenty percent. Weather was 
blamed for eight percent of unscheduled airline accidents, including military and 
private flights, with personnel receiving blame for fifty-one percent of the 
crashes on unscheduled flights. Representative Clarence Cannon of Missouri at­
tempted in 1938 to use the same argument about accidents to prove that recent
119
additional funds did not help the situation. He concluded that, although the 
Weather Bureau was given $56,000 for fiscal 1938 to place a commissioned employee 
at some thirty supplementary stations, the increase in accidents since that time
115 75th Congress, 1st Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1938, p. 159 (March 12, 1937).
116 75th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1938, p. 820 (1937).
117 75th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1938, p. 828 (1937).
118 75th Congress, 3d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1939, pp. 189-190 (February 2, 1938).
119 75th Congress, 3d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1939, p. 188 (February 2, 1938).
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demonstrated that such efforts were useless.
The Weather Bureau received considerable criticism for alleged faulty
observational data at Kirksville, Missouri, involving the air crash in May, 1935,
which caused the death of Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico* Senator Royal
Copeland, chairman of a subcommittee investigating the accident, felt certain
120
that the Cutting plane crashed because of inadequate weather reports. Chief 
Gregg testified in 1938 at Senate appropriations hearings that the ceiling light 
used at the time was effective only to an altitude of 3,000 feet, implying a 
deficiency caused by inadequate appropriations. Improved ceiling lights, pro­
viding readings up to 10,000 feet, were given to most stations later in the 
thirties.
Pilots in other instances blamed weather reports for a share of their 
difficulties. They particularly complained of reassuring radio weather reports, 
whereas the pilot would in reality encounter storms. A portion of this crit­
icism obviously should have been directed at the shortcomings of weather fore­
casting in general. An airway forecaster at Chicago or Washington, D.C., cannot, 
even in 1956, be instantly aware of every local thunderstorm in his district. 
In-flight pilot reports, made possible by the introduction of two-way radio 
shortly before World War II, materially reduced this problem of keeping up to the 
minute with actual flight conditions. Since World War II, radar has also proved 
valuable in tracing storms.
120 74th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1937, p. 61 (1936).
121 75th Congress, 3d Session, Senate Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1939, pp. 112-113 (1938).
122 New York Times. February 25, 1934, sec. VIII, p. 9.
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In addition to the criticism from aviation interests, the Weather 
Bureau faced another dilemma. One of the major difficulties encountered before 
Congress was that aerological expenditures were outstripping funds for general 
weather services. Former Chief Marvin had been denied numerous increases for 
aviation services because of this growing rivalry of agriculture and commercial 
interests with the young "upstart" aviation. To further complicate matters, the 
Weather Bureau remained in the Department of Agriculture, while other aviation 
subsidies, such as those for communications facilities and aeronautical regula­
tions, came from the Department of Commerce. This feeling against aviation 
service was vividly reflected by Representative Cannon’s remarks "You know ag­
riculture out of the goodness of its heart has taken in also this stepchild of 
aerology." Even some Weather Bureau employees felt that too much emphasis
had been diverted toward aviation to the neglect of the other weather service 
12/
interests. In 1940 the Weather Bureau was transferred to the Department of 
Commerce. The transfer merely recognized the fact that Weather Bureau service to 
aviation had come to surpass, so far as appropriations were concerned, aid to 
agriculture or to any other economic activity. It was only reasonable to place 
the Weather Bureau in the department responsible for aviation expenditures. Ser­
vice to agriculture, however, has not suffered as a result of the change, as is
125demonstrated in the preceding chapter.
The Weather Bureau could not properly be blamed for inadequate aviation 
weather service during 1934-1938. Weather Bureau officials were the first to 
realize the incompleteness of the system and presented annual increases in budget
123 75th Congress, 3d Session, House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1939, p. 224 (February 2, 1938).
124 Hew York Times. August 12, 1934, sec. VIII, p. 8.
125 S6e p. 221.
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estimates. That airlines commenced in the middle thirties to hire their own 
meteorologists was not primarily because the Weather Bureau service was poor.
Pan American Airway1s station in Iceland was at a location lacking Weather Bureau 
service of any kind. The airline meteorologist, moreover, had and still has 
many tasks to perform apart from obtaining observational data and forecasts, 
either from his own observations or from the Weather Bureau. For example, fuel 
supply for a flight is correlated with expected wind conditions.
The aviation weather service, established under the Air Commerce Act 
of 1926, principally benefited, as already noted, the continual and rapid growth 
of commercial flying in the United States. Although military meteorological 
units were created, Army and Navy pilots also continued at times to receive use­
ful forecasts from the Weather Bureau. Private pilots also often sought Weather 
Bureau aid. However, inasmuch as Department of Commerce regulations, such as 
ceiling restrictions, do not generally apply to the private pilot, there has 
usually been much less coordination between private pilots and government 
meteorologists.
Transoceanic flights, balloon races or test observations, and dirigible
flights, however, constitute a major exception to the above statement. Perhaps
the Weather Bureau*s busiest early period for special aviation forecasts was in
May, 1927, when several ace American fliers were making plans for a transatlantic
126
flight competition. Captain Charles Lindbergh, one of the contestants, bnH 
earlier in 1927 found Weather Bureau forecasters of much assistance in his trans-
126 Lindbergh, The Spirit, pp. 131-132, 137, 167
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continental flight from California eastward. Lindbergh, prior to his Atlantic
crossing, consulted J. H. Kimball of the Weather Bureau in New York, but Admiral
R. E. Byrd, much to Chief Marvin's disgust, decided to let Navy meteorologist
127
Francis W. Reichelderfer tell him when to commence his flight. Chief Marvin 
did not approve the procedure, stating that since the trip was a civilian under­
taking, the Weather Bureau should issue the forecasts. Byrd decided to allay 
Marvin's fears, and reassured the weather service head that he probably would not 
use the Navy meteorologist at all. Lindbergh was able to complete his prepara­
tions and leave for Europe ahead of his rivals, but, although he had obtained
Kimball's daily weather forecasts for the situation over the Atlantic, he did not
128
wait for a final Weather Bureau confirmation of good weather. Kimball, his
superior J, H. Scarr, and other Weather Bureau scientists, indeed, were surprised
that Lindbergh left when he did, since in their judgment his departure was at
129
least twelve hours too soon. Central Office officials maintained that the 
only Weather Bureau forecasts Lindbergh received on May 19, were the ones issued 
by Scarr's New York office. When once out over the Atlantic, Lindbergh en­
countered the fog and rain which the Weather Bureau had anticipated. He was with­
out radio and carried only a recording barograph to help determine altitude; he 
obtained, of course, no additional weather reports during the gruelling journey. 
He detoured around thunderheads during the night and helped keep awake by darting 
in and out of decks of clouds. Unfortunately for the Weather Bureau, excited
127 Admiral R. E. Byrd to Secretary of Agriculture, April 5, 1927; Marvin to 
Byrd, April 15, 1927; Marvin to Reichelderfer, April 25, 1927, Byrd to 
Marvin, April 25, 1927, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
128 Lindbergh, Spirit. p. 386.
129 J. H, Scarr, to Marvin, May 24, 1927; E. B. Calvert to Scarr, May 27, 1927; 
Scarr to Marvin, June 2, 1927, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
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press descriptions of this first successful transatlantic solo flight indicated 
that the weather had not been as predicted. Scarr and his coworkers were 
shocked i
From his own account /Scarr wrote/ it seems to have been exactly as we 
gave it to all contestants, press associations, and newspapers...
Low over New Brunswick Thursday a.m., fog and rain with freezing 
temperatures beyond Newfoundland. We are willing to remain a silent 
partner but after such long service for this job it i s a  little dis­
appointing to be mentioned only in a disparaging way.
The New York Weather Bureau office, however, received belated credit from the
press when the same meteorologists in June, 1927, aided Clarence Chamberlain’s
Atlantic flight.
During these transatlantic attempts Kimball and Scarr worked overtime
131and obtained special radio reports from as many ships as possible. J Radio 
Corporation of America furnished free service in collecting these two daily ship 
observations. Wind, pressure, sky condition, and precipitation were reported at 
noon and midnight, Greenwich time. However, reports east of mid-ocean were lack­
ing for the Lindbergh flight. The United States later requested forty-eight-hour 
forecasts from Great Britain in preparation for the Byrd flight of June 29-30, 
1927. A particular concern of the Weather Bureau was the sudden storms in the 
vicinity of Greenland which were regarded as one of the worst hazards of the 
Atlantic hop. Pilots, aided by Bureau forecasts of Greenland weather, could re­
main on the lookout for low-pressure centers by watching their altimeter, which
132
would show a rise to indicate a falling barometer. In these days before the 
absolute altimeter, pilots had to seek a standard height of flight near the stir- 
face of the water in order to check pressure change. Chamberlain shifted his
130 Scarr to Marvin, May 24, 1927, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
131 New York Times. June 19, 1927, sec. VIII, p. 6.
132 New York Times. June 19, 1927, sec. VIII, p. 6.
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course twice to avoid storm areas. The Weather Bureau was the victim of ill- 
founded rumors that it had refused aid to the ill-fated Nungesser-Coli attempt 
at an east-to-west Atlantic flight, but received due credit for aid to Lindbergh's 
flight to Mexico in December, 1927. R. Hanson Weightman, forecaster at Washing­
ton, D.C., had issued detailed forecasts, Including wind data for between 1,000 
and 5,000 feet. Twenty-seven hours after leaving Washington, Lindbergh touched 
down at Mexico City. He had been lost for some time over Mexico. Weightman 
had predicted cloudy skies and occasional rain. Lindbergh told reporters:
"The Weather Bureau did not promise me good weather and they were entirely ac-
133
curate....They had called for fog, showers, and rain, and I got them all."
The Weather Bureau was, however, allotted no extra funds for such ex­
tended aid to transatlantic flights. During 1927 its fund for miscellaneous 
services was depleted in providing these special aviation reports. Chief Marvin 
suggested, without success, an appropriation for oceanic aviation service, to 
provide extra forecasters at New York and New Orleans and increased radio facil­
ities for obtaining two observations per day from fifty ships at sea.^^ Marvinfe 
plan, calling for $100,000, was rejected. Private flights would, indeed, have 
been the sole beneficiaries of such anacpanded program, as commercial transat­
lantic flights from the Unites States were over a decade away. Reports from the 
sea were still lacking at the time of the flights of the German dirigible, the 
Graf Zeppelin, in 1929, which deficiency greatly handicapped Kimball in his at­
tempts to provide the best possible forecasts. Meteorologists hoped that the 
Graf Zeppelin's trip from New York to Friedrichshafen would be the last Atlantic
133 New York Times. December 14, 1927, p. 3.
134 New York Times. January 8, 1928, p. 8.
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135crossing undertaken with such meager knowledge of weather conditions.
A cooperative international plan, for providing more weather observa­
tions by radio from ships at sea to weather services in Europe and the United 
States, was discussed in 1929 before a meeting of the International Meteorological 
Organization at Copenhagen. * Germany, Great Britain, France, and the United 
States would have delegated the duties of three daily observations to a total of 
twenty-five ships at sea at all times. The plan was dropped, however, probably 
because of the high expense which would have been involved and the fear that 
the necessary appropriations could not be obtained. The efforts of the I.M.O. 
were turned instead toward improving the daily exchange of land observations 
throughout the Northern Hemisphere. Private pilots, in the meantime, continued 
to attempt ocean crossings, with Weather Bureau meteorologists providing as 
much pertinent data as possible. By the end of the flying season of 1931, nearly 
500 people had crossed the Atlantic by air; transatlantic flights included the 
record-breaking hop of the airplane, Cane Cod, and the round-the-world journey
of Wiley Post and Harold Gatty in the Winnie Mae, with Kimball providing fore-
137casts for both these undertakings. The famous aviatrix Amelia Earhart Putnam 
was one of many who received Weather Bureau help. Kimball, in recognition of his 
aid to aviation, was the recipient of French and Italian honors, as well as the 
Doctor of Science degree from Michigan State University. Ocean data were still
135 New York Times. September 1, 1929, pp. 1, 5, 14j 70th Congress, 2d Session, 
House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, Hearings on...for fiscal 
1930, p. 92 (November 19, 1928).
136 New York Times. September 22, 1929, p. 22.
137 New York Times. May 29, 1932, sec. IX, p. 8; "The Man Behind Ocean Flight 
Heroes," Popular Mechanics Magazine, vol. 57 (Chicago, February, 1932),
p. 281; Weather Bureau, Topics and Personnel. January, 1931; January, 1934.
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inadequate in 1936, during the period when the German Zeppelin, the Hindenbure.
138
was completing the several ocean crossings which preceded its final crash.
Kimball, after hearing complaints regarding the scarcity of ocean observations, 
recalled that he had warned the Germans that their course was well south of his 
sources of data. The Weather Bureau again tried to alleviate the situation, 
especially in the South Atlantic, on this occasion through the cooperation of 
eighteen radio-equipped freighters of the American Export line. Weather Bureau 
employees instructed freighter personnel of the correct procedure in taking ob­
servations. Apparently the close connection of the Weather Bureau with the
American Export Line did not suit one airline whose officials described it as a
139publicity stunt in behalf of the transport firm.
Meteorologists throughout the world were beginning to realize the 
necessity of a program for aiding transatlantic flights. Several meteorological 
conferences were held during 1937-1939, with one in Dublin, March, 1938, entirely 
devoted to the Atlantic p r o b l e m . S o m e  observational data were collected for 
the Weather Bureau in one cooperative effort by Pan American planes, which car­
ried bureau meteorographs to give continuous records of temperature, humidity, 
and pressure. Plans were still in the preliminary stages when interrupted by 
the decision of Great Britain and France to challenge Adolf Hitler in regard to 
his designs on Poland, which led to World War II and the breakdown in the exchange 
of weather data.
138 New York Times. May 19, 1936, p. 25*
139 New York Times. December 1, 1937, p. 12 j Pan American Airways to E. B. 
Calvert, October 10, 1938, Weather Bureau Correspondence.
140 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1937-1938. p. 2j Weather Bureau, Annual
Report. 1938-1939. p. 4.
288
The outlying possessions of the United States in the Pacific meanwhile 
shared to a degree in the airway program of the period. Aviation weather service 
for Alaska, where several synoptic stations, the non-aviation type of city of­
fices, had since 1917 been regularly reporting weather observations to the West 
Coast, was commenced in 1 9 3 1 . The program for aviation service in Alaska, 
after the first appropriation of $26,695, remained static until 1936, when inter­
departmental plans for expansion were begun. E. B. Calvert traveled to Alaska 
for the Weather Bureau in 1937 to help coordinate the accelerated service. By 
1939 approximately 100 airway-reporting stations were operating in Alaska and
Hawaii, and this number was greatly expanded with the increase in the danger of
l/o
involvement of the United States in World War II. These services, however, 
were slight in relation to the vast areas involved, since from the early thir­
ties the emphasis in international aviation meteorology had been on the Atlantic 
143
Ocean, and the Weather Bureau in 194-1 was no better prepared to handle weather 
service on the vast Pacific Ocean than were American military and naval forces 
to face the Japanese in the same region.
Numerous technological advances emerging from World War II have in­
creased the accuracy of the aviation weather service. However, many of the most 
permanently useful practices pre-date the 1939-194-5 struggle. Four developments 
of the period between the wars stand out as particularly significant. The Air 
Commerce Act of 1926 resulted in Weather Bureau service on a twenty-four-hour 
basis, a boon to all types of forecasting. Teletype communications enabled the 
weather service to gather and send data at frequent intervals throughout its
141 70th Congress, 2d Session, House Subcommittee on Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on.•.for fiscal 1931, p. 102 (November 20, 1929).
142 Weather Bureau, Annual Report. 1938-1939. p. 7,* 1939-1940. p. 6.
143 70th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on...for fiscal 1930, p. 294 (1929).
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widespread network of stations. Radio communication from station to pilot pre­
sented the flier with valuable information throughout the trip. Finally, and 
most important of all, the radiosonde observation provided meteorologists with 
detailed upper-air data which had heretofore been unobtainable.
290
CHAPTER XI 
Conclusion
The development of meteorological instruments had advanced by 1870 
to the point where scientists were able to measure the major elements of weather, 
that is, wind, precipitation, barometric pressure, temperature, and relative 
humidity. Numerous studies of previous storms revealed the important relation­
ships of low barometric pressure, usually accompanied by storms, and high 
barometric pressure which customarily was associated with fair weather. Synoptic 
charts aided in this analysis of the behavior of weather. Meteorologists for­
mulated theories of general circulation, the total pattern of high and low-pres­
sure areas, as well as convection, which, with the preceding factors, explained 
the origin of changing weather conditions in local regions.
The collection of weather data on a systematic basis became widespread 
before meteorologists turned to the forecasting of future conditions. In the 
United States the Office of the Surgeon-General, the General Land Office, and the 
Snithsonian Institution established such observation programs for the federal 
government, while several state, municipal, and private organizations for the 
same purpose engaged in similar operations. The perfection and practical appli­
cation of telegraphy about the mid-nineteenth century provided meteorologists 
with current data which enabled them to predict the forward movement of weather 
phenomena. Foremost of these efforts in predictions were those of Cleveland 
Abbe, director of the Cincinnati Observatory, and I. A. Lapham, private meteor­
ologist at Milwaukee. Congress became sufficiently convinced of the possibility 
and value of weather forecasting that in 1870 it established the national weather 
service under the Army Signal Service.
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The Signal Service, with the aid of Abbe and Lapham, established the 
field stations, schedule of observations, and services to the public, including 
uniform collection of weather records and daily forecasting, which were later 
retained by the civilian Weather Bureau. Scandal and strife within the military 
structure of the early national weather service caused its transfer in 1891 to 
civilian control under the Department of Agriculture; it was henceforth known as 
the Weather Bureau. Civilian operation did not immediately rid the weather ser­
vice of internal struggle as Chief Mark Harrington was removed in 1895 after 
political misunderstandings with Secretary of Agriculture J, Sterling Morton,
Chief Willis L. Moore during 1895-1913 led the Weather Bureau through 
an unparalleled expansion of services and research. He improved the flood and 
hurricane services, and, through rigid administrative regulations, promoted only 
the most successful forecasters. Significant achievements were made in observa­
tions of the upper air, evaporation, climatology, and the exchange of weather 
data on an international basis. However, Chief Moore's vigorous leadership 
created extreme discontent in the Bureau and Congress which resulted in much 
criticism and several investigations. Moore's use of government funds and pres­
tige in an attempt to become Secretary of Agriculture led to his removal from 
office in 1913 by President Woodrow Wilson.
The dismissal of Moore brought an end to the periodic internal insta­
bility which had plagued the nation's weather service from its very inception. 
Chiefs C. F. Marvin, Willis R. Gregg, and F. W. Reichelderfer successfully led 
the Bureau to a general modernization of facilities. A fire-weather service was 
organized while the hurricane and river-flood systems were re-organized and 
communications and instrumentation improved. Bureau meteorologists turned to the
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study of air-mass analysis with the resulting improvement of general forecasts, 
especially those covering precipitation. Four daily forecasts, instead of two, 
and the popular five-day forecast were also inaugurated late in this period. 
Original research was lacking during the 1913-194.1 ®ra, but the Weather Bureau 
cooperated with several scientific expeditions by loaning men and equipment.
New Deal funds provided the beginnings of a sorely-needed program for the proces­
sing of past data. In addition to the progress already noted, regular forecasts 
for aviation were inaugurated at the end of World War I while an elaborate net­
work of airport stations was established after adoption in 1926 of the M r  
Commerce Act. This governmental subsidization of aeronautics resulted in the 
aviation services of the Weather Bureau surpassing those activities aiding com­
mercial, agricultural, and maritime interests. This development led in 1940 to 
the transfer of the Weather Bureau to the Department of Commerce, the agency in 
control of aviation and also of the communications facilities used by the 
Weather Bureau. However, all phases of meteorology benefited from aid to avia­
tion. For example, twenty-four-hour service was now available to the public, and 
improved observations by the radiosonde gave better analysis of the upper air in 
addition to improved forecasts at the surface. The teletype, introduced to con­
nect airway stations, also improved communications in all branches of the 
Weather Bureau.
The special services of the Weather Bureau, seldom recognized by lay­
men, were represented by a gradual increase in efficiency. By 1941 this type of 
aid, including warning of hurricanes, floods, frost, and forest fires, annually 
saved Americans more money than the Weather Bureau’s total costs. On the negative 
side, probably the greatest deficiency of the Weather Bureau in 1941 was the
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limited use of the countless past climatological records for frequency data use­
ful to many phases of agriculture and industry. Since World War II the Weather 
Bureau and private meteorologists have made advances toward the solution of this 
problem.
The status of Bureau activity prior to American entry into World War II 
was primarily the same as it remains today. Exceptions to this generalization 
appear mainly in the realm of instrumentation; engineers since 1941 have developed 
radar for the detection of storms and an elaboration of the radiosonde, the 
rawinsonde, which also collects wind data. Airplanes also use these devices in 
tracking hurricanes. Among the innovations since World War II is the thirty-day 
outlook, which attempts to compare with the normal weather conditions the general 
prospects for temperature and precipitation in the various areas of the country. 
Increased appropriations since World War II have, of course, resulted in quanti­
tative expansion of all branches and a consequent improvement in their services. 
One of the costly innovations is American participation in the international 
weather service on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. In the past few years 
meteorologists have taken initial steps, involving the use of electronic com­
puters, which they hope will lead to more rapid and accurate analysis of weather 
data for use in forecasting.
All of these innovations represent improvements, but do not eliminate 
severalcf the basic shortcomings of meteorology. In 1941» indeed, as today, 
forecasters in the Weather Bureau, Air Force, or in private business are all faoed 
with situations for which there is no perfect prognostication. For example, 
sudden cloudiness prevents the maximum temperature from reaching a given figure 
on a certain day, winter or summer. Sudden changes in frontal or pressure move-
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ments sometimes leave a large portion of one state with a minimum temperature ten 
degrees above the expected and without that predicted blanket of snow. This does 
not mean that the Weather Bureau has failed to progress as rapidly as possible. 
Accuracy of daily forecasts in 1941 and today remains at approximately eighty- 
five percent, a level which probably will not significantly improve for many 
years. Perhaps —  although this is pure speculation— any great improvement in 
forecasts will come only from observations of outer space.
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